This project began as an interest in al-Sādāt’s 1977 peace initiative and sought to capture an elusive rhetorical dimension of al-Sādāt’s Knesset address, which I first recognized as exemplary and savvy presidential rhetoric and then as a strategic fusion of epideictic and deliberative rhetoric. Little did I realize that I was intrigued by the invisible presence of a culturally inflected peacemaking practice called ṣulḥ, especially as it intersects with and is potentially eclipsed by diplomatic discourse. *Shades of Šulḥ* moves beyond this early interest in al-Sādāt’s Knesset address and explicates the variegated nature and flexibility of ṣulḥ practices using a variety of illustrative cases. Because our world continues to be beleaguered by violence, this book addresses a great need. The study of ṣulḥ practices contributes to a better understanding of our collective history of peacemaking practices, shedding light on untapped resources of peacemaking.

*Shades of Šulḥ* responds to two interrelated sets of questions. First, the book engages the questions of violence and peace. Second, the book is equally energized by and engages other enduring dilemmas in rhetoric and composition studies. For example, it addresses questions raised by calls to revisit the rhetorical tradition, which invite us to “study the rhetoric of traditions—the ways that political parties, ethnic groups, social movements,
and other discourse communities constitute and maintain the shared values
and assumptions that authorize discourse” (Miller 26). These two seem-
ingly dissimilar lines of inquiry interrelate in this book, which responds to
a long-standing, cross-cultural, disciplinary investment in rhetoric’s poten-
tial for countering violence—an investment revived in rhetorical scholar-
ship, especially since World War II. The book also responds to increased
attention to the rhetorics of reconciliation around the world. This increased
attention is indicated, for example, by rhetorical studies of South Africa’s
Truth and Reconciliation Commission and transitional justice (Doxtader,
*With Faith;* Mack, *From Apartheid*). Scholarship on the rhetorics of recon-
ciliation and peacemaking, however, remains informed mainly by Judeo-
Christian models of peacemaking. This gap dovetails with yet another. To
date, there is no book-length rhetorical exploration of Arab-Islamic rhetor-
ics, let alone of Arab-Islamic rhetorics of reconciliation.

Seizing the opportunity to address both gaps, this book explicates the
ways in which *ṣułḥ* is a cultural, rhetorically mediated resource for peace
that complements and extends our scholarship on Arabic rhetoric and the
rhetorics of peacemaking and reconciliation. To address these two inter-
related areas of research, the book argues that *ṣułḥ* taps into the potential
of rhetoric in numerous ways to counter violence. Like restorative justice
models (i.e., nonpunitive justice measures), *ṣułḥ* provides us with a critique
against violence/conflict and articulates a critique for justice and peace.
Uniquely, however, it organizes the work of peace pursuers and (a) initi-
ates peacemaking using forgiveness, apology, or simply a commitment to
make amends; (b) interpellates a community that pursues peace; and (c)
names witnesses to the peace process as a way to foreground the discourse
of accountability. As such, *ṣułḥ* engages the dialectic of conflict and conflict
resolution.

To engage research on peacemaking rhetorics and on rhetorical tradi-
tions, the book is informed by and draws on a variety of bodies of literature.
In addition to rhetoric and communication studies, two growing areas of
inquiry inform this project, namely comparative and cultural rhetorics and
peace studies. Together, these bodies of literature inform the book’s explo-
ration of the shades of *ṣułḥ* and inform the analysis of the cases studied.

**THE RHETORIC OF VIOLENCE AND THE VIOLENCE OF RHETORIC: FINDING AN ANTIDOTE?**

The phenomenon of violence has attracted the attention of researchers
from different disciplinary walks (Lawrence and Karim). Similarly, the
relation among violence, justice, and rhetoric continues to raise enduring
questions. A vibrant stream of scholarship testifies to a persistent need
and ongoing exploration, especially since World War II. This scholarship includes most recently the 2013 forum on violence (Engels) and numerous articles on specific forms of violence, such as gendered or racialized violence (e.g., McCann, “Entering the Darkness”; “On Whose Ground?”). This growing scholarship demonstrates yet again that rhetoric and violence can be neither reduced to the assumption that rhetoric is/enables violence nor that rhetoric is readily antithetical to violence. We see daily this inextricable, intricate connection in violent and often militarized, yet normalized, metaphors we live by (Tiles) when we “take a stab” at a project or, in our own disciplinary discourses, in “violent metaphors we use to conceptualize argumentation and debate: as battle, strife, and war” (Engels, “Introduction” 180).

The complex, subtle, and incessant relation among violence, justice, and rhetoric energizes scholarship, which explores the violence of rhetoric and the rhetoric of violence and invites further consideration of the responsibilities of rhetoric and rhetoric studies. For example, Erin J. Rand urges, “Our work should be driven by this tenuous balance between, on one hand, the responsibility to criticize violence and alleviate real suffering and, on the other hand, the necessity of considering the productive potential of violence” (475–76), which can catalyze solidarity, strategic thinking, and deep reflection on cultural norms that anticipate/support the emergence, normalization, and sustenance of violence. Accordingly, scholars have paid attention to power (ab)use (e.g., Burbules; Foucault); (coercive) silencing, exclusionary practices, the politics of persuasion, and power relations embedded in genres; and discursive practices and expectations (e.g., Foss and Griffin; Gearhart; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca). In addition, scholars have sought ways to better understand linguistic violence (e.g., Gorsevski “The Physical”; Hallet; Tiles), counter rhetorical hegemony, and enable the move toward understanding and more equitable rhetorical interaction that would realize, for example, the duty to dialogue (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca) or an ideal speech situation (Habermas).

In addition to scholarship motivated by the critique against violence, there is a growing body of literature on the rhetoric of peacemaking, reconciliation, and human rights. This scholarship intersects with peace studies and calls for a systematic study of “discursive opportunities” or “discursive spaces for peace” (Bruck; Rivenburgh). This work seeks to underline facilitative conditions as well as reflective, communicative practices that seek and promote identification, cooperation, and duties to dialogue, listen, assume prudence, and reflect on and embrace silence (e.g., Booth; Burke; Crosswhite; Glenn; Kelley; Ratcliffe). All seek to develop nonadversarial rhetorical skills and stances. They also suggest ways interlocutors can
develop/embrace more peaceful communicative practices while affirming their right to dignity, as in Gerard Hauser’s *Prisoners of Conscience*, claiming their grievances and resisting being co-opted (Gorsevski, “Nonviolent”; *Peaceable Persuasion*).

With increasing scholarly attention to (racial) reconciliation, transitional justice, and truth and reconciliation commissions (e.g., Beitler, *Remaking Transitional Justice*; Doxtader, *With Faith*; Hatch, *Race and Reconciliation*; Mack, *From Apartheid*), rhetoric scholars and others have seized this opportunity to shed light on the exigence, limitations, and potentials of rhetoric and reconciliatory interventions. Their work critiques the limited relational payoff of apologia and the need for national apologies (Hatch, “Beyond Apologia”), dutiful listening to grievance claims (Tully), or confessional accounts—as a measure of (transitional) justice—that promise but often fail to recognize, let alone heal, the harm done to victims (Doxtader, “A Question of Confession’s Discovery”). This attention to the rhetorics of reconciliation, rights, and witnessing is manifest in books and edited collections on memory and forgetting (Phillips, *Framing Public Memory*; Vivian, *Public Forgetting*), the *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* special issue on traditions of testimony and witnessing (Lyon and Olson), and Arabella Lyon’s *Deliberative Acts*. This work invites an exploration of modes of deliberation and reconciliation in different cultural traditions, an area of scholarship that must claim much more of our disciplinary attention.

**INVISIBLE RHETORICAL TRADITIONS AND REVISIONARY HISTORIOGRAPHY: REVISITING ARABIC RHETORIC**

This book is equally informed by calls to revisit our conception of the “rhetorical tradition” (e.g., Miller) and calls to explore rhetorical practices and theories around the globe (e.g., Lipson and Binkley, *Rhetoric Before and Beyond; Ancient Non-Greek Rhetorics*). These calls seek to further disciplinary reflection by “interrogat[ing] how our own dispositions and epistemologies shape our perceptions of the past and press us toward new methodologies and sites of inquiry” (Agnew, Gries, and Stuckey 110). These calls have energized two hard-to-separate bodies of scholarship. The first focuses on historiography and its impact on how we account for, represent, envision, and pass down rhetoric. The second attends to the intersection of culture and rhetoric. I address each of these bodies of literature briefly to underline how both invite and inform my exploration of Arab-Islamic rhetorics and the rhetorics of şulḥ.

Increasingly, scholars have been calling for rigorous reflection on the ways we tell and are informed by the history of rhetoric and its development.
Recognizing the process/product of writing history as a political enterprise, James Berlin underscored the importance of critical reflection, explaining that “historians must become aware of the rhetoricity of their own enterprise, rhetoric here being designated as the uses of language in play of power” (cited in Murphy et al. 6). The rhetoricity of the history of rhetoric impacts—if not determines—our selection of texts, rhetors, and communicative spaces/activities we consider worthy of rhetorical exploration. Our attention to this rhetoricity foregrounds a question. As Victor Vitanza puts it, “The central question is one of whose interests, in a given history, are being served and whose are being deflected or forgotten” (324). Scholarship explicating the rhetoricity of the history of rhetoric and its far-reaching, formative impact, therefore, invites increased attention to un(der)recognized assumptions that influence how we perceive of, define, represent, and study rhetoric. In turn, this question has energized scholarship that sheds light on, recovers, and questions the invisibility of texts, rhetors, and whole regions of enduring rhetorical knowledge and practice.

Not only does this scholarship pay attention to historiographic methods and typology (Vitanza), but it also attends to our rhetorical landscapes (e.g., Glenn, “Remapping”; Royster, “Disciplinary Landscapes”), which illuminate what is deflected and forgotten. Reflective attention to such landscapes helps reveal how space, location, and position inform how we other rhetorically. With the goal of recovering what is forgotten or ignored and increasing disciplinary reflection, Jacqueline Jones Royster (“Disciplinary Landscapes”), for example, provides a multidimensional framework that models and guides the process of rereading, revisiting our uptake of rhetoric’s history, and rewriting our rhetorical histories. Royster’s model entails shifting where we stand, shifting rhetorical subjects, shifting the circle of practice, and shifting the theoretical framework. The growing recognition of such possibilities has resulted in vibrant feminist and revisionist historical research, which calls for and models increased self-reflexive attention to what and who is excluded (archives, rhetors, texts, peoples, traditions, and practices) and how. This investment in the histories and historiographies of rhetoric continues to grow and to chart paths seldom frequented.

Alongside these developments, scholarly attention has been focused on the intersection of culture and rhetoric. This line of research attempts to counter the invisibility of culture and increase commitment to (a) shed light on invisible rhetorical traditions; (b) recover what’s on offer in terms of differing understandings of rhetoric, rhetorical practices, activities, texts, the rhetor, and the responsibilities of rhetoric; (c) reflect on disciplinary perspectives and methods that have eclipsed such traditions; and (d) invite
disciplinary discussion on how to improve and sustain this recovery/reflection project (e.g., Mao, “Reflective,” Royster, “Disciplinary Landscaping”). There has been to date a steady stream—even if slow—of scholarship on different rhetorical traditions and practices.

Starting with the late 1960s, we see work addressing rhetorical traditions of the Far East while recognizing the challenges of comparative/cultural analysis of patterns of communication, rhetorical traditions, and values as well as social and political forces at play (e.g., Oliver, *Culture and Communication* and *Communication and Culture*). Along the road there have been other publications, like George A. Kennedy’s *Comparative Rhetoric*, that have attempted to acknowledge ignored rhetorical traditions. More important, this work’s attention to rhetorical practices and traditions has energized critical reflection on “Doing Comparative Rhetoric Responsibly” (e.g., Mao, “Reflective Encounters”, “Doing Comparative Rhetoric”; Hum and Lyon), underlining the responsibilities to deeply interrogate ideological stances and interpretive and analytical choices. Only then do we move toward understanding cultures on their own terms and have a reflective encounter with othered rhetorical traditions and practices.

This reflective, interpretive, and analytical stance is consistent with the aforementioned transformational shifts that Royster called for: it interrogates “the assumption that the dominant Western rhetorical paradigms must be somehow universally valid and applicable in all contexts, known, unknown, and yet-to-be known” (Mao, “Doing,” 64). In addition, this stance models an art of deep contextualization. As LuMing Mao explains and charges, “We have to learn to develop an etic/emic approach (“Reflective”) or to practice the art of recontextualization (“Searching”) by troubling our own modes of thinking and being and by deftly moving between self and other, the local and the global, and the contingencies of the present and the historical imperatives of the past” (“Doing,” 66). Increased awareness of the need to work differently in order to shed light on forgotten traditions has invited and authorized work on different rhetorical traditions. Such emerging scholarship is not additive, for it has a deep impact on our understanding of moments of origin, rhetoric’s timeline, the image of the rhetor, and the importance and multidirectionality of cultural encounters (oppressive and otherwise). All affect differently the recession or development of rhetorical practices and increase our understanding of rhetoric.

The growth of scholarship on cultural rhetorics and the charge to shed light on different rhetorical traditions inform this book on ṣulḥ, even if indirectly. In a sense, this growing literature invites attention to Arab-Islamic rhetoric, an underexplored tradition. To illustrate, I touch briefly on
some of the important work done and the gap in our knowledge of Arabic/Arab-Islamic rhetorics. We are collectively building bodies of knowledge on African-American rhetorics (e.g., Atwater; Jackson and Richardson, Understanding; Pough; Richardson and Jackson, African American; Royster, Traces); Asian-American rhetorics (e.g., Mao and Young); Chinese rhetorics (e.g., Mao, “Studying”); American-Indian rhetorics (e.g., Lyons; Powell; Stromberg); rhetorics of the Americas (e.g., Baca and Villanueva); and Near East rhetorics (e.g., Lipson and Binkley). Among the work on the rhetorics of the Near East, there has been limited work on Arabic/Arab-Islamic rhetorics. Although there has been some interest in Arab-Islamic—mainly medieval—rhetoric, it is fair to say that to date, rhetoric scholarship does not represent the complexity, richness, and longevity of Arabic/Arab-Islamic rhetorics. Interest in Arabic rhetoric situated in translation and language studies, contrastive rhetoric, Middle Eastern studies, and medieval and Renaissance studies has shed light on poetics and philosophic rhetorics, mostly by exploring commentaries on translations of Aristotle (i.e., the reception of Aristotle). The interest in the reception of Aristotle is manifest in, for example, Deborah Black’s Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy and Salim Kemal’s The Philosophical Poetics of Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroës. The translation movement in both the East (i.e., Baghdad) and the West (i.e., al-‘Andalûs) of the Arab-Islamic world has indeed attracted scholarly attention (e.g., Baddar; Borrowman; Butterworth; Ezzaher, “Alfarabi’s Book of Rhetoric”; Lameer). For example, there are studies of Arab commentators/translators who engaged the work of Plato and Aristotle, such as al-Kindi (Baddar, “From Athens (Via Alexandria) to Baghdad”), Ibn Rushd or Averroes (Shaub; Ezzaher, Three Commentaries), and al-Farabi or Alpharabius (Ezzaher, “Alfarabi’s Book of Rhetoric”). This scholarship remains invisible despite its role in charting numerous paths for the study of Arabic/Arab-Islamic rhetoric. On the one hand, this scholarship opens the door for rhetoricians to study the long history of Arab/Arab-Islamic poetics and philosophic rhetoric and to complicate our understanding of translations and commentaries as derivative (Baddar, “The Arabs Did Not Just Translate Aristotle”). On the other hand, because it sheds light on just a sliver of Arabic rhetoric, it invites us to think about the invisibility of other strands of rhetorical knowledge and practice, like religious oratory, organizational rhetoric, the teaching of rhetorical arts as part of an educational mission, and peacemaking practices as rhetorical knowledge and practice.

For this reason, Philip Halldén’s article, “What Is Arab Islamic Rhetoric?”
which foregrounds and critiques such a narrow scope, is a welcome intervention. Halldén powerfully sheds light on other bodies of work relevant to rhetoricians, including religious oratory and homilies. Halldén’s critical, revisionary assessment of the state of scholarship on Arabic rhetoric is a much-needed reminder of the treasures to be mined in relation to religious dialectic, religiopolitical text and talk, *khutbah* (i.e., religious oratory) manuals, instructions, exemplars, organizational writing, among others. Considering the long history of the Arabs and the expansive territory of Arab/Arab-Islamic communicative activity, the continued invisibility of Arabic/Arab-Islamic rhetorics and the tendency to focus on medieval translations is surprising. Yet it is not: to some extent rhetoric is perceived as philosophic rhetoric. Though philosophic rhetoric is just one line of rhetorical development in the European tradition (Kennedy), this perception informs expectations and, therefore, the study of Arab-Islamic rhetoric as manifest in studies of the commentaries/translations. Around the globe, however, rhetorical traditions manifest numerous lines of rhetorical development. This is made clear in Lipson and Binkley’s two edited collections. Similarly, the Arab world demonstrates numerous strands of rhetorical practice and knowledge. The gap in rhetorical scholarship, concerning the different strands of Arab/Arab-Islamic rhetoric, warrants disciplinary attention.

Seizing this opportunity, my work on *ṣulḥ* goes beyond poetics, translations, commentaries, and philosophic traditions and focuses alternatively on a variety of rhetorical practices. In exploring Arab-Islamic peacemaking rhetoric, my book is unique in three ways. First, this is a book-length study of Arab-Islamic rhetoric grounded in rhetorical scholarship and methodology. Book-length works on Arab/Arab-Islamic communicative practices exist but they do not draw on rhetorical scholarship, methodology, and history/historiography (e.g., Abdul-Raof, *Arabic Rhetoric*; Bassiouney, *Arabic Sociolinguistics*; and Hoigilt, *Islamist Rhetoric*). These works are informed by and situated in sociolinguistics, systemic functional grammar, and pragmastylistics, which are areas of linguistic analyses. Second, current scholarship tends to focus on the Arab-Islamic rhetorical tradition in terms of style (*balāghah*) and translations of or commentaries on the classical cannon, as noted earlier. Scholarship on style/poetics and (translations of/ commentaries on) philosophic rhetoric are important strands in the history and development of Arabic rhetoric. My book extends this scholarship on Arabic rhetoric and engages other strands of rhetorical knowledge and practice by looking at rhetoric as a way of *knowing, doing, and being*. Third, though scholarship on the rhetorics of reconciliation and peacemaking abounds, it remains mainly informed by Judeo-Christian models.
of peacemaking. To date, there is no rhetorical study of peacemaking practices informed by the Arab culture and Islam. These three gaps created a space for my book, which attends to and critiques long-standing Arab-Islamic rhetorical practices of conciliation and explicates the ways in which ṣuḥḥ is a culturally inflected, rhetorically mediated resource for peace.

As a rhetorical study, this book explicates Arab-Islamic peacemaking practices as occasions for rhetorical work that manifests in different types of text/talk and contributes to conversations concerning the question of violence and the imperative to find peace. Generally, much work is needed to study rhetorics of peacemaking and their cultural roots.5 Though we recognize the transcultural, transpatial, and transtemporal exigence for conflict resolution, we still need to shed light on “discursive spaces for peace” and develop a body of literature on the cultural rhetorics of peacemaking around the globe. Traditional peacemaking practices, like ṣuḥḥ, are grounded in a worldview that elevates relational responsibility and understands justice and peace after violation as exceeding the punishment of a wrongdoer (i.e., punitive justice). Rather, they seek to “restor[e] victims, [repair] harm, and re-weav[e] the fabric of human relationships in a community,” and hence are referred to as models of restorative justice (Coben and Harley 245).

Despite the importance of this three-dimensional healing work, ṣuḥḥ and other restorative traditions continue to be invisible in rhetoric scholarship. This invisibility of ṣuḥḥ is matched with its limited visibility in peace-studies scholarship, despite its enduring presence. The role culture plays in reconciliation in peace studies and international relations has generated increased interest (Funk and Said; Hudson; Irani and Funk; Kriesberg) and subsequent interest in and recognition of traditional and restorative peace practices. Despite this recognition, there is a dearth of scholarship on what ṣuḥḥ as a reconciliation model and method has to offer. This invisibility calls for scholarly investment.

As a case in point, I have noted earlier how this project started with an attempt to analyze al-Sādāt’s Knesset address. To date, there is only one rhetorical exploration of al-Sādāt’s 1977 peace initiative (Littlefield). Though the study sheds light on balance as a key feature of the speech, it doesn’t relate this feature to restorative justice, which seeks to address and balance the differing restorative needs of stakeholders. Similarly, without naming or recognizing the cultural framework that informs his peace initiative, scholarship in political science and international studies analyzing the speech notes crucial features of al-Sādāt’s peacemaking initiative, which I contend are features of ṣuḥḥ. For example, Zeev Maoz and Dan S. Felsenthal focus on al-Sādāt’s use of voluntary, self-binding commitment...
to peacemaking to resuscitate stalled peace talks. Their study neither recognizes nor links self-binding commitment to ṣūlḥ’s enduring practices. Likewise, Arnold Lewis’s anthropological study analyzes the peace ritual invoked by al-Sādāt’s trip to Jerusalem without identifying the process as ṣūlḥ, a traditional practice that has a history and characteristic features.

Uniquely, ṣūlḥ offers a resilient, generative, and flexible model of peacemaking (e.g., Drieskins; Lang; Funk and Said; Smith); it is multifaceted, rhetorically and typologically rich, and characterized by a remarkable rhetorical longevity. Not only does ṣūlḥ discourse converge with (extra)juridical and human rights discourses, but it also draws on an expansive array of rhetorical practices, including constitutive rhetoric, suasion, and visionary articulations of moral orders. It is worth noting that this flexibility is also a source of challenge: ṣūlḥ can be eclipsed by our attention to other juridical/extrajuridical or political practices that similarly seek justice and peace, a challenge I underline in chapter 4. In addition, ṣūlḥ cases transcend time and space limitations; practices have been documented in medieval Medina (in modern-day Saudi Arabia) and contemporary Cairo, Egypt, as the chapters illustrate, guiding stakeholders as they negotiate publicly communal conflict in the former and interpersonal conflict in the latter.

As ṣūlḥ travels across time, space, and spheres of interaction, it shares features with other restorative justice models and retains some conspicuous features. Ṣūlḥ shares two dominant features with other restorative models, all critique injustice and violence and advocate for conflict resolution and peace. For short, I refer to the former as critique against and the latter as critique for. Both modes of critique are interdependent; investing in the critique against violence/injustice is not enough, for we equally need to invest in the critique for peace, an investment that articulates and makes actionable a vision for peace and justice. The need for both modes of critique emanates from their different affordances: the critique against is mainly deconstructive, whereas the critique for is revisionary and reconstructive. The second aspect of restorative justice conspicuous in ṣūlḥ is the move toward balancing, at best, the seemingly irreconcilable demands of peacemaking stakeholders, including wrongdoers. Restorative justice models seek to reverse conflict (i.e., a moral need) and to heal all stakeholders and relations violated by an act of aggression (i.e., a relational need). Similarly, ṣūlḥ manifests the critique for and critique against and attempts to balance the moral and relational needs of stakeholders and the community.

Three unique features characterize ṣūlḥ. First, it can be initiated using apology-forgiveness discourse, but it can also be initiated by declaring commitment to the pursuit of peace. This alternative initiation model, despite
seeming atypical, is useful in protracted, multiparty conflicts where parties share responsibility and the brunt of conflict/violence. Second, šulḥ discourses interpellate and reconstitute stakeholders into a deliberative community, which comprises peace pursuers and beneficiaries who grapple with the possibilities and risks of negotiating their peacemaking needs and responsibilities. Third, šulḥ enlists the community who witnesses the resultant agreement to support the move toward peace; members of the community, if you will, become commissive witnesses.

To explicate šulḥ’s rhetorical richness, I have carefully chosen illustrative cases. Each sheds light on šulḥ’s aforementioned unique features, namely (1) initiation using commitment in addition to apology-forgiveness discourses, (2) reconstitution of a deliberative community comprised of different stakeholders, and (3) mobilization of commissive witnesses. Additionally, the cases analyze šulḥ’s varied rhetorical activities and settings, demonstrating how it is malleable enough to address interpersonal, (inter) national, and intrapersonal needs. To illustrate, for interpersonal šulḥ, I draw on published ethnographic studies of šulḥ practices in rural and urban settings. For national šulḥ, I shed light on and analyze the Constitution of Medina. This is a seventh-century document, comprising several merged šulḥ pacts; together, they are recognized as a charter and constitution. As to international peacemaking, I show how šulḥ blends easily with diplomatic discourses. To this end, I analyze political speeches and reference a number of international instruments like Security Council Resolutions. Finally, to illustrate šulḥ’s potential for resolving intrapersonal conflict, I analyze a literary dramatization and epistemic dialogue on peacemaking. As such, the cases demonstrate the malleability, success record, and the variegated range of reach of šulḥ as a ritual and practice. Put differently, šulḥ travels well across spheres of activity (juridical/extrajuridical and political/diplomatic); time (medieval, modern, and contemporary); and geopolitical borders (Cairo, Galilee, and Medina).

Because I wanted to highlight how šulḥ easily flows across the various spheres of interaction, the cases are not organized chronologically. Rather, the book is organized conceptually. This organization recognizes how we tend to experience reconciliation and šulḥ’s typological richness, warding off a potential misreading; in our everyday lives, conflict with others is the most conspicuous form of conflict, and the exigence for interpersonal conflict resolution is more immediate. In contrast, conflict and the move toward communal, national, and international conflict resolution is typically experienced as more impersonal, elusive, and distant, as well as mediated. Moreover, intrapersonal šulḥ is the most taxing and least visible. The chapters

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address the more obvious forms of conflict/conflict resolution first and then address the least obvious and more taxing form of peacemaking last. Because ṣulḥ practices are so varied they invite a typological rather than chronological reading; they engage interpersonal, communal, and political imperatives to counter violence; resolve conflict; and heal individuals and communities. Such a conciliatory engagement can manifest in unilateral, bilateral, or third-party-initiated conciliatory processes. Intriguingly, these processes can be either victim or wrongdoer initiated. This richness implies an expanded repertoire of peacemaking endeavors and calls into question the assumptions that peace is necessarily or typically initiated by apology and by the wrongdoer. Ṣulḥ, as a culturally inflected and relationally driven peacemaking discourse, problematizes such assumptions; the peacemaking repertoire can be limited neither to apology-forgiveness discourses nor to addressing only bilateral or third-party modes of intervention, for peace discourse can also manifest as unilateral, self-binding commitments).

More important, because the book is about ṣulḥ as a cultural resource for peace that is informed by Islam, it neither attempts to historically or typologically survey all ṣulḥ practices nor to provide a historical account, even if short, of Islam or Arab-Islamic rhetoric; these goals are not feasible while maintaining the focus and unique character of this project. Considering the current state of scholarship on the rhetoric of ṣulḥ, it will take a huge disciplinary—not individual—endeavor to attain a critical mass of scholarship, currently unavailable, that would help a rhetoric scholar provide a historical survey like Conley, Kennedy, or Murphy (Classical). Much more orchestrated disciplinary work will be necessary to realize the goal of providing a history of Arab-Islamic rhetoric. As to shedding light on the history of Islam or the history of Muslims, scholars of Middle Eastern studies, history, and theology have been for years doing this important work. However, history is a key player in many of the ṣulḥ cases addressed in this book. Accordingly, it is crucial to highlight aspects of the historical moment that fostered the exigence to mobilize the discourse of ṣulḥ. For example, in chapter 3, I zoom in on the life of a relatively small, emergent city-state known as Yathrib and then Medina. Because Medina’s tribes shared the brunt of a long history of conflict, the city’s history, its tribes, and their conflict is presented. As the backdrop, the history helps us read the rising exigence for peacemaking and the coauthoring of the Constitution of Medina, a document that brings together the discourses of ṣulḥ, rights, and interpellation of a unified citizenry.

Another reason for the typological/conceptual rather than chronological order is to prevent a crescendo, or march of development, which would be a
misrepresentation of ṣulḥ, an unwarranted celebration of one instantiation of ṣulḥ (al-Sādāt’s address), and a closing off of the need to continue critical thinking about ṣulḥ in the (inter)national arena. This is especially important considering debates about the current state of affairs in several countries in the Middle East. By contrast, the conceptual arrangement aims to foreground ṣulḥ’s rhetorical richness, malleability, and unique features.

As the book sheds light on ṣulḥ’s different discursive practices, it provides a multidimensional story of how ṣulḥ is fluid, for it relates to and supports other discourses. This fluidity and multifariousness invite an eclectic method that combines analytical terms and disciplinary perspectives. I combine, therefore, the global discursive insight of rhetorical analysis with the microanalytical precision of critical discourse analysis, which draws on other linguistic disciplines, including pragmatics and sociolinguistics. When combined, rhetorical and critical discourse analyses provide a particularly detail-oriented method. Such an analytical approach is consistent with the complex nature of reconciliation discourse, which mandates astute synthesis of different analytical tools and bodies of scholarship. This combination is conspicuous in chapters 3 and 4 where I combine (1) interpellation, constitutive rhetoric, and categorization of membership to illustrate how people are interpellated as peace pursuers and (2) rhetorical listening with the representation of locution to demonstrate how claims of grievance are listened and responded to. In order to provide a nuanced study of “discursive opportunities” or “spaces” (e.g., Bruck) that promote the possibilities for peace as well as constitute and galvanize peace pursuers, I draw on research in communication (e.g., Bruck; Rivenburgh) and rhetorical studies (e.g., Booth; Doxtader; Hatch; McPhail). I complement this scholarship with studies of the role of culture in peace studies (e.g., Abu-Nimer; Lederach; Kriesberg; Shaw) and foreign policy (e.g., Hudson). Using these cross-disciplinary perspectives, I explicate the rhetorical nature of efficacious ṣulḥ processes across interpersonal, communal, national, and international spheres; ṣulḥ’s contribution to the study of culturally inflected peacemaking rhetorics; and the richness of ṣulḥ deliberations that can blend political, religious, and social registers. This exploration unfolds in the chapters that follow.

Chapter 1, “Peacemaking Topoi: Cultural Iterations of Relational and Moral Needs,” underlines cross-cultural commonplaces of peacemaking rhetorics and demonstrates that culture plays a central role in shaping peacemaking expectations, processes, articulations, and outcomes. Across varied models of conflict resolution, reconciliation pursuers debate (a) punitive/restorative/transitional conceptions and modes of justice; (b) perceived/real
tensions among justice, (political) prudence, (moral/social) recognition, and calls for remembering/forgetting; and (c) measures that translate peacemaking endeavors into a stable/formalized relation (e.g., binding peace pacts/treaties). These cross-cultural commonplaces emanate from and address culturally inflected relational, ethical, and political imperatives, seeking ways to resolve conflict and move forward. Additionally, this chapter argues that these topics are also analytical tools that can capture the generative potential of debates about peacemaking as a goal and process. Using exemplary moments from cases that range from contemporary Egypt (after the January 25, 2011, revolution) to Sierra Leone in the wake of its civil war, this chapter explicates the rhetoric of peacemaking as a sphere of discursive activity. This discursive sphere hinges on a repertoire of culturally inflected, rhetorical uptakes of the aforementioned commonplaces. In shedding light on these recurring and culturally inflected topoi, the chapter sets the stage for the study of central terms of the manuscript and grounds ṣu lḥ in its cultural imperatives and doctrinal roots.

Chapter 2, “The Power of Sweet Persuasion: Cultural Inflections of Interpersonal Ṣu lḥ Rhetorics,” draws on and revisits ethnographic accounts of ṣu lḥ from Cairo, Lebanon, and Galilee and explicates how ṣu lḥ exceeds typical apology-forgiveness conciliation. Specifically, cases range from transgressor (Lang) and third-party-initiated (Abu-Nimer Nonviolence) to wronged-initiated ṣu lḥ (Ayoub). Therefore, the chapter argues that articulations of apology, forgiveness, and/or commitment-driven ṣu lḥ are motivated by relational goals (relations with self, others, and community). In addition to arguments from (religious) authority and precedent, the chapter captures how reconciliation pursuers debate, among themselves and with others, the possibilities and stakes of pursuing peace or taking revenge. To further draw out the relational dimension, as I analyze different interpersonal ṣu lḥ cases, I shed light on dimensions of what I refer to as performative open-hand rhetoric. For example, muṣāfaḥah (shaking hands), muṣālaḥah (reconciliation), and mumālaḥah (eating together) are crucial social acts with conspicuous relational goals that counter the logic of violence/violation/alienation and begin the work of peaceful coexistence.

Chapter 3, “We the Reconciled: The Convergence of Ṣu lḥ and Human Rights,” focuses on the Constitution of Medina (622 CE), the first Arab-Islamic constitution. This chapter demonstrates that the constitution, a composite text of ṣu lḥ pacts, weaves together rhetorics of reconciliation and human rights by ratifying a prolonged reconciliation between tribal communities of different faith traditions (polytheists, Christians, Jews, and Muslims) and of relative political power. More important, the chapter explicates
how the constitution established Medina as a city-state, an act that constituted a unified citizenry based on equal rights and obligations. Medina’s constitution affirmed the rights of new immigrants and their equal standing and peaceful relations with the native inhabitants; outlined everyone’s right and obligation to the pursuit of justice; recognized the religious freedoms of all citizens of Medina; and obligated all to the protection of the city-state. My analysis demonstrates that the forty-seven articles of the constitution capture a relationally driven, albeit political, conciliatory investment in the welfare of individuals (citizens) and communities (bound either by tribal affiliation or religious traditions)—an investment that draws on and realizes a discourse of human rights. “We the Reconciled,” therefore, explicates a historical precedent of the successful convergence of discourses of ṣulḥ and rights, which could efficaciously counter the tribal logic that often denied rights by foregrounding tribal interests, privileges, and status. This chapter—in the context of recent debates in Cairo about writing a new constitution; the rise of political Islamist movements calling for a religious state; and ongoing religious conflicts—sheds light on the political imperative that informs ṣulḥ and engages enduring rhetorical questions: How can the discourses of conciliation and (transitional) justice best realize the discourses of citizenry and equal rights? What are the discursive conditions manifest in historical precedents that can enable their realization?

Chapter 4, “From the Egyptian People’s Assembly to the Israeli Knesset: al-Sādāt’s Knesset Address, Ṣulḥ, and Diplomacy,” analyzes al-Sādāt’s Knesset address and a series of speeches and statements given by Muḥammad Anwar al-Sādāt before and after the Knesset address to shed light on the symbolic and procedural dimensions of his peace initiative and how ṣulḥ practices are invoked, initiating what led to the Camp David Accords in 1979. Consequently, the chapter identifies culturally influenced rhetorical moves that proved to be efficacious in the international arena. Calls for accountability and openness to the other are traceable rhetorical moves. al-Sādāt used rhetorical tools, like constitutive and epideictic rhetorics and speech acts of promise while signaling rhetorical listening to the needs and fears of the other. Together, these tools were potent enough to initiate peace and to reconstitute a community of peace pursuers who share the responsibility for and rewards of peacemaking. As such, the chapter provides a detailed, case-driven exploration of (1) policy measures that peace pursuers embraced as a crucial part of their conflict resolution and (2) the mobilization of international imperatives for peace (using public diplomacy). A case in point is the way in which policy discourse interpellates subjects as participants in deliberation who are shaped by and influence foreign policy.
And within today’s Egyptian context, there are calls for revisiting the Camp David Accords and equally forceful calls for honoring international treaties, a rhetorically rich political situation that invites further exploration of the discourse of the 1977 peace initiative and its interpellated subjects. If peacemaking rhetoric hinges on a discursive sphere of activities that actualize formalized and binding conciliatory work and relations, what conditions recycle the phase of articulating grievance claims, and what short-circuits or affirms peace?

Chapter 5, “To Gather at Court: Ṣulḥ as Rhetorical Method,” analyzes an overlooked dialogue titled The Great Court of Ṣulḥ. The chapter argues that the dialogue (1) brings together the different dimensions of Ṣulḥ, highlighting its spiritual roots and (2) dramatizes a humanistic, dialogue-driven, interventionist approach to reconciliation. The approach is applicable to personal, interpersonal, communal, and international conflict. The lucidity and broad applicability of this rhetorical approach to reconciliation come from the fact that The Great Court of Ṣulḥ is responsive to its times—written after World War I, the Versailles Treaty, and the establishment of the League of Nations—while being attentive to the recurring problem of power over that results in marginalization, domination, and denial of rights. By analyzing the dialogue, this chapter shows how Ṣulḥ is a rhetorical resource for conciliatory intervention. The Great Court of Ṣulḥ makes a simple argument: internal reconciliation between warring factions of the self is a precursor to, condition of, and model for the resolution of world conflicts and the establishment of a cooperative international community of peace pursuers. Intriguingly, from the dialogue, we can extrapolate a culturally inflected, rhetorical method for reconciliation, comprising a functional interaction of three discourses: (1) a bidirectional, reciprocal discourse of expressing and listening to grievances; (2) introspective, reflective discourse; and (3) a visionary/devotional discourse. In unique ways, each discourse articulates a vision for peace. As such, the dialogue presents a functional, collaborative move from grievance claims to the establishment of a restorative peace. At the same time, this chapter illustrates how dimensions of Ṣulḥ rhetoric are grounded in traditional, Islamic philosophy, which entails a reconceptualization of virtues, the nature of the self, the value of moderation (wasatīyah), and the pursuit of justice and excellence.

Each of the book’s chapters explicates ways in which Ṣulḥ is a rhetorically mediated model for reconciliation, and each seeks to underline a dimension of Ṣulḥ. Together, these dimensions provide an account of Ṣulḥ, a culturally inflected, rhetorically mediated process and practice of reconciliation. This account complements and extends current scholarship on Arabic
rhetoric, which is invisible and does not represent well the richness of its rhetorical traditions. But more important, by shedding light on the iterative, responsive, rhetorical labor of conciliation, my account of ṣuḥḫ addresses concerns we all share. On a daily basis, the news strikes us yet again with horrifying images and details of escalations of violence and impending war in the world. This project on ṣuḥḫ invites us to acknowledge the history and richness of reconciliation practices like ṣuḥḫ. These practices chart a different, a more peaceful path.