Transnational and nonstate actors have exerted a pervasive influence on postcommunist transitions in Central and East Europe. No aspect of politics has been untouched. To start with, transnational actors, including international governmental and nongovernmental organizations, corporations, foundations, and activist networks, have played a key role in processes of democratization in postcommunist Europe. When Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that the Orange Revolution in Ukraine was fomented by outside forces, he appealed to xenophobic impulses and underestimated the domestic sources of protest. Yet no one could suggest that he was entirely wrong. In fact, a diverse mix of transnational actors was deeply involved, including United States aid agencies, the European Union (EU), and election observers of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The same could be said of the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the popular uprising in Kyrgyzstan that ousted President

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A Fourth Dimension of Transition

External actors have always influenced politics in Central and East Europe (Janos 2000; Rothschild 1974). But as Vachudova suggests in this volume, the diligence and ultimate success of external actors—particularly the EU—in influencing domestic change in the region is historically unprecedented.

In virtually any area of policy in Central and East European countries, one can find transnational actors assisting state reforms and societal organizations active in that area. International organizations and expert networks have provided critical aid to economic reform teams across postcommunist Europe starting in 1989. Recent studies have focused on transnational actor involvement in pension and social policy (Orenstein 2000; Sissenich 2006), minority rights (Kelley 2004), defense policy (Jacoby 2004), and across the areas included in the EU’s body of laws and regulations, the *acquis communautaire*. Transnational actor influences are not restricted to state policy; they also extend deeply into postcommunist civil society. Aid organizations, international organizations, and transnational nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like the Soros Foundation have played a substantial role in the development of local NGOs, civil associations, businesses, and social movements (Wedel 1998). Perhaps most dramatically, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Kosovo were, at the time of this writing, mandates ruled in large part by transnational organizations such as the United Nations and the EU.

Despite growing interest in examining the role of transnational actors, many scholars have ignored, downplayed, or disputed their importance in Central and East Europe and elsewhere. Leading models of postcommunist transition, for instance, tend to emphasize the causal force of domestic variables such as domestic interest groups, political parties, institutional variation, and the like, often excluding transnational politics altogether. Others accept that transnational actors may dominate elite discourse in some areas, but have only minor significance on the ground. Scholars in the realist tradition insist that states, particularly powerful ones such as the United States or Germany, remain the leading actors in international society and that the impact of transnational actors is limited (Kennedy, this volume).

This book advances our understanding of Central and East European transitions by integrating a wealth of new research on transnational politics into the field of postcommunist politics. We do this first by reframing debates about the “dual” or “triple” transition to include a fourth aspect of
postcommunist transition: the integration of new or newly independent nation-states into an international system marked by complex interdependence. Second, we show that careful analysis of the transnational dimension of transition requires attention to two central questions: how do transnational actors influence domestic politics and how much are they able to do. Third, we introduce a group of essays that make important empirical contributions to each of these research agendas. They represent competing perspectives that illustrate the terms of an emerging debate. Together, these essays advance an agenda that combines concern for both transnational and national dimensions of governance.

This effort to integrate transnational and domestic perspectives on postcommunist politics mirrors a broader trend in comparative and international politics. In recent years, a variety of scholars working in the fields of international relations and comparative politics have suggested that what used to be called “domestic” politics must include a systematic recognition of transnational influences (Orenstein and Schmitz 2006). Following developments in international relations theory and sociological institutionalism (Meyer et al. 1997; Strang and Soule 1998), comparative politics scholars have begun to collapse boundaries between international relations and comparative politics. This new transnational scholarship is characterized by five interlocking claims. First, it challenges the notion that there are one or two global trends transforming politics globally. Instead, the new transnationalism emphasizes multiple trends, including those in the field of governance and organization that are shaping outcomes differently in multiple contexts. Second, the new transnationalism focuses on a host of nonstate actors that have not been terribly significant in comparative politics scholarship before but are seen to have an increasing role in what used to be conceived of as “domestic” politics. Third, it recognizes that states themselves have transnational ties that go beyond the diplomatic realm. Slaughter (2004), for instance, emphasizes that a wide range of state agencies are now part of transnational governmental networks that increasingly develop norms that affect state behavior. Fourth, spheres of governance are being redefined away from hierarchical and territorial forms of governance and toward more networked forms of interaction in internationally contested policy arenas. Fifth, the new transnational scholarship takes both ideas and interests seriously. While influenced by constructivist scholarship in international relations, transnational scholarship in comparative...
politics has tended to show concern for both material interests and the construction of interests through norms, rather than pitting one set of explanations against another (Epstein 2005; Grabbe 2005). We seek to integrate these insights into the study of postcommunist transitions.

The Quadruple Transition

A key starting point for this project is the concept of transition itself. At the outset of transition in 1989, it was widely believed that postcommunist societies faced a challenging dual transition: a simultaneous move to capitalism and democracy. Przeworski (1991) and others (Dahrendorf 1990; Elster 1993) argued that creating new capitalist market economies and democratic political institutions were linked yet threatened to undermine one another. Democratic politics could put an end to economic reform. And economic dislocation could create a large body of economic losers who might vote against democracy in free elections. Using the J-curve to illustrate his point, Przeworski (1991) argued that voters could reject democracy at the polls if the postsocialist economic downturn was either too steep or too protracted. The potential incompatibility of the dual transition to market and democracy became a core issue in postcommunist transition theory.

Claus Offe (1997) broadened the scope of this debate by arguing that postcommunist societies actually faced a triple transition. Many postcommunist states were new or renewed nation-states. Their simultaneous move to nation-statehood, Offe hypothesized, could complicate efforts at democratization and economic reform, especially in multiethnic states. With the case of Weimar Germany in mind, Stephen Van Evera similarly argued that the economic dislocation that would follow the demise of state socialism could fuel nationalist mobilization and instigate ethnic war: “If economic conditions deteriorate, publics become more responsive to scapegoat myths, hence such myths are more believed, hence war is more likely” (1994, 30). Like the dual transition literature, the triple transition literature suggested that different aspects of transition had the potential to disrupt one another.

These problems of simultaneous reform caused scholars to analyze the optimal sequencing of various components of the triple transition. Some scholars argued for rapid economic reforms to take place before a democratic electoral reaction made such reforms impossible (Balcerowicz 1994;
Sachs 1993). Others took an opposite approach. Linz and Stepan (1992, 1996) cautioned that electoral institutions should be legitimated before serious economic reforms were introduced. They also stressed the importance that the proper sequencing of national and regional elections could play in the maintenance of national cohesion. Gorbachev’s decision in 1990 to first hold elections to republican parliaments, Linz and Stepan argued, fostered secessionist pressures that eventually brought down the Soviet state. What these scholars had in common was a sense that different aspects of transition could undermine one another.

However, forecasts of the problems of dual and triple transitions proved overly pessimistic with regard to Central and East Europe. Greskovits went so far as to declare that “it now seems justified to write in the past tense: the breakdown literature has failed” (1998, 4). The simultaneous introduction of democratic political institutions, market economies, and nation-states went more smoothly than analysts had predicted. Contrary to the assumptions of the J-curve, the losers of economic reform did not turn against democratic political institutions. In fact, Steven Fish found a positive relationship between economic reform and democratization in postcommunist states. Countries that avoided democratic backsliding were generally those that implemented the most thoroughgoing economic liberalization (Fish 2001). Moreover, ethnic scapegoating and other manifestations of ethnonationalism failed to materialize during the postsocialist recession, despite the tremendous drop in living standards. In post-Soviet Latvia and Ukraine, economic reforms have been found to facilitate ethnic cooperation by breaking down the economic differentiation of ethnic groups cultivated during the Soviet period (Bloom 2004).

We believe that the central reason that the dual and triple transitions literatures failed to predict the relatively happy confluence of democratization, economic reform, and state building in Central and East Europe was that they ignored or underestimated a fourth dimension of transition: the role of transnational actors in the transition to complex interdependence in Europe. The process of integration of postcommunist states into not only the EU but also a whole range of international organizations, production networks, and international associations constituted a major, and initially ignored, dimension of transition. The geographical proximity of Central and East European states to the EU (Kopstein and Reilly 2000), as well as the simultaneous processes of transition and globalization,
however, came to be seen as key variables in the analysis of postcommunist transitions.

The quadruple transition framework that we are advancing does not simply insert a neglected fourth component into the study of postcommunist transition. Rather, a quadruple transition framework suggests that the projects of nation-state building, democratization, and marketization have been embedded within transnational agendas and pressures, most importantly but not limited to those of the EU. The movement toward complex interdependence, we argue, helped to facilitate the simultaneous introduction of democratic political institutions, market economies, and nation-states. The Council of Europe, in coordination with the OSCE and the EU, carefully monitored the state of democracy throughout the region and, during political crises, dispatched teams to negotiate solutions that reinforced democratic political institutions (Pridham 2002). Transnational economic advisers influenced almost all areas of economic policy making, from privatization to monetary policy. Transnational economic assistance, such as the EU’s PHARE and Tacis programs, however piecemeal, facilitated the efforts of foreign economic advisers and deepened their impact. A surprising 60 percent of the residents of Czechoslovakia were aware of the EU’s PHARE program in 1991 (Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 1991). Transnational corporations also played a significant role in transition, with foreign firms gaining majority shares in banking, manufacturing, and other sectors in most Central and East European countries through the privatization process (see Epstein, this volume). As prospective members of the EU, postcommunist states were also more constrained than initially thought in their choice of minority policies. The EU required countries to develop national plans for combating ethnic discrimination, to ratify the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe, and to implement a wide range of OSCE recommendations concerning the treatment of specific minorities (Kelley 2004). This motivated the ethnic majorities in these states to make credible commitments to protect minority rights (Fearon 1998). The quadruple transition framework rests on the observation that transnational integration limited the scope for disruptions and disjunctures that had been theorized between the various transition projects. At first ignored, transnational actors turned out to be the dark matter that held the various aspects of postcommunist transition together in Central and East Europe.
Any analysis of transnationalism should begin by defining the relevant terms. Transnationalism and transnational actors are used in a variety of ways in the academic literature. We take a broad definition here, considering transnational actors to include any intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), private enterprises, foundations, state bodies or associations that act on policy in a transnational space. IGOs consist of organizations such as the EU, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), OSCE, Council of Europe, and others, whose members are states and which seek to affect policy across multiple national boundaries. In addition, transnational actors include INGOs such as the Soros, Ford, and Mott Foundations that advocate or fund advocacy organizations operating in multiple states and policy areas, as well as issue-specific INGOs such Greenpeace, Transparency International, or Doctors without Borders. Transnational actors also work in coordination with bilateral and other state agencies that act as policy advocates and policy entrepreneurs in multiple states, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) or the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), as well as German party-based organizations such as Heinrich Böhl Stiftung. Finally, in any given issue area, proliferation of transnational actors can constitute a transnational policy community, issue network, or coalition (Rosenau 2003).

Transnational actors’ agendas are not always clearly distinguished from those of states. A long literature has developed on the reasons that states delegate responsibilities to transnational and nonstate actors. Realist (Gilpin 2001) and neo-Marxist (Wade 2002) scholars argue that the actions of transnational actors are closely aligned with the priorities of powerful states. While this may be true, Barnett and Finnemore (2004) emphasize that there are a number of reasons to believe that international organizations act relatively independent of states. As typical bureaucracies, they seek to extend their own power and influence by stretching mandates into new areas and developing problem definitions and solutions that require new forms of activity, higher budgets, and greater independence. This helps to explain why few international organizations die, even after their initial mandate is completed. Transnational organizations, like all bureaucracies, can be
creative at wrenching themselves free from strict hierarchical control by state sponsors. This relative independence of transnational actors applies especially to INGOs and NGOs, and to a lesser extent to state aid agencies or quasi-independent aid organizations that may represent policies grounded in a single party or bureaucratic constituency rather than the government in power.

Many recent studies of transnational influence in Central and East Europe have focused on the EU, for obvious reasons. The EU has been the most powerful transnational actor in postcommunist politics, wielding enormous influence over countries that placed a high premium on membership and were willing to accept almost any price to attain it (Grabbe 2006; Grzymała-Busse and Innes 2003; Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003). The EU is at once an international organization, representing the interests of its member states, and an autonomous actor in its own right, with agenda-setting power concentrated in Brussels. In terms of EU enlargement, the European Commission sought to build consensus around a policy goal not necessarily in the interest of all member states and powerful constituents by appealing to Europe’s historic mission to reunite Europe around liberal democratic norms (see Schimmelfennig 2003; Sedelmeier 2005). On the part of would-be members, elite and popular desires to quickly “return” postcommunist states back to Europe guided the transition process and gave national elites much leeway in pushing through domestic reforms.

While the EU has been a powerful transnational actor in Central and East Europe, it is by no means the only one. This volume seeks to expand understanding of transnational actor influence beyond the EU. We include studies that emphasize the roles of the Catholic Church (Byrnes), international financial institutions (Johnson), and IGOs and NGOs (Lindstrom). This allows us to address areas of policy and politics beyond the narrow range of policy questions included in the acquis communautaire. Instead, we consider transnational influence on a wide variety of domains, such as party systems, public attitudes, interethnic relations, and the full range of postcommunist politics (see also Kelley 2004; Vachudova 2005). We also examine how the decision-making processes of the EU intersect with the agendas of other international organizations, networks, and coalitions. In defense policy, for instance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was critically important (Epstein 2005; Jacoby 2004). In minority policy, the OSCE and Council of Europe played an important role (Hughes,
Sasse, and Gordon 2004; Kelley 2004; Kymlicka 1995). Analyses of bank privatization (Epstein, this volume) or central bank policy (Johnson, this volume) must consider how the European institutions complemented or conflicted with global financial institutions such as the World Bank or the IMF. Although many studies tend to emphasize the importance of a single organization like the EU, we show that in any given policy area multiple transnational actors are at play, often coordinating formally and informally to achieve maximum impact on postcommunist states and societies.

Integrating the study of transnational and national politics requires a multi-level research perspective. We focus on two separate but interrelated aspects of the relationship between transnational and national politics in Central and East Europe: how transnational actors seek to influence domestic politics, and how much influence transnational actors have at the national level. The contributors to this volume focus primarily either on mechanisms of transnational actor influence or on a critical evaluation of the extent of transnational actor influence.

How Do Transnational Actors Exert Influence?

Central to the emerging literature on transnational politics is the question of how transnational actors exert influence. The essays in this volume reflect two competing approaches: rationalist/materialist and constructivist. The rationalist/materialist tradition suggests that actors make choices based on a rational calculation of their material interests, while the constructivist tradition argues that ideas and issue frames also influence how actors perceive and construct their interests and behavior.

Studies drawing on rationalist approaches argue that conditionality mechanisms based on material interests and rewards can best explain domestic policy change in Central and East European states, particularly EU membership conditionality (Kelley 2004; Vachudova 2005). This external incentive model posits that when EU conditions are consistent and credible and domestic adoption costs are low, there is a high degree of domestic compliance (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). Milada Vachudova’s essay takes a strong position in favor of rationalist/materialist interpretations.

Vachudova focuses on the EU as the “causal behemoth” of transnational influence in postcommunist politics. Given Central and East European
states’ overwhelming desire to reap the tremendous benefits of membership, the EU has managed to exert the greatest leverage of any transnational actor in shaping political change in the region. Anchoring her argument in the logic that material rewards create powerful incentives for states to comply with EU rules, Vachudova offers an explicitly rationalist framework for understanding transnational agenda setting. The European Commission, acting on behalf of EU member states, managed to influence political outcomes in the region through both passive and active leverage. Vachudova shows how in the early stages of transition, the attraction of EU membership itself—and the threat of exclusion—gave the EU passive leverage over aspiring members. Once the EU set out clear conditions and guidelines for membership, its leverage became more active, forcing states to comply with vast and intrusive entry requirements. The EU managed to make its active leverage more credible by taking advantage of the asymmetric interdependence between the EU and its weaker and poorer neighbors, as well as its enforcement mechanisms based on meritocracy. Vachudova suggests that while other transnational actors played a role in bringing about political change, namely NATO, the Council of Europe, and the OSCE, their leverage and influence relied on the EU providing legitimacy to the standards they set and creating material sanctions for violation of these standards.

In contrast to Vachudova’s realism, several authors represented here engage with the constructivist tradition and seek to integrate the role of ideas into the study of transnational actor influence. They do this by disaggregating the state and transnational actors and studying the different ways actors approach particular policy agendas.

Nicole Lindstrom analyzes the role of ideational or cultural frames on policies toward antihuman trafficking policies in the Balkans. She notes that human trafficking has become an obsession of the international community, but there are at least four competing frames deployed in international discussions: a migration frame, a law-enforcement frame, an economic frame, and a human rights frame. These frames each suggest different policy responses, different targets, and different objectives. Lindstrom concedes that state interests remain important, because it is ultimately powerful states that determine the choice of frame to be deployed in an issue area. In the case of human trafficking, the EU has advocated a migration approach, while the United States emphasizes law enforcement, and these
choices have made a difference. But the ideas that animate the problem definitions also have an independent influence. Lindstrom’s account is nuanced in that it allows for the possibility that framing choices will change over time. Her account also suggests that policy obsessions (or campaigns) by diffuse networks of transnational actors may have negative or unintended consequences.

Chapters by Jacoby, Johnson, and Epstein combine arguments based on material incentives and ideational influence in innovative ways. Wade Jacoby seeks to bridge the rationalist/constructivist divide by studying the coalitions that form between transnational and domestic actors. This “coalition approach” to the study of transnational influence has the benefit of providing a finer-grained analysis of cross-border collaborations and their impacts (Jacoby 2006). Jacoby shows that transnational actors may have different levels and types of influence depending on the configuration of existing domestic actors and their ideas. While some may act as “veto players,” others act as “vehicles” of transnational actor agendas. In particular, Jacoby suggests that transnational actors influence policy by alloying with domestic groups that have historically been on the losing end of policy battles, or what he calls “minority traditions” in domestic politics. Transnational actors leverage their resources to turn domestic political losers into winners, thus gaining substantial influence on policy. In this way, the material resources of transnational actors are deployed to advance particular ideological agendas. Jacoby shifts the emphasis away from whether rational or ideational explanations are better by combining elements of both in a perspective that focuses on deciphering particular mechanisms of influence. He also provides a whole new language for thinking about transnational actor interventions through this “coalition approach.”

Juliet Johnson contributes further to combining the realist and constructivist perspectives with an essay on two-track diffusion. While previous analysts have emphasized either normative suasion or material coercion as mechanisms of transnational actor influence, Johnson argues that both mechanisms may operate in any given area, affecting different groups differently. For instance, she argues that Central European central bankers tended to be heavily socialized into liberal economic norms, so heavily that their enthusiasm for the adoption of the euro, for instance, outstripped what many economists thought reasonable from the perspective of state...
interest. Other actors who had supported European integration out of interests and incentives but did not necessarily share the liberal zeal of central bankers, came to oppose quick adoption of the euro. Johnson concludes that the reasons actors adopt policy positions matter, since changes in incentives (or norms) may affect different actors differently over time, in this case preventing the embeddedness of policies. Johnson’s contribution further suggests the importance of analyzing transnational actor influence not only on states but also on interest groups within states. This can lead to a finer grained analysis of the influence of transnational actors. It puts further weight on substantial differences between normative and incentive-based compliance.

Rachel Epstein emphasizes that international organizations can shift the terms of debate on policy in multiple states, but their influence is contingent on their ability to mobilize politically positioned domestic reformers. Such an argument is clearly consistent with that of Jacoby and the coalition approach. Epstein focuses her attention, however, on how transnational actors mobilize such support. Transnational actors successfully implement their agendas only when they are able to build domestic resonance for their policies. In this way, the content of policy ideas helps to determine the power of transnational actors. She puts forward three main reasons why transnational actors may mobilize domestic actor support: uncertainty of domestic actors about which policies to support, desire for social recognition, and perceived credibility of transnational agendas and policies. Where domestic actors have strongly formed countervailing preferences, Epstein would not expect to see compliance with transnational actor agendas. However, where domestic policy makers are not firmly wedded to alternative ideas, and indeed may be seeking solutions to significant policy problems, transnational actors may play a powerful role. Epstein also places great importance on the individual and group desire for social recognition by transnational actors. If policy makers care about the judgments of transnational actors, they may behave differently than if they are indifferent to them. Finally, the perceived credibility of transnational policies matters.

Epstein illustrates these arguments through a detailed discussion of debates over bank privatization in Central and East Europe. She argues that policy makers in Poland and Hungary were far more receptive to transnational actor agendas than their counterparts in Romania, since Romania
had less interest in membership in various European clubs and simply ignored transnational actor advice that would have moved the country toward privatization and sale of banking assets to foreigners. Epstein thus moves toward a theory of why different social groups may accept or reject transnational actor advice.

These authors have found substantial support for the view that transnational actors affect policy in Central and East Europe. Further, they have identified a variety of mechanisms of influence and have begun to uncover when certain actors and mechanisms are important and when they are less so. They build on a broad literature in international relations theory on the role of transnational actors that shows the extent and type of international influence and domestic institutions to be key determinants of domestic change (Risse-Kappen 1995). By bringing this debate into the field of transition studies, these essays make a major contribution to the literature by illustrating how transnational actors have structured the opportunities and norms of transition.

How Influential Are Transnational Actors?

While a burgeoning literature has demonstrated the significant influence of transnational actors and considered the mechanisms of this influence, many scholars in comparative politics and international relations remain less convinced of the relevance of this research agenda. Some critics in the realist tradition argue that states remain the central determining actors in international relations and that international organizations act in the interest of leading states and their hegemonic interests. Skeptics of the transnational research agenda suggest that the influence of transnational actors still depends crucially on the cooperation of local actors who dominate national politics, from governing elites to powerful domestic constituencies. The influence of transnational actors is thus significantly constrained by domestic political institutions and interests and often amounts to small potatoes. Moreover, by neglecting to fully address the realities of domestic politics, transnational actors’ actions can result in unintended consequences. Another criticism of the role of transnational actors is the reaction hypothesis. Many scholars have argued that the growing influence of transnational actors and the policies that they spread, including neoliberal economic
policy, democratization, and cultural globalization, fuel nationalist and other particularist reactions. The campaigns of Zapatista, leader Subcommander Marcos, and the French sheepherder turned peasant leader José Bové, whose fight against the World Trade Organization (WTO) landed him in jail on charges of bombing a McDonald’s restaurant, serve as vivid examples of what Benjamin Barber calls Jihad versus McWorld. Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations (1996) suggests that if members of non-Western civilizations previously emulated the West, today they are more likely to form reactive identities in opposition to it.

To what extent can these critiques of transnational politics be applied to postcommunist Europe? Some analysts have argued that democratization and economic reform efforts encouraged by international organizations in the postcommunist countries have not only failed but also fueled domestic reaction. Jack Snyder, in considering the relationship between democratization and nationalism, argues that in newly democratic countries, politicians are rewarded for playing the nationalist card in the nascent and highly imperfect marketplace of ideas. Slobodan Milošević in Serbia and Franjo Tudjman in Croatia exemplify this trend (Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Snyder 2000; Snyder and Ballentine 1996). Susan Woodward (1995), also writing on the Balkans, claims Western-imposed structural adjustment policies were the root cause of nationalism in the former Yugoslavia. These measures, Woodward argues, led to heightened competition among the Yugoslav elite, producing incentives for the politicians of the wealthier republics, namely Slovenia and Croatia, to secede.

One may similarly hypothesize that as the EU has reached deeply into domestic society, reshaping much of the legal infrastructure of the new member states in its image, it has challenged the role of many national politicians, who are no longer the final arbiter in many decision-making arenas. That governing elites, some of whom fought for national independence, would not want to relinquish this newly won sovereignty to external entities does not seem surprising. The largely undemocratic (or at the very least nontransparent) manner in which the EU accession process has been conducted has provided additional incentives for local elites to adopt anti-EU reactive positions. With a casual glance at the findings of Eurobarometer surveys, one finds a sizable population of Euroskeptics in most new member states. It is only logical that local elites would capitalize on such anti-EU sentiment. Robert Rohrschneider, Stephen Whitefield, and their
colleagues’ analysis of public opinion surveys on EU integration noted growing Euro skepticism in East Central Europe as accession drew closer, as well as negative positions on key policies and values underpinning integration, including the foreign ownership of property and basic market values (2006). This suggests that transition to transnational interdependence may indeed foment nationalist reactions.

We should not assume, however, that politicians who seek to mobilize domestic resistance will be successful. As Gagnon’s work shows, many politicians have either failed in their attempts at playing the nationalist card or their actions have been intended to demobilize rather than mobilize national groups (1996, 2004). Some of the EU enlargement-related issues are highly technical in nature and, as a result, may be difficult for domestic politicians to frame effectively. The appeal of domestic reaction has also been more varied than assumed by scholars. While many Serbs joined militias, others avoided the draft (Milicevic 2004). It is worth adding that the reaction against the supposed foreign roots of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution failed miserably, whereas Putin’s naked interference in Ukraine’s domestic affairs, which included appearances before each round of the election, appeared to backfire (Karatnycky 2005). Liudmila Yanukovych, who may have ended up in the proverbial historical dustbin, instead became the butt of numerous jokes in Ukraine. Her reactive diatribe against the foreign financing of the demonstrations on Independence Square, which supposedly included the provision of American felt boots and narcotics-laced oranges, not only flopped but became the target of a popular dance remix. What is more Soviet than felt boots?

The broad currents of criticism of transnational actor influence—the “small potatoes” camp, the “reaction” camp, and the “realist” camp—are not irrelevant to the study of transnational actors because they present important objections to this line of analysis that can be useful in the development of the field. Contributors to this volume consider the highly contingent nature of the interplay between transnational and national politics in postcommunist Europe and the multiple unintended consequences of transnational actors’ influence.

Timothy Byrnes, for example, presents a mixed view of the influence of transnational actors, showing that their influence can be muted by domestic politics. In particular, Byrnes questions how effective the Roman Catholic Church has been in advancing its transnational agenda. He finds limited
results and roots his explanation in the structure of the church as an organization. Pope John Paul II did develop and seek to spread a coherent agenda for the future of Europe that included integration of Central and East European states into the EU, a reinvigoration of spiritual traditions in Europe, recognition of the Christian nature of Europe, and protection of life. This agenda was not always easy to pursue within the national churches of the region. Since national church leaderships in Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Croatia have been tied closely to nation-building projects in those countries, the transnational church was not always able to supersede those agendas. The church failed in its attempt to create better ties between Slovaks and Hungarians in Slovakia, for instance, or to influence the Croat church to support peace in the Balkans. Byrnes shows how the church’s efforts backfired in these and other cases. An unintended consequence of the church’s intervention in the Balkans was it being perceived as a bulwark of Croat national sentiment, a position Pope John Paul II had hoped to avoid.

Hislope similarly questions the transformative influence of transnational actors in his study of the impact of transnational anticorruption agendas in Macedonia. While he documents a widespread obsession or campaign by transnational actors against corruption, Hislope argues that corruption had a far more positive side than transnational actors perceive: it is the glue that held together a country otherwise beset by ethnic conflict. Interaction through bribes and corrupt activity was the only way rival Albanian and Macedonian political and business leaders could cooperate. Party competition, he clearly illustrated, did not lead to cooperation but to extreme competition and possibly to conflict and ethnic cleansing. Hislope showed that transnational actors have been ineffective in rooting out corruption in Macedonia, and, should they ever be effective, they would have the unintended consequence of undermining another major transnational objective: protection of ethnic peace. This conclusion points to the seeming inconsistency between different transnational actor agendas. Because transnational actors are not part of a single government, but rather a loose configuration of different organizations pursuing distinct policy campaigns or obsessions, it is possible that consistency is not the strong suit of transnational actors across different policy areas. Hislope’s study also suggests that when transnational actors encounter deeply embedded cultural practices with strong domestic support, they can have only limited impact. Transnational actors need domestic partners and may not always find them.
David Ost’s essays provide compelling support for both the realist and reaction critiques of the influence of transnational actors in his study of Polish foreign policy debates since the fall of communism. He finds that Poland’s decision to adopt a pro-U.S. foreign policy stems mainly from a desire to check the power of the EU, with Poland effectively playing one transnational influence—that of NATO and U.S. interests more generally—off transnational influences coming from the EU. Why would Polish decision makers want to check the EU at the same time that they are trying to enter it?

Ost offers two main arguments for this seemingly paradoxical decision by Poland to pursue an independent foreign policy. First, the Polish elite, following the logic of political realism, increasingly feared that the EU masked the interests of leading states, especially France and Germany. Citing parallels to the interwar era and earlier historical periods when Poland was carved up by dominant powers, Ost shows how the strong voices coming from Old Europe fueled fears within the Polish elite that Poland’s national interests would not be considered within the EU. Second, Polish decision makers adopted a pro-U.S. stance—and initially supplied one of the larger contributions of troops to Iraq—in reaction to the asymmetrical and deeply humiliating nature of the EU accession process. During the accession process, Polish politicians and intellectuals were not asked their opinions, but instead simply told to implement all of the *acquis communautaire*. When the opportunity arose to take an independent action, in this case supporting the U.S. decision to invade Iraq, Polish political actors reacted to the humiliations of accession by choosing an independent foreign policy in line with that of the United States. Ost also points out that the Polish decision to stand up to its Western European partners might have interesting unintended consequences. While some within the Polish elite initially feared the decision to adopt a pro-U.S. stance would hurt Polish interests within the EU, Polish defiance may have strengthened Poland’s hand in later negotiations with the EU, guaranteeing it more rather than fewer goodies from Brussels.

The realist critique of the transnational politics literature is found in Michael Kennedy’s chapter. Kennedy argues that transnational actor influence is embedded in broader geopolitical trends and belongings, features of the international system not readily apparent in the middle-range theory perspective of the transnational actor literature. Kennedy analyzes military and energy security issues in Central and East Europe and argues
that in these policy areas, the dominant actors are still states that seek to protect their fundamental interests. Transnational actors are less important, and, indeed, the impact of transnational actors has to be seen in the context of a transition culture rooted in the Western powers’ growing sphere of influence. Kennedy’s argument notes important limits to transnational actor influence and suggests that it needs to be understood in the specific geopolitical context of post–cold war Central and East Europe. Outside such a context, defined by the rise of Western powers and the retreat of the Soviet Union, transnational actor influence may be limited.

Together with simultaneous processes of democratization, marketization, and nation-state building, postcommunist states are in the midst of a “fourth” transition to complex interdependence. The key issues in an emerging research agenda on transnational actors in postcommunist politics are these: How do transnational actors seek to affect state policy? By what mechanisms and modes of influence? And how much influence are they able to wield? Under what conditions can they be expected to be effective or not? These questions provide a useful starting point for a future research agenda in postcommunist politics. A quadruple transition framework helps to account for the anomalies of the triple transition literature and provides deeper insight into the domestic politics of accession than one that inquires into either the domestic or transnational projects alone.

The chapters in this volume do not adopt a unified approach to the analysis of transnational influence. Instead, they represent a range of perspectives that constitute an important emerging debate on the importance of transnational actors in Central and East European transitions.