Chapter 1

Constructing Movements and Comparisons

Politics is the art of unification, from the many it makes one.
Michael Walzer (1992)

Indigenous peoples in Latin America dispatched the twentieth century as they did the eighteenth, with a wave of social mobilizations that frightened elites and dramatically altered the political possibilities for a democratizing and modernizing continent. In the 1780s, the Aymara, Quechua, and mestizo armies of Túpaj Katari and Túpac Amaru initiated what some have called the “first war of independence” in Spanish America (Albó 1987), only to see it crushed by colonial power and later eclipsed by the more conservative “white-” or Creole-led movements of Bolívar, Sucre, and San Martín.

Two hundred years later, indigenous people launched new offensives, not as military campaigns but as largely peaceful social movements that have proven dangerous to the exclusionary political and economic structures of neoliberal Latin America. Throughout the Americas, from Canada to Chile, indigenous people have challenged the national political and economic proj-
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ects that in centuries past rarely took them into account. In arguably the most contentious republics in the Americas, Ecuador and Bolivia, massive indigenous and popular mobilizations have toppled presidents (three time in Ecuador and twice in Bolivia between 1997 and 2005) and won important and even stunning electoral victories (on local and national levels). In the Bolivian presidential elections of December 2005, cocalero leader Evo Morales surpassed all expectations and won an unprecedented absolute majority with 53.7 percent of the vote. Rather than disappearing from national politics, as modernization theories of the left and the right predicted, indigenous people have shaken the (neo)colonial foundations of contemporary Latin American states and recast debates over development and democracy. In complex ways, they have articulated powerful political “voice,” in the sense that Albert Hirschman has given the term: “any attempt to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs” (1970, 30).

The appeal of Hirschman’s idea as a point of departure for this book is perhaps not surprising, especially given the numerous studies that have deployed Hirschman’s influential “exit, voice, and loyalty” thesis. Yet it is also interesting to note that in his original 1970 text, Hirschman made special mention of “Andean Indians” for whom “exit is bound to be unsatisfactory and unsuccessful.” Writing about Bolivia, Hirschman, following Richard Patch (1961), argued that indigenous individuals who left their communities and entered urban centers were often subject to discrimination in societies where whiteness was prized and privileged (Hirschman 1970, 110). At that time, Hirschman (quoting Patch) believed that the alternative to individual exit was a group process in which the rural community was the “agency regulating the adoption of mestizo [mixed indigenous-European] traits,” something of a collective exit. Hirschman and Patch were expressing the prevailing beliefs of the day that “formerly Indian communities” (Patch’s term) were being incorporated, albeit unevenly and slowly, by nation-building ideologies that replaced the old language of caste (indio) with a newer language of class (campesino). Fueled by the expectations of modernization, national leaders could proclaim solutions to the old “Indian problem” as Ecuadorian President General Guillermo Rodriguez did in 1972 (the year that Ecuador became an oil-exporting country). He told an Amazonian Kichwa community, “There is no more Indian problem, we all become white when we accept the goals of the national culture” (cited in Whitten 1976, 7). Similarly, in Bolivia,
after the 1952 revolution ushered in agrarian and other social reforms, “Indians were re-baptized as peasants and their old communities . . . were transformed into ‘agrarian unions’” (Albó 1994, 57).

In the decades since Hirschman’s work, indigenous people have challenged the official ideologies of mestizaje and modernization which simultaneously celebrated racial mixture and legitimized discrimination against those who were not quite mixed or modern enough, like the large Quechua- and Aymara-speaking populations in the Andean highlands. Ironically, the nation-building discourse of mestizaje continued to rely on notions of national homogeneity and thus became, in Stutzman’s (1981) apt formulation, “an all-inclusive ideology of exclusion.” The emergence of indigenous voice, then, came not from regulating mestizaje but rejecting it. Moving from stigma to strength, indigenous organizations have rearticulated indigenous and campesino identities, and mobilized in unprecedented numbers against neocolonial racial orders and neoliberal elites.

Yet, as O’Donnell (1986) reminds us, the formation of “vertical voice” (protesting against the relatively powerful), necessarily involves the challenges of constructing “horizontal voice” (coordinating among the relatively weak). Making many voices into one, harmonizing horizontal identities and interests into a singular vertical voice is never easy and, in truth, never completely successful, as plurality rather than unity tends to characterize social contention. Though there is the assumption that ethnically and racially defined communities have an advantage in acting collectively, indigenous movements have a host of divisions and internal differences that complicate efforts to forge larger “imagined communities” of struggle (Anderson 1991). While movement unity is stressed in slogans and rhetoric such as the Kichwa phrase one often hears at Ecuadorian marches—*shuc yuyailla, shuc maquilla, shuc shimilla* (one thought, one hand, one voice)—the process of creating Indian political subjects involves many thoughts, many hands, and many voices. This book is a historically grounded and theoretically guided account of the complex processes through which these voices became articulate, organizationally powerful, and politically relevant in Bolivia and Ecuador. Though these two countries share many commonalities politically, economically, and sociologically, they also illustrate important differences in the ways in which indigenous people have been represented politically.
While indigenous movements have emerged in striking ways throughout the region, from Chiapas to Chile, in most Latin American countries José Carlos Mariátegui’s old lament remains largely accurate: “The Indians lack national linkages. Their protests have always been regional” (1928, 49). Even in Bolivia, where indigenous people constitute a majority of the national population and have engaged in impressive (and revolutionary) mobilization, the contemporary indigenous movement, even after the victory of Evo Morales, is characterized more by regional fragmentation than national unity. Meanwhile, in Ecuador over the course of the 1990s, one national organization was clearly more successful than others in claiming the ability to speak and act for indigenous peoples of highland and lowland regions. The empirical focus on movement unity versus regional fragmentation, however, should not be mistaken for a normative argument for the superiority of one pattern over the other. Though Latin American protests have celebrated the idea that unity leads to victory (un pueblo unido jamás será vencido), one of the surprising findings of this book is that a fragmented social movement environment in Bolivia proved to be more politically effective than a unified one in Ecuador. This book, then, seeks to explain why and how certain political voices have become more articulate, audible, and effective than others.

Though the point of departure for this book is a more unified pan-regional coordination of Ecuadorian indigenous contention and a more fragmented Bolivian context, it is important to point out that both social movement environments are dynamic ones, as different indigenous actors have risen and declined in importance over the years. Thus, this book examines the experiences of indigenous politics in Ecuador and Bolivia as contrasting cases of the politics of articulation as theorized by Stuart Hall (1996), James Clifford (2000, 2001), Tanya Li (2000), and others. For students of political representation, the double meaning of articulation provides a language for exploring both the discursive expressions (vertical voice) and “cobbling together” of political identities (horizontal voices) which occur in powerful and provisional ways. The ways in which indigenous projects have been expressed and cobbled together in Ecuador (in a more unified, though still divided movement) and Bolivia (in a more regionally differentiated constellation) reveal important lessons about political opportunities, the imagining of indigenous collectivities, and the transnational political economies of neoliberal multiculturalism.
Representing Indigenous Multiplicity

Two questions about the making of indigenous movements guide this book. First, why do some movements achieve greater unity than others? To fully understand the first question, we must address a second: Why do some indigenous voices become more representative than others? These questions concern the construction, articulation, and selection of indigenous political voice(s), and they have been understudied in the existing scholarship on the return of the Indian to Latin American politics (Albó 1991).

One weakness common to much of the existing literature on indigenous movements is the tendency to speak of “the” Indian movement in various countries as a unitary actor, eliding the organizational and ideological diversity of contemporary indigenous contention. To be sure, some scholars have emphasized the differences between such Indian actors as labor federations, ethnic federations, urban intellectual groups, religious organizations, and transnational associations (e.g., Smith 1984; Warren 1998; Andrade 2004; Rappaport 2005). Stefano Varese (1996, 68) notes that these groups are not mutually exclusive but rather complimentary, as “they respond to different conjunctures and places, to specific demands arising in different socioeconomic contexts.” While on a certain level of abstraction Varese is right, in many times and places it is often the case that ethnic, religious and labor models are presented as competing alternatives. These differences are of political, theoretical, and methodological importance. The political implications of this diversity come into focus once we ask why certain types of Indian organizations are seen by state and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as more representative than other Indian organizations. For actors as different as indigenous campesinos and U.S. State Department officials, it is of considerable importance which organizations and leaders speak and act on questions like agrarian reform, coca eradication, and oil exploration. The theoretical implications of this diversity arise when we ask what “representation” means when one is not talking about individual citizens, but socially constructed ethnic communities in polities where party systems are notoriously inchoate and unrepresentative (Mainwaring and Scully 1994). The methodological implications of this diversity come into focus when we ask how indigenous movements have been “cased,” Charles Ragin’s (1992) term for the way in which scholars construct (not just select) samples of a particular
type of phenomenon. In analyzing social movements, scholars have made choices about how to map fields of social movement activity and which actors to include and exclude from the sample of cases. This book sheds light on how indigenous movements are represented in states and scholarship and why this matters.

More broadly, the study of indigenous voice speaks to an urgent need in political science to understand the working of “actually existing democracy.” Throughout Latin American history, the Indian problem was a political problem produced by the imposition of postcolonial (liberal) political structures over colonial (illiberal) foundations. While indigenous communities were (to varying extents in the Andes and Amazon) able to preserve or re-create forms of solidarity and mount often dramatic acts of resistance, Andean states continued to be through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries “republics without citizens.” As many of our theories on democratization and social movements are based on the experiences of states in the global North and West, understanding the processes of democratization in polities that are fractured by histories of (neo)colonialism and economic dependency can yield greater understandings of the formal and informal institutions that constitute democratic regimes in the global South and beyond.

Additionally, the (re)construction of a new political actor and its articulation with the political system provides an opportunity to understand the politics of representation. Since the independence period of the late nineteenth century, indigenous people have occupied the margins of national political life. Official ideologies of racial mixture erased Indian identities from political vocabularies and formal political exclusions, like Spanish-language literacy requirements, kept indigenous people disenfranchised until late into the twentieth century. In the 1990s, powerful indigenous mobilizations forged new patterns of representation.

To understand how indigenous people are represented in contemporary Latin America, one must know something about changes in the social construction of political subjects (Who shall be represented?), political organization (How will “we” come together?), and what Appadurai (2004) has called the “terms of recognition” (How will “we” include “them”? How will “we” become part of “them”?). Drawing inspiration from political theorists (from Mill and Burke to Pitkin and Foucault) as well as contemporary social movement scholars, this study speaks to the
double legacy of the concept of representation as a term of politics and culture, organization and art. The following chapters explore how indigenous voice has been produced (out of many voices) and what this says about the politics of representation in Ecuador and Bolivia.

**Casing and Comparing Indigenous Movements**

Following David Laitin, I contend that “the comparative method is most useful when a small number of cases share a great number of key attributes. When similarities abound and differences are subtle, it is possible to isolate those subtle differences in order to observe their impact on society” (Laitin 1986, 188). While I argue that Bolivia and Ecuador are precisely these kinds of cases, it is important to note that the main focus of this study is not whole countries, but rather the articulation of indigenous movements. Moreover, my concern is not the emergence of movements but their patterns. In the interest of clarity, I define a social movement, following Tilly (1993–1994: 1–2), as “a sustained challenge to power-holders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those power-holders by means of repeated public displays of that population’s numbers, commitment, unity and worthiness.”

To case indigenous movements effectively, it is important to explore both national and subnational configurations. On one level, country units are appropriate given that national boundaries contain much of the state-society contention and negotiation that is at the heart of the interactive notion of “movement” (as a process, not a thing). Moreover, indigenous activists, though aware of broader regional and international contexts, see states as the primary arenas and targets of their demands. Ecuador and Bolivia are, like all countries, important contexts and fields, constituted by varying landscapes of culture and politics that shape the patterns of indigenous contention. In these countries (and elsewhere), indigenous movements are the articulation of communities, organizations, and ideas. In this sense, Ecuador and Bolivia are similar cases that share many political, economic, and cultural characteristics, and that have produced strong movements through different outcomes in the patterns of contention: in Ecuador one national confederation has emerged as the leading voice of indigenous politics, while in Bolivia regional fragmentation continues to be the rule.
In addition to national-level differences in examining social movement articulations, this book is concerned with the many ways in which various indigenous identities, discourses, and projects have (and have not) come together. This suggests the second kind of case that this book uses to conceptualize indigenous movements: social movement organizations, which are not actors but are themselves a site of articulation for identities, discourses, and strategies. Social movement fields in the Andes are highly institutionalized, in the sense that the movement is largely constituted by organizations that are formally registered with the state and that include various member organizations and communities also formally recognized by the state. The formation of organizations and the decisions of their leaders are crucial to understand the social constructions of indigenous political voice. Given that terms like “Indian” and “indígena” are fluid categories, organizations are crucial structures that channel meanings politically.

Fragmented States and Indian Collectivities in Bolivia and Ecuador

Looking at the economic indicators for the central Andean countries as macroeconomic wholes, Andean states are among the poorest countries in the hemisphere, as a majority of people in each country lives below the poverty line (Ecuador 67 percent; Bolivia 63 percent). With the more comprehensive metric of the Human Development Index, these states are in the bottom half of Medium Human Development countries; Ecuador the 100th place, Bolivia the 114th in the HDI rankings of 177 countries (UNDP 2004, 140–141). Politically, inchoate party systems in the Andean countries have done a poor job of representing the interests of the excluded sectors of society. In Bolivia and Ecuador, massive social protests have driven democratically elected presidents from office (1997, 2000, 2005 in Ecuador; 2003 and 2005 in Bolivia).¹⁰

These countries are also home to significant indigenous populations. Consulting recent census data, between 50 and 61.2 percent of the Bolivian population identifies itself as indigenous (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas 2003).¹¹ The range of estimates for the Ecuadorian indigenous population is larger as the 2001 census suggests that roughly 7 percent of the population is indigenous, while other studies have found that the indigenous population makes up about 15 to 20 percent of the national popula-
tion (Censo del Ecuador 2001, Zamosc 2004). However, these population estimates are subject to sometimes acrimonious debate and are produced by disparate methodologies. Therefore, these numbers should be treated with caution; they are themselves evidence of the difficulty of representing indigenous people (even, or especially, statistically). What is beyond debate, though, is that indigenous people continue to be among the poorest of the poor in Latin America. A recent World Bank study confirmed that not only do indigenous-majority regions have higher poverty rates, but even when controlling for social factors that are related to poverty (like education, employment status, and household composition), being indigenous significantly increased the probability of being poor (16 percent increase in Ecuador and 13 percent in Bolivia) (Hall and Patrinos 2006, 223).

Historically, the economies of these countries have been linked to international markets through primary commodities like tin and natural gas (Bolivia), and bananas, cacao, and oil (Ecuador). Development patterns of these countries are very uneven, creating distinct regional patterns in economy and state. Highland political centers (La Paz, Bolivia, and Quito, Ecuador) often had to confront emerging economic centers in the lowlands (Santa Cruz, Bolivia) and on the coast (Guayaquil, Ecuador). In the mid-twentieth century, both countries experienced swings between civilian and military rule (Isaacs 1993; Klein 1992). In the 1960s and 1970s, reformist military governments institutionalized forms of authoritarian corporatist government that instituted agrarian reforms that redistributed much of the land monopolized by rural elites and ended the long era of hacienda-centered political development in the highlands. The Amazonian lowlands offered a way to ease the political pressure of agrarian reform, allowing the state to encourage colonization of supposedly empty lands rather than having to redistribute additional lands. The move of highland population eastward and the rise of economic activities like agro-business and oil extraction led to a greater state presence in the Amazonian lowlands than ever before. It also meant new threats for lowland indigenous populations.

In the 1980s, these countries underwent difficult periods of regime change (from military rule to formally democratic rule) and economic structural adjustment. The transitions in both countries proved difficult for indigenous people who, to varying degrees, faced political violence, dictatorship, and, later, neoliberal reforms. Indigenous people make up
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over half of the population in Bolivia and, according to most estimates, around a quarter of the population in Ecuador. Geographically, the highland regions in these countries are home to the largest indigenous groups (Kichwa in Ecuador; Aymara and Quechua in Bolivia). However, lowland organizations in all three countries have often had the most success in negotiating with states, a regional difference that reflects the different regional histories of state formation and state-Indian relations. Region has played an important role in the political history of both elite and popular politics (see table 1).

Region and place clearly shape the cultural politics of Indianness in Ecuador and Bolivia. Ethnicity, Peter Wade notes, is tightly linked with notions of place. “Where are you from?” argues Wade, “is the ethnic question *par excellence*” (1997, 18). Accordingly, Indianness takes various forms in various places. The noted artisanship, economic success, and political visibility of Otavalo’s (in the northern Ecuadorian highlands) makes them the ideal guidebook Indian. But for the same reasons, these “rich vendors” are the very representation of inauthenticity to others. Similarly, eastern lowland Indian federations accuse Aymara peasant union leaders in Bolivia of having “forgotten” their original Andean forms of organization in choosing the Occidental import of unions.12

| Table 1. Regional cleavages and patterns of indigenous representation in Ecuador and Bolivia |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| **Ecuador**                       | **Bolivia**                       |
| Largest Indigenous Groups         |                                   |
| Highlands: Kichwa (85–90% of total Indian population) | Highlands: Quechua, Aymara (98% of total Indian population) |
| Lowlands: Shuar, Kichwa (10 smaller groups) | Lowlands: Guaraní, Quechua, Aymara (35 other groups) |
| Elite Regional Cleavages          |                                   |
| Coast (Guayaquil) / Highland (Quito) | Eastern lowlands (Santa Cruz)/ Highlands (La Paz) |
| Indian Regional Cleavages         |                                   |
| Lowlands/highlands (coastal groups weak) | Lowlands/valleys/highlands |
| Patterns of Indigenous Representation |                                   |
| One dominant confederation        | Fragmentation along regional and ideological lines |
| Dominant: CONAIE                  | Lowlands: CIDOB                   |
| Important National Orgs.:         | Valleys: Cocaleros                |
| FENOCIN, FEINE                    | Highlands: CSUTCB, CONAMAQ         |

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Like all political identities, the ones involved in indigenous movements (e.g., Indian, peasant, Amazonian, Aymara, cocalero, or citizen) suffer from that condition Bakhtin said plagued all our words: each one “is populated—overpopulated—with the intentions of others. Expropriating it, forcing it to submit to one’s own intention and accents is a difficult and complicated process” (Bakhtin 1981, 294). I maintain that forcing these words to submit is also a political process to the extent that questions of classification are closely intertwined with those of power and governance. “New social movement” theorists observe that social movements are political precisely because “meanings are constitutive of processes that implicitly, or explicitly, seek to redefine social power” (Alvarez, Escobar, and Dagnino 1998, 4–5).

Movement activists then confront the difficult and complicated process of redefining power by attempting to forge collective identities and organizational structures capacious enough to accommodate different views and experiences. Among indigenous activists throughout Latin America, Ecuador’s Confederation of Ecuadorian Indigenous Nationalities (CONAIE) has been widely heralded as the most successful in this regard by articulating Indian federations from the coast, sierra, and Amazon regions. Most scholars and Ecuadorian activists agree that CONAIE is the most important Indian interlocutor in dialogues, not only with the state but also with international bodies like the World Bank. Concentrating on the strength of CONAIE’s indigenous political project, however, has led many scholars to overlook the processes through which CONAIE began to shed the traces of its “labor” roots, emphasizing indigenous “nationality”—and not union-like organizations—as the appropriate unit of representation. Moreover, concentrating mostly on CONAIE has meant that other important actors, such as the class-based Federation of Peasant, Black and Indigenous Organizations (FENOCIN) and the religion-oriented Ecuadorian Evangelical Indigenous Federation (FEINE) have been sorely understudied.

In Bolivia, the issue of national indigenous representation is less clear as three national organizations, from the highlands, valleys, and lowlands have disputed leadership of “the” indigenous movement: the highland Unified Confederation of Bolivian Rural Workers (CSUTCB), the Six Federations of Coca Growers of the Cochabamba Valley, and the lowland Confederation of Bolivian Indigenous Peoples (CIDOB). Additionally, another highland organization, the Confederation of Ayllus and Markas of Qollasuyo (CONAMAQ) has sought to challenge the CSUTCB’s role.
in the highlands, with some help from the lowland CIDOB. Ayllu Federations emphasize the use of traditional community (rotating) leadership systems and reject the Western union models that characterize most highland organizations like the CSUTCB. Evangelical organizations also exist in Bolivia but do not have the national presence that FEINE has achieved in Ecuador.

This book seeks to explain and interpret differences within each country as well as differences in national indigenous social movement dynamics. Additionally, this study seeks to show how representation is conceptualized and structured in the institutional environment of political society. In Ecuador, it has only been recently (1996) that indigenous people have entered formal electoral competition through a plurinational electoral movement, Pachakutik (MUPP). The movement has close ties with CONAIE, but in keeping with its multiethnic character runs Indian and non-Indian candidates. In Bolivia’s more fragmented party system, multiple Indian parties have formally existed since the 1970s but have floated in and out of alliances with bigger parties of left and right, though since 1995 indigenous parties have acquired greater strength (Van Cott 2005). Additionally, CIDOB and other indigenous organizations have encouraged local alliances with political parties of various ideological stripes, recognizing parties for what they have been for most of Bolivia’s (nonauthoritarian) political history: ideologically thin electoral vehicles. In 2004, Bolivian law ended the monopoly of parties in electoral contests and allowed lists of independent citizen groups (agrupaciones ciudadanas) and indigenous people to participate if they were able to gather signatures from at least 2 percent of the electorate. This has been lauded by some as a move toward a more inclusive electoral system; it has been criticized by others as another way to fractionalize an already centerless party system (see Calderón and Gamarra 2004).

In both countries, indigenous movements have tested the architecture of new democracies in calling for the creation of state institutions dedicated to Indian concerns. In the late 1990s, Ecuador established a state planning agency (CODENPE) that recognized the strength of one social movement organization (CONAIE) and privileged that organization’s preference for representation by indigenous nacionalidad (nationality), explicitly rejecting other confederations’ calls for representation by organization. Meanwhile (also in the late 1990s), Bolivia accommodated
an Indian vice ministry (VAIPO), later elevated to a ministry (MAIPO), within the existing patrimonial dynamic in which political offices were given in return for political favors. Whereas CONAIE in Ecuador captured the state agency (at least initially), Bolivian organizations have (until recently) been junior partners to the political parties that make up the ruling coalition. These state agencies are, among other things, terrains of struggle that reflect changing Indian-state relations, as we will see in exploring the recent problems Ecuadorian indigenous actors have had with the government and the impressive gains of Bolivian indigenous leaders like Evo Morales, whose elimination of the Ministry of Indigenous Affairs marks but one way indigenous people are currently transforming the political landscape.

**Rationalist, Structuralist, and Culturalist Approaches**

Rationalist approaches, inspired by the insights of microeconomics, take collective action problems as the main points of departure. A rationalist would ask how indigenous leaders in each country provide selective incentives or punishments to overcome the rational desire not to get involved in what is often risky mobilization. Indeed, as Hirschman himself noted, “voice is never easy; it can even be dangerous” (1992, 79).

From a rationalist perspective, one could indeed identify such selective measures, especially on local levels. In the indigenous community where I lived for several months, it was understood that those who did not engage in the collective works called mingas would be sanctioned by reduced local water service. Thinking about national units, it is perhaps not surprising that the smaller country with fewer indigenous ethnic groups (Ecuador) had more success in mobilizing indigenous supporters behind a national cause. Consulting Olson’s classic work (1965), we would expect collective action problems to be greater among larger groups. Thus, even a cursory look at the larger and more diverse groups of Bolivia should lead us to expect that their situation would be characterized by more fragmentation than the numerically smaller and ethnically less diverse Ecuadorian indigenous populations. On closer examination, however, Olson’s expectations and rational choice theory have three important limitations.

First, Olson’s theory is of limited help in explaining the regional differences in the making of collective action that have been so crucial in indig-
enous politics. In both countries, the sites of the greatest marches, protests, and mobilizations have been precisely in the parts of the countries where collective action problems would be presumably the highest: the densely populated Andean regions. To understand why indigenous collective action is more common in the highlands than in the less populated lowlands, one must understand historical differences in state-community relations. Histories of land tenure, colonial legacies, and communal moral economies structured contention in ways not captured by ahistorical calculations of individual marginal utility.

Second, Olson’s emphasis on selective incentives or punishment misses the social components of collective action and representation. Relying on communally rooted mobilizing structures and traditions, indigenous organizations are often able to convoke larger protests than most labor unions. Moreover, indigenous movement leaders rarely need to invoke selective incentives or punishments and have had little trouble with the Olsonian collective action problem of free riding. More than the challenges of individual rationality, social movement leaders face the social challenges of “coordinating, sustaining, and giving meaning to collective action” (Tarrow 1994, 16). Indigenous communities, with consensual practices of community governance and shared histories of exclusion and discrimination, have little trouble meeting these challenges.

Third, the instrumental calculations of rational actors do not help explain the cultural dynamics of representation. Who spoke for and acted on behalf of Indians (and how this was done) is not simply a matter of rationality but a consequence of the interactions between the cultural understandings of state leaders, local elites, indigenous leaders, social scientists, and nongovernmental agents. Understanding representation is about more than the power of numbers or mobilizing resources; it is also about the productive power of culture and politics.

If rational explanations are not convincing, then perhaps structural explanations might be more useful. Indeed, unlike rationalist explanations, structural explanations have been used by scholars of social movements with often impressive results (e.g., McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1994; Tilly 2004). Using what social movement scholars call the political process approach, many analysts have explained movement emergence and success by exploring the configurations of political opportunities (León 1994; Zamosc 1994; Yashar 1998, 1999, 2005). Per-
haps the most concise formulation of the approach has been provided by Deborah Yashar (1998, 2005), who suggests that the opening of political liberalization, the pressure of economic reforms, and the existence of rural networks together provided the opportunities, catalysts, and capacities needed for indigenous mobilization. Accompanying transitions away from authoritarian political regimes, neoliberalism reinforced a general restructuring of Latin American state-society relations, or what Yashar (1999, 2005) elsewhere calls “citizenship regimes.” As neoliberalism displaced the populist and inward-looking models of economic development, it took the form of Washington Consensus policies like structural adjustments, privatizations, and trade liberalization. As economic crisis and reform crippled the structures of state corporatism that had mediated state-rural relations for many years, indigenous people found the space to reconstitute themselves politically. Simultaneously, the withdrawal of the state in the form of disappearing agrarian reform, declining rural subsidies, and the absence of credit threatened the precarious livelihoods of indigenous communities and sparked indigenous protest.

While this kind of structural view of opportunity and capacity is a valuable approach and does better than a strictly rationalist approach, from the vantage point of our research question regarding the emergence of certain kinds of indigenous voices and not others, this perspective can only take us so far. The main drawback here is that the focus on political networks and opportunities, like the previous focus on collective action problems, is culturally very thin. Though scholars working in the structuralist and political process tradition agree that identity is socially constructed, a structural view of movement emergence tends to assume a rather static notion of indigenous identity and struggle, one that remained hidden during corporatist times (disguised as “peasant communities”). Thus, “real” ethnic identities seemed simply to be awaiting the right conditions in order to emerge, almost geologically, through the cracks of shifting political formations. In the prevailing structural account, nonindigenous actors like NGOs and churches play a facilitating external role only in so far as they provide the channels for the eruption of national protests. Lost in these analyses is the important cultural work that creates identities and political subjects.

Thus, culturalist approaches are needed to fill in the gaps left by other kinds of explanations. However, there are at least two versions of cultural-
ist arguments. Closest to the methodological individualism of rationalist perspectives is the framing approach (inspired by Erving Goffman) which suggests that leaders and their opponents are engaged in a contest of meaning production, one in which each side seeks to situate the struggle within a particular narrative or master frame (Johnston and Klandermans 1995; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996). In contrast to the focus on frames, and closer to the methodological holism of structural approaches, the new social movement (NSM) perspective, influenced by critical theorists like Gramsci and Foucault, places less emphasis on the agency of movement actors and critiques the positivist “myopia of the visible” (Melucci 1994, 107). The NSM focus on cultural codes tends toward a more decentered poststructural understanding of the constitution of collective identities and the discursive power of movements (Melucci 1988, 1994, 1996; Alvarez, Escobar, and Dagnino 1998).

While there are some epistemological and ontological differences between those who emphasize strategic framing and those who explore decentered discourses, in pragmatic fashion, I suggest that both are crucial to a comparative understanding of political indigenous voice. The framing perspectives have been used in the literature to grapple with the question of indigenous identity and especially the thorny question of how class identities (peasant) were transformed into ethnic ones (Indian). The more constructivist discourse-centered approach has been used to show how indigenous political identities are formed dialogically by a plurality of actors who engage in a conversation over what indigenous identity is and what its political projects should be about.

**Organization, Representation, and Transnational Opportunities**

Elisabeth Clemens (1993, 1996) provides one particularly useful attempt at bringing these different research traditions together through her study of organizational repertoires in U.S. women’s and labor movements. “Answers to the pragmatic question of ‘How do we organize?’” she argues, “reverberate inward to the shaping of collective identity and outward to link movements to institutions or opportunity structures.” Her work suggests that movement activists engage in important acts of bricolage as they “creatively recombine existing components of a society’s
organizational repertoire in the hope of optimizing the social potential for mobilization while attaining a working, but not too close, relation to political institutions and elites” (Clemens 1996, 207). This tinkering has to try to overlap with mobilizing structures embedded in particular social contexts and also overlap with the institutionalized channels of political access. Too much overlap in either direction, warns Clemens, results in some unpalatable consequences: co-optation, too little mobilization, or repression.

There is something very appealing about Clemens’s bricolage. Some organizational shapes fit well, others too well, and others not at all. Clemens’s scheme, however, is a bit too simple since state responses to popular mobilization depend on constellations of forces that go far beyond organizational shapes. Indeed, it is important to ask how these shapes come to be in the first place. Activists are certainly concerned with organizational form, but to paraphrase Karl Marx’s familiar insight, these forms are not forged entirely under conditions of activists’ own choosing. Selecting organizational models, an essential aspect of the constitution of social actors, is not the solitary decision of utility maximizing agents or creative **bricoleurs**, but rather is the result of messier sets of interactions in contested settings. As Jean Jackson and Kay Warren point out: in the crowded conversation over who is Indian, many actors get a say. In addition to development professionals, social science and social scientists have also played important roles in shaping the identities, concepts, and strategies that indigenous movements have appropriated in their own struggles (Karakras 1995). As neoliberalism has only increased the role of NGOs in the countryside and in development more generally, the cultural work of authenticating indigenous actors is in even greater need of scholarly attention. Indeed, as NGOs, the World Bank, and other actors make decisions about which indigenous organization to work with and which indigenous project to support it becomes even more clear that, as Arturo Escobar (1995, 15) put it, “development operates as an arena for cultural contestation and identity construction.”

Thus the state, NGOs, missionaries, international agencies, agrarian reform agencies, and (even) social scientists all have a say over what Indian organizations are supposed to look like (Jackson 1995). Borrowing a line from James Joyce, this is a case of “Here comes everybody.” Of course, not everybody is equally important. The task for empirical re-
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searchers is to ascertain which actors and interactions are most important in these processes. Thus, I argue that in addition to focusing on Clemens’s question (“How do we organize?”), we should also ponder the ways that movement activists think about the people in whose name they organize (“Whom are we organizing?”).

It is here that revisiting the debate over representation may help clarify both the emergence and impact of social movements on reconfiguring state-society relations. While earlier pluralist formulations viewed social movements as evidence of democratic dysfunction or “short-circuited thinking,” more recent theorizing views social movement politics as a normal and healthy aspect of democratic politics. For Craig Jenkins (1995), social movements are almost always “claims for political representation.” I agree but should emphasize that my use of political representation differs from the traditional political scientific usage that puts electoral arrangements at the center of analysis.

Political representation starts long before we think about elections or voting; it occurs also in the various ways we order and classify the world. Putting it simply, political representation has two dimensions that I will call cultural and institutional. The cultural side of political representation calls our attention to the processes by which certain political subjects are constructed both internally and relationally and therefore become visible and representable. Certain social descriptions and categories—like Indian, black, woman, Republican—are forged in dynamic ways that map certain political spaces in historically and culturally specific ways. The institutional dimension of political representation involves the routinized processes through which certain constructions, out of the many possible ones, are selected and linked with larger political communities.

This formulation has theoretical and empirical roots that will be explored in greater detail in the following chapter. But it is worth noting from the outset that I am indebted to Pitkin’s (1967) classic discussion of the family of meanings associated with The Concept of Representation. Reviewing ideas on representation from Hobbes’s absolutist view to those of twentieth-century liberal pluralism, Pitkin concludes that “representation is not any single action by any one participant, but the overall structure and functioning of the system, the patterns emerging from the multiple activities of many people” (1967, 222). Empirically, this general conceptualization allows us to understand the particular histories of Latin America...
without an a priori emphasis on elections, parties, or parliaments. This is a useful conceptual move, especially for the study of Latin America, where these liberal inventions have historically been less important to linking ruler and ruled than the informal and formal institutions and practices associated with populism, clientelism, and corporatism. All these structures of representation were “top-down” constructs that served the needs of the state or ruling elite. In the last few years, changes in state and economy have greatly weakened those traditional structures and new ones have begun to emerge, this time from the bottom up. Networks of civil associations and social movements can be understood as crucial elements in these new structures of representation (Chalmers et al. 1997).

Such a formulation goes against much conventional wisdom that expects social movements to present a challenge to formal political representation (instability), and the view that political representation is the end of social movement activism (institutionalization) (Huntington 1968; Oberschall 1986). Rather than framing movement and representation as opposite ends of a Huntingtonian governability model (where effective political representation would mean no social movement), we should begin to rethink how movements themselves are forms of representation.

Cutting through much of the confusion, Jenkins formulates the “key question” of social movements and political representation as “whether social movements constitute a direct form of representation resembling classic conceptions of participatory democracy, a device for representing the underrepresented and countering entrenched oligarchies, or an elitist group of self-appointed advocates. In assessing this question, we have to deal with the relationships between citizens and the state as mediated through movements” (1995, 17). Jenkins’s three options—direct democracy, representing the underrepresented, or Michelsian iron-law advocates—provide some helpful starting points for thinking about the connection between indigenous movements and democracy in Latin America. In practice, there is usually a mixture of all three elements in all movements, but to be more specific about the kinds of representation that social movements provide requires one to examine the specific political environments from which they emerge.

Though formal political institutions have been notoriously weak in the Andean region, the long and enduring patterns of uneven state formation still offer important sets of opportunities and constraints for so-
cial movements. State formation, then, is another large process that needs to be taken into account in explaining the construction of indigenous representation. States in Latin America have rarely been clear examples of those Weberian ideal-type human communities characterized by clear territorial boundaries and monopolies on the legitimate means of violence. In Latin America and elsewhere, capital and coercion interacted with colonial legacies that created national political communities that were far from the neatly bounded and coherent political spaces imagined by Weber. Reading Cardoso and Faletto alongside Barrington Moore, one can discern in the political economic history of Latin America different patterns of state formation. The ebbs and flows of export industries, hacienda agriculture, mining, agrarian reform, and oil export influenced the distribution of power among regional elites, the formulation of national development models, and the administration of ethnic difference. These patterns also influenced the form that opposition to those regional elites, development models, and ethnic policies assumed. Such a statement requires much more elaboration than can be provided here, but as I will try to show in the following chapters, export-oriented growth, populism, and, most recently, neoliberalism have accompanying politico-administrative logics that in different ways create constellations of power that fostered competition among regional elites, reconfigured indigenous territories, and structured different regimes of representation. While a thorough history of Andean state formation must be left for another day, this book will show how differences in the formation of national states provided disparate environments for the structuring of indigenous representation.

Finally, the dependent nature of Andean economies calls attention to the importance of international forces for the formation of state domination and societal resistance. Just as international forces and institutions constrain the political economies of Latin America, transnational configurations can provide “targets and political opportunities and create the conflict and alliance system that shape social movement development” (Jenkins 1995, 34). In the cases of Ecuadorian and Bolivian organizations, each society’s organizational repertoire is constantly changing in response not only to different national dynamics (like those related to state formation) but also international agendas (like those set by markets, NGOs, and development agencies). The World Bank is perhaps the best example of target and opportunity as it is often vilified during street pro-
tests as a nefarious agent of globalization, yet it also now finances various indigenous projects, legitimizing certain indigenous units over others through various state programs for indigenous development. Moreover, international nongovernmental organizations like Oxfam America (USA) or state-sponsored development organizations like DANIDA (Denmark) pursue regional strategies and sponsor international events in which indigenous leaders from various organizations exchange ideas and form transnational linkages. Lastly, the existence of international treaties and conventions (especially those of the International Labor Organization and the United Nations) also provide supranational resources for building indigenous strategies and political vocabularies (Brysk 2000). All the national indigenous leaders I interviewed were familiar with these international bodies and agreements and all had traveled internationally. And while not all had been to the United States or Europe (most had), all did have contacts with North Atlantic NGOs and all without exception had traveled much more than the social scientist from the “First World” who had come to interview them.

**A Pragmatic Constructivist Approach to Indigenous Representation**

As there are many indigenous voices, why and how do certain ones emerge as representative of the complex and variegated social group that the label “indigenous people” has come to include in Latin America? To answer this question, this book employs a constructivist, self-reflexive methodology to understand the articulation of indigeneity, both in the sense of voice that is expressed and in the ways that indigenous ideas and subjects are constantly being connected and reconnected, depending on both political conditions and strategies. Additionally, we examine the ways that indigenous movements have been cased by social scientists as another example of the politics of representation, given that social scientific rendering of indigenous movements themselves have consequence on scholarly and political visions of what count as properly indigenous and as a proper kind of movement. Practitioners of positive political science may be skeptical about the use of such self-reflexivity, often thought to be the realm of anthropologists and other wayward postmodern souls, but such an inquiry is an essential part of any theoretical exercise that
asks Kenneth Waltz’s (1979, 8) question: “Do we only know what we see, one may wonder, or do we only see what we know?”

The constructed nature of identities is something that has become commonplace in many social sciences, but for political science, whose hallmark remains the plotting of causal relationships, the concern with social construction is often viewed as nonscientific or, at best, pre-scientific. Recently, Wendt (1999) has done much to bridge the divide between rationality-minded positivists and culturally-oriented interpretivists by drawing a useful distinction between causal and constitutive theories. Both are important to social scientific inquiry, but they involve different kinds of relationships. Causal theories seek to identify the mechanisms that lead from \( X \) to \( Y \), where \( X \) and \( Y \) exist independently of each other, where \( X \) temporally precedes \( Y \), and where without \( X \), \( Y \) would not have occurred. Constitutive theories ask how units like \( X \) and \( Y \) came to be in the first place, and how they were constructed internally (water is made of \( \text{H}_2\text{O} \)) and/or externally (the category “master” exists only in relation to “slave”). The relational kind of constitution is particularly important for social science. While constitutive relationships are not causes in the strict sense of the term, they do have effects that are crucial for explanatory purposes.

While this book will avoid entering into the vigorous philosophical debates over the meanings of pragmatism, the approach taken here is pragmatic in the spirit of John Dewey, William James, and G. H. Mead in exploring the consequence of ideas, in privileging holistic modes of inquiry, and in being, in the words of William James, “uncomfortable away from the facts” (1948). Pragmatism offers crucial insights for the study of identity and cultural politics, since it recognizes, as Dewey and Mead did, that the self is a social achievement, thus rooting individual agency in social forces. This view also makes clear that the approach to identity and voice here is constructivist—but not postmodern—in seeking to explain effects of the constitution of social facts within an explanatory framework still concerned with causal mechanisms. Finally, the framework of this book is comparative and historical, as it examines Indian-state relations during different national periods and compares both national and subnational cases of representation. Unlike rationalist models that take actors and preferences as givens, this historically grounded constructivist approach illuminates the political effects of identity formation. Unlike postmodern deconstruction that “problematises” without explaining, my ap-
proach employs a set of generalizable concepts and propositions that help account for different political outcomes. Here, briefly, are the main ones:

• Multiscalar identity construction: Political identities and discourses are forged dialogically through social interactions across local, national, and transnational scales.24

• Political opportunity structures: The configuration of power relations shape and constrain the possibilities for contemporary collective imaginings and collective action. They also help determine which identities and discourses can jump scales.

• Structured contingencies: Unlike the concept of political opportunity structure, which is often treated as a preexisting given, the concept of structured contingency privileges the ways in which interactions between actors in state and society reshape those very structures.25 Negotiation and contestation often result in new institutional arrangements (like new political agencies, development programs, or political alliances) that shape later rounds of contention.

This pragmatic constructivist framework is useful for analyzing politics in Latin America and beyond, as it sharpens our understandings of both the cultural and institutional processes involved in representing political subjects.

Methods of Fieldwork and Interpretation

I lived and worked mostly in the highland capitals of Quito and La Paz. Though the lingering centralist tradition of Latin America is such that all national organizations have offices and representatives in these capitals, I conducted research outside of capital cities as well. I lived for four months in the Northern Ecuadorian canton of Otavalo in rural and urban settings and worked with the provincial organization: the Indigenous and Rural Worker Federation of Imbabura (Federación Indígena Campesina de Imbabura, FICI). I also made four trips to the lowlands in both countries. While each lowland visit did not last longer than two weeks, the visits nevertheless gave me a very clear sense of the importance of region in indigenous politics. Sixteen months of field research in Ecuador and Bolivia provided great opportunity to gather data on all the main national indigenous organizations, several local organizations, relevant
state agencies, NGOs, and prominent social scientists. In-depth, semi-structured interviews, participant-observation of NGO projects and various indigenous assemblies, and archival research of the history of particular indigenous organizations allowed me to confirm Kay Warren’s insight that understanding who speaks for whom requires one to ask who speaks with whom (Warren 1998). The connections of indigenous organizations with other national and international actors disabused me of any notion of indigenous parochialism and gave me a sense of the wide boundaries of a social movement sector that included national agencies, international NGOs, churches, foreign researchers, and multilateral institutions.

I was afforded another vantage point from which to study indigenous politics by institutional affiliations with respected local NGOs, CEDIME in Quito, and CIPCA in La Paz. I was counseled by some against having such visible institutional affiliations. While there may be some limitations to local affiliations, I think there is no better way to get a sense of the local landscapes than to work with local institutions. Usually saying I was from CEDIME/CIPCA opened doors. When doors seemed to close, it was always instructive to find out why. Similarly, in doing volunteer work with various indigenous organizations (providing logistical help, translation services, or assistance in creating indigenous organization Web pages), I learned much about interorganizational tensions. Social movement sectors may be wide in geographic scope, but they can also be somewhat intimate communities where everyone knows everyone. And intimacy is often positively correlated with contempt, especially when many organizations compete for finite attention and funds.

Being close to the actors, living in urban and rural indigenous communities, and gaining the trust of movement activists provided clear advantages when trying to understand social movement landscapes and discern leading organizations from secondary ones. Additionally, in-depth qualitative study provided access to many of the ideas and images that constitute what I will call the cultural dimension of political representation. Talk of “dirty” Indians, appeals to “compañerucuna” (roughly “comrades” in Kichwa-ized Spanish), and derision of “ll’unkus” (roughly “Indian sell out” or “Uncle Tom” in Aymara) all have real effects in creating political and ethnic boundaries and shaping political conflicts. It is through these kinds of everyday cultural representations of civilization (clean/dirty), development (urban/rural), and authenticity (loyal, poor/sell-out, capitalist) that powerful ideas of inclusion and exclusion are created and reproduced.
Indigenous Movements in Ecuador and Bolivia

The following chapters explore the thoughts, hands, and voices that have formed indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia. A theoretical discussion of the concept and history of representation will be provided that explores canonical and contemporary debates, making a case for a constructivist and culturalist conception of political representation. Given the large gulf between the expectations of liberal democratic theory and the practices of actually existing Latin American democracy, the politics of representation involves more than parties and parliaments. To understand representation more fully, we must attend to the cultural and organizational work that goes into articulating subjects and states.

Early moments of state-society relations in Ecuador and Bolivia suggest a long history of differing approaches to the “Indian problem” that varied in terms of both region (highland/lowland) and actors who sought to speak for and administer indigenous populations. Exploring the distinct “associational ecologies” of different regions provides a crucial insight into the shaping of contemporary indigenous movements (Warren 2001). Indigenous people were not passive actors in this or any other period, but in a variety of ways, structures of domination across public and private spheres served to limit indigenous political voice. Like the nineteenth-century French peasants that Marx was so dismissive of in *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, indigenous people in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Latin America were thought not to be able “to represent themselves. They must be represented.”

The terms of recognition and representation underwent powerful and dramatic transformations in the late twentieth century as Indianness became articulated through important regional and national organizations. Indigenous representation was shaped by political and cultural landscapes. The structures of political opportunity and the ways in which indigenous movements were imagined, in Anderson’s (1991) sense of the creation of models of membership and networks of communication, made possible new alternative political geographies and solidarities. Since the 1990s, the transnational ideas and policies of neoliberalism and multiculturalism have reconfigured Indian-state relations in ways that have often been surprising to neoliberals, multicultural advocates, and indigenous peoples. The transnational negotiation of indigenous authenticity and the local strategies used by very different indigenous actors provides important insights into...
the formation of indigenous political representation. Both Ecuador and Bolivia ultimately prove to have great worth for the study of indigenous politics, social movements, and political representation more broadly.

While the reconstitution of Indians as political actors is a late-twentieth-century phenomenon, the underlying political patterns are neither new nor isolated to Latin America. In the age of national states, state-builders made not only national governments but also national subjects: peasants had to be made into Frenchmen, Sicilians into Italians, Indians into citizens (Weber 1976). The lesson was seemingly clear: social actors do not descend from the heavens; they are works in progress. Unfortunately, political scientists have often overlooked the politics involved in the constitution of collective identity, preferring to see its units of analysis as already constituted givens; subjects sprung fully formed from the sociological imagination. My research on Indian movements suggests that without understanding how subjects are made, we will only have a thin understanding of how they are politically represented. Thinking pragmatically about the social construction of indigenous voice in Latin America directs our attention to the inter-subjective ways in which Indian political communities are imagined, the structures of political opportunity that shape the impact of such imaginings, and the strategies that actors use in negotiating ideas, structures, and resources of transnational indigenous movements.