In the history of rhetoric and composition, the year 1980 is unique: it solidified one historical trajectory, started another, and covered over a third. Throughout the 1970s, rhetoric and composition was growing as a discipline: theories from the history of rhetoric were coming back to inform composition and composition was developing its own knowledge base through scholars’ cognitive and ethnographic research on writers. By 1980, Richard Young had summed up these developments and set the tone for their expansion in his article “Arts, Crafts, Gifts, and Knacks.” But also in 1980, James Berlin wrote “The Rhetoric of Romanticism,” which, unbeknownst to many, started the disciplinary movement toward cultural rather than cognitive investigation. While these two histories are largely known, even though Berlin’s article typically is
not, another historical trajectory began in 1980 but is just now (re)emerging. Paul Kameen’s article “Rewording the Rhetoric of Composition,” also published in 1980, questions these two histories of the field even before they begin to dominate the landscape. While most maps of rhetoric and composition acknowledge the work of Young and Berlin, Kameen’s position has been largely overlooked. This chapter begins the process of remapping rhetoric and composition to bring Kameen’s ulterior position to the surface by examining Young’s drive for disciplinarity. Young’s categorical mapping, and the areas of investigation that lead up to and follow his grounding assumptions, excludes issues that can be important for invention—most notably an acceptance of a broader notion of method as an acceptable model for rhetorical invention.

The desire to map the field of rhetoric and composition comes from its inception as a discipline. In his essay “Freshman English, Composition, and CCC,” David Bartholomae locates this desire in the dichotomy of the two opening plenary speeches of the Conference on College Composition and Communication (CCCC) in 1949. He casts Richard Weaver as the emblematic figure in English studies that CCCC was established to question: Weaver’s speech promoted the belief in a unified culture, a morality, and a truth that language must represent. Bartholomae sees James McCrimmon as the new voice: McCrimmon’s speech set the tone for what would become a new emphasis on rhetoric that would inform the development of rhetoric and composition. This oppositional debate establishes a tension that drives early mappings of the field. Virginia Anderson notes in “Property Rights: Exclusion as Moral Action in ‘The Battle of Texas’” that “[t]he tensions of these social relations can be read in the pages of College Composition and Communication (CCC). From its earliest days in the 1950s, contributors constructed and then reconstructed a changing set of conceptual Venn diagrams positioning rhetoric, linguistics, science, social science, and especially literature in relation to composition” (451). The debates revolve around how much influence these disciplines should be allowed to have on composition and which disciplines should be excluded from composition.

As the discipline develops and searches for an identity all its own, it invariably (perhaps necessarily) falls into various categorical mappings and polemic
narratives that emerge from the two positions established at the first CCCC. The situational need to delineate a territory for rhetoric and composition (to define a them to exclude and an us to identify with) fed into a narrative of retreat and return. The early nineteenth century, as the story was and is told, saw the devaluation of rhetoric due to the Enlightenment elevation of logic, the value of romantic individualism, and the rise of national literatures throughout the nineteenth century. To fill the void left by rhetoric’s displacement, composition emerged in the late nineteenth century largely due to a literacy crisis that provided the exigence for what has become first-year composition. But the separation of composition from literature through the development of a separate conference in 1949 allowed a space for rhetoric’s return.

The combination of mapping via categorical distinction and a narrative of rhetoric’s retreat and return sets the disciplinary context for Daniel Fogarty’s Roots for a New Rhetoric (1959). Fogarty is credited with naming current-traditional rhetoric as the paradigm that develops from the institutional structure of first-year composition as well as sounding a call for a new rhetoric in opposition to the outmoded current-traditional approach. All the now-classic current-traditional characteristics are present in Fogarty’s categorization: the focus on grammar, mechanics, syntax, spelling, and punctuation; the focus on the four modes; the focus on clear and coherent style; the division of texts/discourse into paragraphs, sentences, and words; and the naive empirical epistemology. Fogarty constructs this current traditionalism category explicitly to situate the “new rhetoric” exemplified in the work of I. A. Richards, Kenneth Burke, and the General Semanticists. To assess their potential importance for improving the first-year course, Fogarty charts Aristotelian rhetoric, outlines current-traditional rhetoric, and displays them adjacent to a diagram of the ideas of Richards, Burke, and the General Semanticists. In short, to discover the new rhetoric he has to delineate the old rhetorics.

The first thing Fogarty sees in this map is a distinction between teaching rhetoric and the philosophy of rhetoric. This distinction is important in two respects: first, it shows that current-traditional rhetoric is “still largely Aristotelian in its basic philosophy” but has new formal elements that “time and expediency have added to the teaching of rhetoric” (120), and second, it shows a
similarity among Richards, Burke, and the General Semanticists—they all want to extend their philosophies of rhetoric into their teaching rhetorics. For Fogarty, all three look to make this move because “the new sciences had given them a new consciousness of the all-pervading importance of language for any study in any field. And language has provided multiple problems never adequately faced before” (121). This situation calls for these issues to be raised in the composition classroom if the students are going to be equipped to deal with language use in the cultural context of the late twentieth century. Fogarty imagines that in Aristotle’s time, and in the times of the trivium and quadrivium, students studied both philosophy and rhetoric. But in his day, “the average college student may never make the connection between his philosophy and his composition” (122).

_Roots for a New Rhetoric_ provides a basis for two important developments in rhetoric and composition: first, it sets up current-traditional rhetoric as a category to be mapped and argued against, providing rhetoric and composition with an exclusionary term and scapegoat category and a them/us, old/new mapping strategy, and second, it provides a foundation for Berlin’s social-epistemic rhetoric. For the moment, the former is central because Fogarty sees current-traditional practice as an extension of Aristotelian classical rhetoric (hence the name current-traditional), rather than seeing a distinction between classical rhetoric and current-traditional rhetoric. Much of the “new rhetoric” in the 1960s explicitly brought back classical themes (e.g., C. H. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca’s _The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation_), which is a much different approach to “new rhetoric” than Fogarty’s emphasis on Burke, Richards, and the Semanticists. For Fogarty, current-traditional rhetoric’s philosophical basis is Aristotelian, even though that basis has been largely forgotten under the pressure for more direct pedagogical application. Fogarty’s new rhetoric does not bring back Aristotle but looks to contemporary theorists to build a new philosophy for the development of new practices.

Nevertheless, major figures in the field, including Young, set up current-traditional rhetoric in opposition to new classical rhetorics, which supports a narrative of retreat and return: classical rhetoric retreats during the dominance of current-traditional practices but is returning in the late twentieth century. A corresponding move seeks to link literature and romanticism to current-
traditional rhetoric and early approaches to composition. Historically these moments do happen in conjunction, but their articulation in early arguments for the return of rhetoric function predominantly in the service of polemics and a rhetoric of exclusion. In the 1970s, and up through the 1980s, compositionists such as Janice Lauer, Frank D’Angelo, Hal Rivers Weidner, Young, and Ross Winterowd worked to find a solid basis for rhetoric and composition’s disciplinary status and generally did so at the expense of some scapegoat category, whether it is characterized as current-traditional rhetoric, literature, romanticism, expressivism, vitalism, or articulated in some amalgamation of these discourses. The combination of categorical exclusion and narrative retreat and return establishes specific disciplinary roots for rhetoric and composition that ground attempts to map out disciplinary territory and continue to influence the field today.

Romanticism and the Case against Vitalism

Fogarty’s oppositional approach to mapping the emerging discipline is extended to other debates as new classical approaches face challenges. Some of the early debates surrounding romanticism centered on an exchange in 1971–72 between Janice Lauer and Ann Berthoff. The exchange began with Lauer’s “Heuristics and Composition” (1970) a bibliography of work in psychology on creative problem solving, which was taken from her dissertation. For Lauer, these investigations held great promise for those “interested in identifying the stages of creativity, defining heuristics and locating its place in the creative process” (397), which were some of the main goals of scholars looking to make rhetoric and composition a discipline. Ann Berthoff, however, sees a potential problem with “converting English composition itself to a problem” (“The Problem of Problem Solving” 237). In other words, the problem is the reduction of creative thinking in general to problem solving in particular. In her response to Berthoff, Lauer claims that she does not reduce creativity or heuristics to problem solving, even though many of the psychologists she includes call creativity “creative problem solving.” In her mind, problem solving as a heuristic is “effec-
tive guessing,” not limited but “open-ended” (“Response” 208–209). Berthoff, however, in her own “Response,” notes, “Adding ‘creative’ to ‘problem solving’ doesn’t really solve the problem” (404). It does not address the reduction of thinking and heuristics to a specific conception of problem solving.

One of the primary problems in the exchange between Lauer and Berthoff is epistemological: for Berthoff, as for Fogarty, language is more than a signal code as the psychologists conceive it. Rather than relying on experts in psychology, she argues that a method of creative thinking with a coherent epistemology based on language and a corresponding, sound pedagogical history exists in English studies in the “legacy of the Romantic Movement” (“Response to Janice Lauer” 415). For her, Coleridge’s method is developed around the creative person as artist, not as problem solver. She points to Melville: “a careful disorderliness is the true method”; to Whitehead: “a state of imaginative, muddled suspense . . . precedes any successful inductive generalization”; and to Klee: “I begin with chaos; it is the most natural start” (415). For her, Coleridge’s method works with thinking that is “something other than effective guessing” (415). But most importantly she states that artists use their minds—they do not simply express themselves—and she goes on to list all of the things a writer can develop through practice and learning. In her mind, these are the things that can be taught in composition, and they are all beyond the things that psychologists can reduce to sub-abilities so they can make laws out of them.

As the debates between heuristics, specific procedures for the process of invention, and method, a more open-ended procedure for addressing situations, heat up, their importance becomes clearer. In these debates, Berthoff, along with others, is labeled a “new romantic” who believes that writing cannot be taught, a position she shows in her “Response” that she does not hold.

The term “new romanticism” is coined and defined by Frank D’Angelo in his book A Conceptual Theory of Rhetoric (1975):

The importance of these new approaches to writing [that focus on creative expression and on personal writing] is that they provide a healthy balance to the rational, systematic approaches to writing which have long dominated the classroom. These new approaches emphasize feeling rather than intellect, exploration and discovery rather than preconceived ideas, the imagination,
creativity, free association, fantasy, play, dreams, the unconscious, nonintellectual sensing, the stream-of-consciousness, and the self. . . . This new emphasis on writing which is relatively free of control and direction may be termed the new romanticism. It holds that not all of our mental processes are rational. It denies that the intellect is more in touch with reality than the imagination or other non-logical process. (159)

D’Angelo’s characterization may seem innocent enough. But unfortunately the binary that is created between problem solving or heuristics, on the one hand, and new romantics, on the other, becomes drastically polarized into those who see invention—and by extension writing—as teachable via heuristics, and those who have no method at all and leave invention up to subjective genius and feeling, seeing it as unsusceptible to being taught. The result is that Berthoff, and anyone associated with other versions of romanticism, is relegated to this reductive notion of new romanticism. But Berthoff is not a romantic in this particular, expressivist sense. She never espouses genius without any method but rather works for a method that utilizes the mind, language, and the world. Eventually James Berlin comes to this understanding and claims that Berthoff is a “new rhetorician,” but the general category of new romanticism becomes the new scapegoat for new classical rhetorics.

After their lively exchange, Lauer continued to work with cognitive psychology and heuristics, while Berthoff focused on Coleridge and method. These two points of departure go on to develop into two different trajectories, and the conflation and confusion on which they are built continue on through Young and into the field. One of the most important events in the rhetoric/romantic debates is how vitalism gets connected to romanticism in the field. In the mid-1970s, Weidner set the precedent for the dismissal of vitalism as a productive part of rhetoric and composition’s history in his dissertation “Three Models of Rhetoric: Traditional, Mechanical and Vital” (1975), which was directed by Young. Most problematic is Weidner’s conflation of vitalism with the general category of new romanticism outlined by D’Angelo. In his dissertation, Weidner uses Coleridge as the vitalist-romantic who is the archetypal adversary of rhetoric and all future teachers of writing. Weidner claims that Coleridge had no principle or method of origination, no method of inventing the sub-
stance of his poetry. But as Kameen points out, Weidner depends on certain assumptions about vitalism as a whole in his reading and subsequent categorization of Coleridge. Unfortunately, Young popularizes, through his own work and that of many of his students, much of what Weidner claims as being the case against vitalism. The result for rhetoric and composition as a discipline is a widespread and unnoticed confusion of intellectual and historical categories.

In his dissertation, Weidner examines rhetoric’s treatment in the hands of scientists and romantics in England between 1750 and 1850. To do so, he sets up an opposition between science and philosophy. For him, science subordinates rhetoric and commonplaces to experiment, while romantic philosophy subordinates rhetoric and commonplaces to insight: “In either case, it is thought that an art is no longer needed for mediating between the formal systems of theory and the applied principles of practice. In both the scientific and romantic movements, it is believed that ‘facts’ alone, either objectively or subjectively discerned, are wholly sufficient for the effective government of human life” (6). They both see nature, the material world or the world of the mind, respectively, “as the living corpus of truth”; therefore, they have no need for rhetorical “artifice” (6). Weidner’s distinctions among art, science, and philosophy set up a clash of epistemologies between classical rhetoric, the enlightenment, and romanticism. He examines the clash by choosing one work from one author to represent each of the three models: Aristotle, traditional; Campbell, mechanical; Coleridge, vital. He acknowledges that it is a shortcut to treat one historical work as a paradigm, qualifying his results as tentative. Nevertheless, the real problem with his mapping is that he never addresses his use of the term vitalism as a synonym for romanticism. For him, “Coleridge is, in England, one of the vitalistic movement’s most articulate literary philosophers and surely its strongest opponent of mechanism. Most of his ideas are shared to a greater or lesser degree by authors labeled by literary historians as ‘romantic’” (190).

And with that claim, Weidner lumps all vitalists and romanticists together under the category “anti-mechanism”—a category that creates a genus/species problematic. If a category is broad enough, vastly different species will be able to fit under its umbrella. Weidner claims that “Romantic theory in general and
Coleridge’s metatheory in particular are both essentially vitalistic” (211) and elevates this to a general category, which is historiographically problematic: the general categories simply fit into slots in the narrative of retreat and return, which sidesteps a closer examination of vitalism.

One of Weidner’s problems in this regard is that at crucial moments in his argument, where Coleridge is linked to a conception of vitalism, he relies too heavily on other readings of Coleridge rather than his own. He does quote Coleridge’s texts quite often, but when vitalism and its conflation with romanticism comes up he appeals to someone else for validation. For example, he turns to Jacques Barzun’s Classic, Romantic, Modern for a critical point. For Barzun, vitalism implies “that life is an element and not merely a combination of dead parts. It implies organic structure and organic function. It implies that the primary reality is the individual and not either the parts of which is made or the artificial groupings which they enter into. This in a word is individualism” (quoted in Weidner 211). Weidner then quotes an extended definition of vitalism from Arthur Berndtson’s entry in A History of Philosophical Systems that is fair enough. But he bases his reading of Berndtson’s philosophical definition of vitalism on Barzun’s literary interpretation, claiming, “To [Berndtson’s] concept of vitalism Coleridge’s theory adds a concept emphasizing man’s uncommonly powerful creative potential, directed by a universal spirit with whom man communicates by means of feeling. This capacity of the individual to directly apprehend truth frees him from conventions: social, intellectual, or linguistic” (212; emphasis added).

What Weidner fails to recognize is that this addition makes Coleridge’s theory something other than vitalism: if romanticism can be added to vitalism, then they are not necessarily equivalent and it opens the question of the nature of vitalism as distinct from romanticism. As I will argue, vitalism in most of its forms does not subscribe to subjectivism, individualism, or an individual will. This position is a product largely of the romantic period, though Hegel’s romanticism can be read as acknowledging the individual’s dialectical relationship to the social whole—an understanding that can be seen in Coleridge as well. But the problem is that these historically specific discourses are applied to all vitalisms and romanticisms. Vitalisms in other periods display different
As rhetoric and composition scholars chart out the discipline’s paradigms, this historical difference gets forgotten and vitalism’s relationship to art, method, situation, and ultimately rhetoric is obscured.

The Problem with Paradigms

In 1978–79, Young directed a National Endowment for the Humanities post-doctoral seminar, “Rhetorical Invention and the Composing Process,” at Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) that became a foundational moment for the discipline. The seminar was attended by many people who went on to become key figures in the field. It exposed these people to the practice of mapping the field, and its content drew directly from Fogarty, the Berthoff/Lauer debate, and Weidner. The seminar was attended by Sharon Bassett, James Berlin, Lisa Ede, David Fractenberg, Robert Inkster, Charles Kneupper, Victor Vitanza, Sam Watson, Vickie Winkler, and William Nelson. Speakers or visitors to the seminar included Linda Flower (who was teaching writing in the business college at CMU and gave protocols to many of the participants that she and Dick Hayes used as a basis for their early research on the composing process), Richard Ohmann, Alton Becker (of Young, Becker, and Pike), Bill Coles (University of Pittsburgh), A. D. Van Nostrand (Brown University), Richard Enos (who was interviewed for a position at CMU), Otis Walter (University of Pittsburgh, Department of Speech), Janice Lauer (University of Detroit), and Henry Johnstone (an editor of the journal *Philosophy and Rhetoric*).

Since many of the participants had degrees in literature rather than rhetoric—generating one of the primary needs for the seminar—Young exposed them to many maps of the field as a way of orienting them to composition: Fogarty’s Aristotle, current-traditional, and new rhetorics; James Kinneavy’s expressive, persuasive, referential, and literary; Frank D’Angelo’s logical (static, progressive, repetitive) and nonlogical (imagining, condensation, symbolizing, displacement, free association, transformation, nonlogical repetition); Weidner’s traditional, mechanical, and vital; Stephen Pepper’s formalism, mechanism, organicism, and contextualism; Northrop Frye’s comedy, romance, tragedy,
and irony (satire); and M. H. Abrams’s pragmatic, mimetic, expressive, and objective. In addition to reading Fogarty’s book, the participants read three important dissertations: Albert Kitzhaber’s dissertation (1953) in which he examines the pedagogical practices Fogarty later calls current-traditional from which Kitzhaber initially published the bibliography; Janice Lauer’s dissertation (1967) from which she also published the bibliography that initiated the early debates with Ann Berthoff; and Weidner’s dissertation (1975) that laid the basis for rhetoric and composition’s dismissal of vitalism.5

The NEH seminar was largely based on Young’s articles “Invention: A Topographical Survey” (1976) and “Paradigms and Problems: Needed Research in Rhetorical Invention” (1978). “Paradigms and Problems” provided a basis for the seminar by establishing an image of rhetorical invention that is informed by Fogarty’s notion of current-traditional rhetoric, Weidner’s use of vitalism, and Lauer’s take on rhetorical invention. In the article, Young uses Thomas Kuhn’s concept of the paradigm as “disciplinary matrix” to argue that Fogarty’s current-traditional rhetoric is the dominant paradigm in composition. Young argues that current-traditional rhetoric has been operating in the mode of normal science—using the assumptions of a paradigm without questioning them. But as Kuhn notes, this period of stability rarely endures. At some point a problem arises that the paradigm cannot account for. In Young’s mind, the discipline is confronting such a crisis in the late seventies because current-traditional rhetoric does not properly account for rhetorical invention.

Following Weidner, Young argues that the current-traditional paradigm rests on “the vitalist assumption that creative processes . . . are not susceptible to conscious control by formal procedures” (“Paradigms and Problems” 32) and therefore excludes the formal arts of invention from composition practice. Current-traditional rhetoric relies on other disciplines for content and the production of knowledge, while vitalism relies on a collection of informal methods of invention—using lists of topics to elaborate on by looking up references, writing from experience, reading essays and applying their ideas, or using look-think-write procedures based on images (33). Composition begins to use these informal methods, according to Young, because relying on other disciplines was not working. But he also sees informal approaches as insufficient because
they assume invention cannot be taught directly. Informal methods only try to set up conditions so the habits of inventive thinking can be learned, and, perhaps more importantly for Young, such methods do not address the need for invention as critical thinking or analytical problem solving. Consequently, the discipline needs new research in formal rather than informal invention practices so scholars can judge the old current-traditional paradigm as problematic and develop the basis for a new rhetorical paradigm.

To establish this opposition between current-traditional and rhetorical paradigms, Young reenacts two of Weidner’s categorical moves. Weidner conflates romanticism and vitalism and puts them in opposition to mechanism or scientific formalism but then connects romantic philosophy and scientific method and opposes them to rhetoric as art. Young follows both of these curious moves. Though Young does not use the term romanticism in “Paradigms and Problems,” his reading of vitalism has questionable supports. One says the individual writer is not in control of invention (32) and the other says some aspects of invention cannot be taught and exist in the writer (32n5). Both positions may have associations with some romantic philosophies, but neither has any clear connection to vitalism. Young is assuming Weidner’s conflation (as Kameen notes [“Rewording” 91n10], Weidner’s thesis is listed in the bibliography of “Paradigms and Problems” but is not cited directly). Young also follows Weidner in connecting science and romanticism/vitalism in opposition to rhetoric as art or technê. By reducing rhetorical invention to D’Angelo’s logical/nonlogical (formal/informal) dichotomy, Young can group oppositional approaches such as current-traditionalism and vitalism together as informal. It is odd, however, to place current-traditional rhetoric in the informal category. The connection between science as a strict, formal method of invention and current-traditional rhetoric as formal methods of arrangement and style makes sense. But the connection to “vitalist” informal methods makes less sense. When Young calls for research into formal arts of invention, he is linking art to science and current-traditional rhetoric. The connection is between current-traditional rhetoric and classical rhetoric, not current-traditional rhetoric and vitalism or romanticism. Unwittingly, perhaps, this categorical sleight of hand reduces art or technê to a brand of formalism. In valuing scientific and ethnographic research—over
and above his call for metarhetorical, philosophical, and historical research—Young is turning rhetoric toward the scientific and the formal.

By following Weidner’s categorical moves and trying to reduce them to formal and informal categories, Young essentially covers over the connection between Aristotle’s rhetoric and current-traditional rhetoric established by Fogarty. Sounding much like Fogarty, Young argues that “an important educational, and social, need is not being met” by current-traditional rhetoric (“Paradigms and Problems” 34). But unlike Fogarty, Young links current-traditional practice to scientific method and romantic philosophy rather than Aristotelian philosophy. Seeing that current-traditional, formalist practice is grounded on Aristotelian philosophy, Fogarty calls for the development of a new philosophical basis for the new twentieth-century rhetorics and the extension of this philosophy into the production of a prose communication course. Young, however, accepts a particular version of classical rhetoric as his philosophical foundation and calls for the scientific study of formal arts of invention to support and extend that philosophy rather than for a contemporary philosophy of rhetoric and hence a new teaching rhetoric.

The emphasis on scientific study of formal arts of invention rather than on philosophical foundations leads Young into a form/content distinction. Young wants rhetoric and composition to develop formal heuristics that would enable students to derive content. The form/content binary is still there. Rather than develop a philosophical basis to displace current-traditional formalism, Young is actually extending formalism into invention and inadvertently extending current-traditional rhetoric. His conflation of vitalism (Weidner) and current-traditional rhetoric (Fogarty) under the rubric of informal inventive procedures that cannot be taught (D’Angelo) may allow him to see the need for research into invention, but it also keeps him from seeing that classical rhetoric and current-traditional rhetoric can be classified together under formalism. Perhaps one of the reasons Young and others do not follow up on Fogarty is that his call for a new rhetoric is emphatically interdisciplinary and Young’s real goal is to establish rhetoric and composition as a discipline, not prose communication as a course. This would account for the fact that Young dismisses Fogarty’s recognition of the collusion between Aristotelian rhetoric and current-traditional
rhetoric—Young needed classical rhetoric as an authoritative basis for the discipline.

There are two keys things to take away from “Paradigms and Problems.” First, the issue of vitalism’s historical and theoretical nature is directly linked to issues of inventional methods. Vitalism is seen as leaving invention up to a mystical process, whether in the world or the mind, that writers cannot consciously control or account for. In this sense, the term is used almost analogically or metaphorically rather than to designate a historical theory or philosophy. Second, the enduring problem is that this negative use of vitalism excludes informal methods (or habitual and contextual learning) in favor of formal procedures for the ultimate goal of disciplinarity rather than learning. Research into formal procedures can provide a stronger justification for claiming that rhetoric and composition is a research-based discipline with its own knowledge base, but in the long run it loses sight of pragmatic classroom practice by reducing what counts as rhetorical invention.

Arts, Crafts, Gifts, Knacks

Perhaps in response to these categorical difficulties, Young tries to refine his position in “Arts, Crafts, Gifts, and Knacks: Some Disharmonies in the New Rhetoric” (1980), which establishes the distinctions and solidifies their extension into the discourse of the field. In “Paradigms and Problems” no mention is made of romanticism or expressivism, only vitalism. But in “Arts, Crafts, Gifts, and Knacks,” Young works from Weidner’s position that vitalism is synonymous with romanticism to extend D’Angelo’s characterization of new romanticism, indicate its connection to vitalism, and establish rhetoric as a middle-ground option between the formal methods of science and current-traditionalism and the informal methods of romantic-vitalism. To do so, Young makes a number of Platonic, species/genus moves that are difficult to follow. He establishes two sets of categorical distinctions and attempts to integrate them. In the first, he sets up the binary of current-traditional rhetoric and new rhetoric and then divides new rhetoric into new romantic and new classical versions. Both new
rhetorics are reactions to current-traditional rhetoric, but for Young a new romantic approach to invention and the composing process is problematic. To make this argument he uses a second set of distinctions among art (heuristics to aid in the discovery of content), craft (the emphasis on form and surface features of a text), gift (innate natural talent), and knack (something learned through habit or practice). The subtle interconnections of these two categorical sets ultimately establish the basis for the misplacement of Coleridge and the devaluing of vitalism.

Young begins by making the distinction between current-traditional rhetoric and new rhetoric, selecting the nineteenth-century rhetorician John Genung, whom he cites in “Paradigms and Problems” as one of his vitalist examples, to represent current-traditional rhetoric and mid-1960s compositionist Gordon Rohman to represent new rhetoric. Genung recognizes that rhetoric as an aspect of literature cannot be reduced to “mere grammatical apparatuses or [equated] with Huxley’s logic engine” because real authorship must also be concerned with “the whole man, his outfit of conviction and emotion, imagination and will, translating himself . . . into a vital and ordered utterance” (quoted in Young, “Arts, Crafts” 53). But even so, the teaching of rhetoric does not include invention. The teachable aspect of rhetoric is craft—modes, genres, structures of discourse, and norms of style and usage. Thinking, invention, and creativity are left up to the more mysterious powers of gifted individuals.

Current-traditional rhetoric, in the example of Genung, combines the formal study of craft with the vitalist approach to invention that leaves it up to natural genius. Young then describes Rohman as claiming that the new rhetoric of the twentieth century encompasses the entire writing process, including invention. For Rohman, invention entails “an active, not passive enlistment in the ‘cause’ of an idea. . . . [It is] essentially the imposition of pattern upon experience” (quoted in “Arts, Crafts” 54). Following compositionists such as Rohman, new rhetoric seeks to include the structure of thinking and invention among the teachable elements of rhetoric and thus combines the formal study of craft with explicit approaches to teaching the art of invention.

However, there is disharmony in the new rhetoric. Young’s next move is to distinguish between two movements within new rhetoric: new romanticism
and new classicism. Young claims that new romanticism is “a reaffirmation of
vitalist philosophy” that argues the composing process should be free of con-
trol, believes the rational is no more in touch with reality than nonrational
processes, sees the composing process as a mysterious and unconscious growth,
and insists on the “primacy of the imagination” (55). Quoting James Miller’s
position that teaching orderly processes does not result in good writing but in
dehumanized and unreadable writing, Young concludes that new romantics
leave the teacher with nothing to teach but the mystery of the process of imag-
ination. Even though Young makes the initial distinction between current-
traditional rhetoric and new romanticism, he reestablishes their connection.
Citing William Coles as an example of a contemporary new romantic, Young
argues that, like Genung, Coles believes the art of composing cannot be taught
even though craft can. But unlike Genung, this does not mean that invention
must be ignored. For Young, the new romantic writing instructor is “no longer
a purveyor of information about the craft of writing but a designer of occa-
sions that stimulate the creative process” (55). Essentially Young is reasserting
his formal/informal distinction. Whereas current-traditional rhetoric contrasts
craft with gift and emphasizes teaching craft, new romanticism contrasts craft
with art as the mysterious powers of creative invention and emphasizes creat-
ing situations in which it can be learned informally.

New classicists, on the other hand, are those who see art as technê—“knowl-
edge necessary for producing preconceived results by conscious directed ac-
tion” (56)—thus making writing and invention teachable. According to Young,
this notion of art contrasts with knack—“a habit acquired through repeated
experience” (56). Basing the distinction on Aristotle, Young sees artists as people
who have a theory of what they have learned through experience, which en-
ables them to teach others the skill. This distinction is an attempt to code new
romantics who teach via creating contexts as only allowing their students to ac-
dquire habits. Even though Young, following Aristotle, recognizes that both “the
man who has knack and the man who has art can carry out that activity” (56),
he disregards the fact that habit can work for students who are not going to be
teachers and privileges technê as habit turned into a system via the knowledge
of causes. To avoid the charge that this form of Aristotelian philosophy is falling
back into the formalism of current-traditional rhetoric, he makes yet another distinction: his position espouses a heuristic system ("explicit strategies for effective guessing") rather than a rule-governed system ("a finite series of steps that can be carried out consciously and mechanically without the aid of intuition or special ability, and if properly carried out always yields a correct result") (57). Young wants to position heuristics as a middle-ground option between unconscious knack and craft as a near-algorithmic emphasis on form. Not only do heuristics more easily avoid becoming algorithmic by producing provisional results, according to Young, but they also avoid becoming merely habitual because they are used consciously and systematically—they are generic and rationally directed.

These slippery categorical distinctions ultimately generate problems for the field of rhetoric and composition. Young makes a crucial statement regarding new romanticism: "Though we lack the historical studies that permit generalizing with confidence, the position [of the new romantics] seems not so much an innovation in the discipline as a reaffirmation of the vitalist philosophies of an old romanticism enriched by modern psychology" (55). It is precisely the lack of historical studies of romanticism and vitalism in rhetoric and composition that allows Young to claim that new romanticism is a vitalist philosophy based on mystery and genius. And it is precisely this lack of historical basis that allows both of Weidner’s curious moves to disseminate through the discipline. First, even though in “Arts, Crafts, Gifts, and Knacks” Young mentions Coleridge only once, as someone who grapples with the same issues surrounding art, the connection between Coleridge and romanticism is so widespread that the additional connection to vitalism that Weidner assumes and Young extends through his characterization of new romanticism continues to stick. This is especially so with regard to issues surrounding method and its formal or informal status. Second, these historical and categorical confusions also lead to unnecessary distinctions and debates over what constitutes art. Aristotle recognizes the validity of both knack and technē. Arbitrarily dividing them based on the need to assert disciplinary status only hurts the teaching of invention in the end. Young’s attempt to establish his position as the middle-ground option does nothing to keep the application of heuristics from generating what are really just new forms of formalism.
It is in fact this complicated relationship between Aristotle’s basic philosophy, current-traditional formalism, and vitalism that is at issue. Even though Young attempts to shift the formalism that Fogarty sees in Aristotle’s basic philosophy over to vitalism and romanticism, his understanding of technê is grounded in a commonsense, empirical notion of cause and effect.

Young privileges technê as habit turned into a system via the knowledge of causes. By labeling vitalism as naive genius and excluding new romantic informal methods as inadequate for learning to operate in systems, Young’s work closes off the ability to see vitalism, and ultimately Aristotle, differently. As I argue in chapters 4 and 5, complex vitalism looks to articulate a more complex notion of system beyond basic cause and effect, which can be used to enhance the practice of contextual teaching. This notion of vitalism will not only ultimately allow for a different perspective on informal methods in relation to invention but also create a space for looking at Aristotle in a way that goes beyond a more commonsense, empirical philosophy.

**Romanticism as Current-Traditionalism**

Young’s attempt to delineate both the connection and distinction between current-traditional rhetoric and new romanticism is grounded in Weidner’s elevation of Coleridge to the archetypal anti-rhetorical vitalist through assumptions about Coleridge’s relationship to formal scientific method and romantic individualism. This complex categorical connection to Coleridge is built on rhetoric’s traditional narrative of retreat and return. Vasile Florescu, for example, in “Rhetoric and Its Rehabilitation in Contemporary Philosophy” (1970), outlines a typical genealogy for connecting scientific method to individual expression. The reduction of rhetoric as a focus of study begins, for him, with Bacon and Descartes. Bacon supplements Aristotelian syllogistic logic, the primary mode of inquiry in the Renaissance, with inductive logic. But the increasing value of inductive logic results in a devaluing of rhetoric, seen as another form of deductive inquiry. For Florescu, Descartes’s attempt to provide a method founded on something other than scholastic logic proves even more damaging to rhetorical study. Descartes’s utilization of self-evidence as the cri-
terion for clear and distinct ideas denounces scholastic logic as sterile. Essentially, Descartes is condemning all art, technê, and heuristics in favor “not [of] divine inspiration, but the simple natural talent” of the inquirer (197).

For Florescu, this slippage from formal method to individual talent for perception is pushed further by German romanticism. Influenced by the Reformation, this individual talent gains prominence primarily through the theological mysticism of the time and culture expressed in the works of Kant and Hegel, among others. Florescu sees the culmination of this line of thought in Benedetto Croce. In Estetica come scienza dell’expressione e linguistica generale (1902), Croce’s coupling of intuition and expression resulted “in eliminating rhetoric from the esthetic problematic” (Florescu 202). From this point of view, “an idea is born with its expression”; therefore, “every work of art is a unique phenomenon,” which “signifies the denial of all the theory of specialized arts” (203). Art in this narrative moves from rhetorical technê to scientific method to natural talent, resulting in the loss of rhetoric.

Two scholars in rhetoric and composition—Sharon Crowley and Ross Winterowd—have situated Coleridge at the center of this movement from rhetorical invention to formal method to romantic individualism. In The Methodical Memory: Invention in Current-Traditional Rhetoric (1990), Crowley notes the basis of current-traditional rhetoric in Cartesian philosophy. To show that all knowledge comes from direct experience of the world, Descartes has to assume that all experience is accurately coded into memory and that a precise method would allow any individual to accurately remember experiences and record them in language. Crowley argues that the “big three” eighteenth-century rhetoricians—George Campbell, Hugh Blair, and Richard Whately—transfer rhetorical forms into this sense of formal method. Aristotelian topoi and tropes are shifted to associational psychology or put into style and arrangement. In each case, authority is turned from the rhetorical tradition to scientific method (either forms in the mind or in the text). Crowley extends her reading of Descartes and formal method into a reading of Coleridge’s method. For Crowley, Coleridge sees method as a combination of unity and progression—method unifies disparate material by focusing it toward a common end. The individual mind establishes the purposive goal through initiative or in-
tention. If the mind follows a properly methodical path, it can operate in line with natural and metaphysical laws. This synthesis goes beyond the basic empiricism of Locke and Hume to establish the mind, rather than the rhetorical tradition or scientific method, as the primary determinant in discursive or artistic acts. The individual mind does not simply reflect nature but unifies and thus forms it (42–43).

By the mid-nineteenth century, this shift from rhetoric to method turns decidedly toward texts and textbooks and produces what compositionists now call current-traditional rhetoric. For current-traditional rhetoric, a clear, ordered text not only shows that the writer has employed the proper method but also ensures the text’s validity. Thus, current-traditional textbooks focused on punctuation, grammar, economy, and clarity to the detriment of invention and audience. Most compositionists see current-traditional rhetoric as an extension of the work of Peter Ramus—a rhetoric with no theory of invention. For Crowley, current-traditional rhetoric does have invention, but it had to be redirected into the mind or the text (a position that generates the research paper as an inventional device—writers are to discover the arguments in other texts) in order to correspond to the empirical epistemology of the day. This displacement of rhetoric and invention generates the notion of romantic genius when shifted into the mind and the notion of composition when shifted into the text. This is part of the reason the term composition developed in the late nineteenth century to take the place of rhetoric—composition is an analogue for arrangement.

While Crowley abstains from turning this analysis into a denunciation of romanticism, Ross Winterowd, in *The English Department: A Personal and Institutional History* (1998), carries this reading of current-traditional rhetoric more vigorously into romanticism and the individual. In a discussion of Crowley’s book, Winterowd reads romantic “method” as Crowley sees Cartesian “method.” Enlightenment mentalism sees the mind as the accurate, passive receiver of the objective world but gives way to a romantic mentalism that sees the structure of the individual mind as the active agent in perception. In each case, mentalism becomes what Winterowd calls “methodism”: “That methodism was a major force shaping current-traditional rhetoric is beyond doubt,
but it was also a prime element in romantic rhetoric, and for evidence we can turn to Coleridge and Emerson” (49). He bases this claim on his reading of Coleridge’s imagination as “split” into “two or more subfaculties” (51). He is referring of course to Coleridge’s now (in)famous distinction between primary imagination, secondary imagination, and fancy. Winterowd’s subsequent reading of these distinctions is a fairly standard, hierarchical one. Primary imagination is passive perception (Enlightenment mentalism), secondary imagination is the active, creative mind (romantic mentalism), and fancy is everyday cultural commonplaces (traditional rhetoric). Coleridge and romantics, as Winterowd and others argue, privilege secondary imagination as the genius of the creative artist, which for Winterowd is “an innate, mysterious power” (53). Art in this schema is a product of methodism—the primary imagination photographs objective reality, and secondary imagination turns these photographs into ideas to be called up later in memory and reshaped by creative genius into artistic works, most notably poetry.

For Winterowd, “the solipsism became total with Coleridge” (58), and the ultimate result is the devaluation of rhetoric as fancy. The creative genius is the person who can unify universal law (mind) and natural law (world) through intuition without the intervention of fancy (culture or tradition). For Winterowd, this “‘method’ is simply introspection” (123). Descartes’s formal method follows strict, rational, linear rules. But according to Winterowd’s readings, Coleridge’s methodism is ultimately a method of no method at all: it turns formal, objective method into arbitrary, subjective impulse. For Cowley, formal scientific method is still present in Coleridge. But Winterowd’s reading is much more value laden. He argues that Coleridge dismantles formal method, leaving only individual intuition, which ultimately even devalues informal method. What is natural talent in Florescu and methodical synthesis in Crowley becomes natural genius in Winterowd’s reading. This is not an innocent term. Genius carries with it a much more caustic and evaluative tone, and it is this term that, despite even Winterowd’s use of the term methodism, is seen as completely arbitrary and free of method.

Crowley links Coleridge to the history of method, and Winterowd links Coleridge to individual genius. It is Coleridge’s position at this intersection of
current-traditional formalism and romantic individualism that Weidner and Young mischaracterize as vitalism. There are two fundamental problems with this placement. What allows the conflation of romanticism and vitalism is the problematic nature of defining romanticism. Romanticism is much too large for one definition to cover. Isaiah Berlin, in *The Roots of Romanticism*, provides a dizzying catalogue of definitions and characteristics of romanticism that provide a wealth of conflicting if not contradictory elements from valuing life to valuing death, from individualism to the dissolution of the individual, from the retreat to the primitive to the call for a new future through revolution (14–18). Likewise, in “On the Discrimination of Romanticisms,” Arthur Lovejoy opens with another dizzying list of different origins and descriptions as well as offspring of romanticism, the result of which, for him, is “a confusion of terms and of ideas” (232). For Lovejoy, there are a number of romanticisms in operation historically: Germany in the 1790s (which, for Lovejoy, is most legitimately called Romanticism), England in the 1740s, France circa 1801, France from 1810 to 1820 (which adopted the German concept of romanticism that carried almost the opposite meaning of the 1801 version), and the works of Rousseau and a number of other writers and thinkers (235–36). These romanticisms cover a broad range of characteristics: a revolt against neo-classical aesthetics, an admiration of Shakespeare, a push toward independence from artistic rules, a distinction between nature and art that values the natural, the value of the savage over the cultural. But the term nature in particular is also complex and shifting. In earlier romanticisms it connotes the value of the simple, naive, unsophisticated, and primitive. Later romanticisms see in nature the value of the complex, wild, spontaneous, and irregular to the point that later German romanticism promoted conscious art over mere nature (241). All of these ideas can rightly be called romanticism but should not be confused or conflated.

The other problem with Weidner’s and Young’s mislabeling is that, in the discourse of rhetoric and composition, both Coleridge and vitalism get caught up in this categorical confusion. Coleridge gets wrongly associated with a naive approach to natural genius rather than method and complexity. Coleridge follows this more complex trajectory of romanticism espoused by the later Ger-
mans and should not be thought of as standing for irrationalism, or a “natural”
genius devoid of method. Genius in Coleridge is not simply genetic and left up
to the subjective mind but is taught and methodical, a product of education.
In the disciplinary discourse of rhetoric and composition, however, all roman-
ticisms have come to be seen as merely subjective—left up to the mysterious gift
of geniuses. A similar problem exists in terms of method. Coleridge’s sense of
method should not be read strictly in terms of Cartesian method and current-
traditionalism. As I argue in chapters 2 and 3, James Berlin reads Coleridge’s
method in terms of Hegelian and Marxist dialectics, and Kameen reads it as an
attempt that goes beyond formal scientific logic and epistemology to engage
with rhetorical situations. These readings ultimately problematize the gener-
alizing categorical move that links current-traditional rhetoric, romanticism,
and vitalism.

Lovejoy’s conclusion is that “any attempt at a general appraisal even of a
single chronologically determinate Romanticism . . . is a fatuity. . . . It will, no
doubt, remain abstractly possible to raise the question whether the prepon-
derent effect, moral or aesthetic, of one or another large movement which has
been called by the name was good or bad. But that ambitious inquiry cannot
even be legitimately begun until a prior task of analysis and detailed compar-
ison . . . has been accomplished” (252). In short, one cannot make definitive
good or bad evaluations based on overly general categories. Such a move is at
root uncritical. Ironically, those who charge Coleridge and, by association, vi-
talism with anti-intellectualism are operating historiographically and argumentatively with a form of anti-intellectualism. In the end, Coleridge cannot
stand as a metonym for the intersection of all of these elements that make up
the ahistorical category of vitalism as it is used rhetorically in rhetoric and
composition. What I am trying to do is read Coleridge outside of this narrative
of retreat and return, with its built-in scapegoat category for the demise of
rhetoric, and instead read him from an ulterior narrative—the history of vi-
talism as a distinct paradigm. Rather than equate vitalism with a naive ap-
proach to nature, I build a new series of categorizations for it that follow its
genealogy from Aristotelian theories of nature through the complexities of
German romanticism to contemporary theories of complexity.

34  MAPPING RHETORIC AND COMPOSITION

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Disciplining Rhetoric and Composition

Despite this categorical complexity, Young follows Weidner by conflating the notion of current-traditional rhetoric with new romanticism under the guise of vitalism, and he uses it as a straw man against which to define a new disciplinary paradigm. In the 1950s and on through the 1960s, there were two dominant pedagogical approaches in composition classrooms: current-traditionalism (based on formalism and craft) and expressivism (based on gift and knack). Geoffrey Sirc, in his essay “Never Mind the Tagmemics, Where’s the Sex Pistols?” discusses expressivist pedagogies of the late sixties as a reaction to the focus on objective, formal writing. In order to offset the sterile compositions being produced by the students, these pedagogies “preached sincerity and relevance at the expense of rules” (11) and used popular culture as the primary content for writing. In the general context of anti-establishment sentiments, the classroom became a place for the teacher to create a happening—a situation that stimulates or fosters invention. But as Sirc notes, “gradually such dreams were abandoned in favor of righting writing; traditional, determinate goals were re-affirmed. Writing could no longer be, it had to be a certain way” (11). For those who were invested in creating a discipline, the classroom situation had become quite undisciplined. If a new paradigm was going to be established, there had to be general, easily communicable, and transferable strategies that were grounded in institutional values; there had to be discipline.

Young opens “Arts, Crafts, Gifts, and Knacks” with the claim that “to understand the new rhetoric . . . we must see it as a reaction to an earlier rhetoric” (53; emphasis added). This mandate is a rhetorical response to these two dominant pedagogies that were still holding sway in the 1970s. In order to valorize the new rhetoric, Young conflates current-traditionalism and expressivism by arguing that they both rest on the same assumption—writing and invention cannot be taught. For Young, both epistemologies ignore the social and the teachable, one in favor of objectivity, the other in favor of subjectivity. If invention is unproblematic as in objective, current-traditional methods, or is left up to the realm of chance, intuition, or genius as in new romantic or expressivist pedagogies, then the only thing left to teach is the surface features of...
arrangement and grammar—not the directed origination or discovery of content. So if current-traditional rhetoric continues to dominate writing instruction, or if expressivism becomes the predominant theoretical model for composition pedagogy, there is no research object or practice that can serve as a basis for the discipline. There is no justification for claiming that composition is worthy of disciplinary status. Rhetorically, Young has to group current-traditionalism and expressivism together because they are the forces to be reckoned with if he wants to establish rhetoric as a new disciplinary paradigm. Rhetoric can provide a deeper historical legacy to justify composition's status as a unique discipline, and rhetorical invention can be examined by the methods of other more contemporary science-oriented fields to ground disciplinary research.

In order to draw upon these two institutional values for establishing a discipline—history and science—Young works toward developing rhetorical heuristics that are based on scientific research. This project began as early as Young's textbook with Alton Becker and Kenneth Pike, *Rhetoric: Discovery and Change* (1970). The book draws upon the more scientific disciplines of linguistics and psychology to produce a structured procedure that could apply to a large array of situations. Young, Becker, and Pike argue that people deal with the chaos of life (external reality) via three cognitive processes: (1) they categorize perceptions by comparison/contrast with other perceptions, (2) they determine differences among perceptions within the same category, and (3) they look at the way these perceptions are distributed in their experience. In each of these activities, the object under examination can be seen as (1) an isolated particle, (2) a dynamic wave, or (3) a field of relations. This produces nine possible ways to examine an object or topic and a nine-celled grid with corresponding heuristic questions. This generic template can be applied to a wide array of writing situations to produce content on almost any topic. The heuristic is formal but also open to chance connections a student may make.

This type of research program accomplished what Young hoped—it extended into the 1970s and influenced research into the cognitive aspects of the composing process, composition's unique research object and disciplinary center. However, it did have unintended effects. *Rhetoric: Discovery and Change* was published in 1970, just before the Berthoff/Lauer debates, and set the stage...
for privileging one side of this debate over the other. At least as early as “Arts, Crafts, Gifts, and Knacks” (1980), Young does attempt to place rhetoric (art) in the middle-ground position between current-traditionalism (craft) and new romanticism (gift and knack). He writes that heuristics such as Francis Christensen’s generative rhetoric of the sentence and tagmemics “[do] not insist on the primacy of reason, nor . . . repudiate non-rational activity; instead [they] assume a subtle and elaborate dialectic between the two” (58). This dialectical middle way makes perfect sense theoretically, but it does not necessarily play out in the influence of Young’s position on disciplinary discourse and pedagogical practice. Research on invention continues to value science over the humanities.

As late as 1994, in their introduction to *Landmark Essays on Rhetorical Invention in Writing*, Young and coauthor Yameng Liu try to heal the opposition that still lingers from the Berthoff/Lauer debates by positing the distinction between discovery (science) and creation (humanities) and then posing invention (rhetoric) as a synthesis of the two. For them, invention means heuristics, which they define as “explicit strategy[ies] for effective guessing which enables the writer to bring principles of invention to bear in composing by transforming them into questions or operations to be performed” (xvi). The types of strategies commonly associated with invention—using clustering or mapping to produce a visual representation of content, using commonplaces or topoi as generic forms of argument, freewriting or keeping a journal to collect ideas, or answering journalistic questions or questions based on the tagmemic grid to generate material—are largely acontextual. This is what it means to be heuristic—“applying an art of rhetorical invention which is simultaneously heuristic and managerial, giving the rhetor both a universal capacity to define issues in indeterminate situations and a receptivity to the particularities of individual situations” (xiv).

However, what this does is create a gap between the universal and the particular. The two are not really integrated—one is *applied* to the other: the heuristic predetermines what can be seen (or not seen) in the situation. For Young and Liu, this is what gives heuristics their teachability. However, this opposition merely upholds the problematic binary at play in the field. Young
and Liu reiterate the argument that invention (or heuristics) produces a dialectical relation between the “reason” of the “new classicists” and “the imagination” of the “new romantics” (xvi). But requiring invention to be generalizable—directly teachable and applicable—actually upholds the division. A heuristic may be somewhat open-ended with regard to student responses but remain instrumental in its operation, its application. In the end, the subtitle of Young’s earlier textbook, *Rhetoric: Discovery and Change*, belies the emphasis on science and discovery rather than rhetoric and invention.

In his quip “never mind the tagmemics,” Sirc is in some ways reacting to the irony that it is current-traditionalism and expressivism that get conflated and not current-traditionalism and Young’s rhetorical approach. In “Arts, Crafts, Gifts, and Knacks,” Young indicates that he wants writing instructors to be able to teach increased control over rhetorical invention. But he recognizes that “the great danger of a technical theory of art . . . is and has been in the past that it may over rationalize the composing process. In their preoccupation with analysis and method, those holding the theory may ignore our non-rational powers, inadvertently trying to turn heuristic procedures into rule-governed procedures and devising strategies for carrying out processes that are better dealt with by the unaided mind” (59). This is indeed the danger. It is the connection between current-traditional practice and the Aristotelian philosophy that Fogarty recognized early on. And as Crowley’s analysis implies, it is the commonsense physics and rhetorical topoi of Aristotle that get transferred into current-traditional texts via the scientific paradigm, not the supposedly irrational individualism of Coleridge. The devaluation of art and technê that Florescu attributes to Descartes is not a denunciation of Aristotle but a transfer of Aristotle from inventional forms, to formal method, to formal texts. This connection is played out in the attempts to put tagmemics into practice. *The Bedford Bibliography for Teachers of Writing* notes that Young, Becker, and Pike’s textbook, *Rhetoric: Discovery and Change*, was “seldom used in undergraduate courses” (86). The process of using the heuristic was overly formalized and too difficult to implement widely. To Young’s credit the heuristic is trying to tackle complexity, but it is too rigid and attempts to control and direct the invention process too much. Its basis in scientific research justifies disciplinary status but does not necessarily play out pedagogically.
Some Categorical Consequences for Invention

Despite the categorical confusion and ultimately exclusionary effect of Young’s species/genus analytics, the implicit scientific, and essentially political, value continues to influence the way invention, and in particular research on invention, is conceptualized and discussed. Janet Atwill traces similar historical territory regarding invention in her introduction to *Perspectives on Rhetorical Invention* (2002). Going back to the Berthoff/Lauer debates, Atwill argues that Berthoff is trying to defend the humanities from the sciences and critiques her for reducing the issue to politics (xiv). But Lauer is equally trying to save composition from literature, stating that it is “time for writing teachers to ‘break out of the ghetto’” (quoted in Atwill xiii). It is hard to see Lauer’s position as apolitical. Both Lauer and Weidner were Young’s students, and it seems clear that disciplinary politics is at the root of their collective efforts. Richard Enos, who worked with Young at Carnegie Mellon, indicates as much in his foreword to *Inventing a Discipline*. He writes, “Young’s vision was no less ambitious than to change the landscape of the field of English studies. Young’s effort was not merely to ‘reclaim’ rhetoric for English but to reconceptualize what rhetoric is and, in doing so, change forever our idea of what English is, does, and offers” (viii). The issue for both Lauer and Berthoff is the defense of disciplinary territory and the humanities/science, literature/composition divide. Lauer invokes the contemporary authority of science and links it to rhetoric in order to defend rhetoric against the domination of literature in the English department. Berthoff is trying to link rhetoric to the humanities in order to establish rhetoric as a traditional part of the English department and keep science at bay. Even though they both appeal to rhetoric, the result of the debate is the solidification of the new romantic category and its opposition to new classical approaches, each with its own image of rhetoric.

One consequence of the categorical history, then, becomes a dispute over the definition of rhetoric—is it more of a general theory (like a science) or is it an artistic practice (like most of the humanities)? Lauer sees rhetoric and invention as a general theory. As Atwill puts it, “the very purpose of invitational strategies is to enable practice across rhetorical situations” (xvi). Rhetoric, in this case, is a generalization from empirical studies that can be applied to a va-
riety of contexts. Lauer is following a particular reading of the Aristotelian tra-
dition that seeks to generalize from actual practitioners so those generalizations
can be applied to other situations. But there are other rhetorical traditions.
Rhetoric is also the *kairotic* development of discursive strategies out of specific
situations, not just their extraction and later application. Atwill proffers Stanley
Fish’s argument that practice is so situation-bound that a general theory does
not apply as the typical postmodern anti-invention stance, arguing that this
strict theory/practice division “challenges” rhetorical invention, putting it on
the “defensive” (xvi). Fish’s proposition, however, can be read as calling for a
continued, ongoing practice/art of invention. Theory in this case is always being
invented out of practice rather than extracted ahead of time and then applied
—various theories and practices come together in a particular situation and a
new theory for dealing with that situation comes out of the mix. Rather than
being applied, a general theory or heuristic is one element of a more complex
situation. Atwill is still operating on a model that splits invention along these
competing notions of rhetoric and privileges a scientific notion of invention
over humanistic approaches—a position that allows Atwill, who is following
Lauer, to argue that “research” on invention was declining during the 1990s in
favor of theory (xi), a position that undervalues all of the ways invention was
talked about and practiced during that decade.8

For me, this is the second legacy of “Arts, Crafts, Gifts, and Knacks”: dividing
and categorizing arts, crafts, gifts, and knacks ultimately leads to overvaluing
some elements and undervaluing others. All four are important to invention
as a practice rather than a research object, and even though Young seeks to make
invention/rhetoric a mediating principle between science and the humanities,
the categories involved set up valuations and exclusions when it comes to in-
ventional procedures. Though he includes James Britton’s essay in the *Land-
mark Essays* collection, for example, Young still codes Britton’s “spontaneous
inventiveness” as “romantic” (xxii), and in doing so he sets it up to be of less
value. The roots of this devaluation lie in the use of vitalism as a rhetorical
figure in the narrative of rhetoric’s retreat and return. When Young follows
Weidner in labeling the conflation of current-traditionalism and new roman-
ticism “vitalism” as a way to devalue his competition, he cannot go back and
try to mediate these categories. Once vitalism is established as a trope for the “earlier rhetoric” that has to be excluded in order to define the new rhetoric, the die is cast. The whole notion of heuristics as the ultimate value in invention cannot be cleanly separated from the context of exclusion.

The long-term consequences of this definitional and categorical divide effect a number of issues surrounding the concept of invention: expanding the definition of method as well as art, theorizing affect and the body, and developing situation-specific heuristics or methods. The short-term issue that grounds these long-term consequences is the problematic reading of Coleridge as the archetypal representative of the conflation of current-traditional rhetoric and romanticism under the moniker of vitalism. Undoing Coleridge’s function as a rhetorical trope in the metanarrative of rhetoric’s retreat and return opens up a space for valuing invention in the context of pedagogy rather than research.

Genius, Talent, Sense, and Cleverness

Despite, or because of, the dominance of the narrative of retreat and return as the grounding metanarrative for the rise of the discipline, rhetoric and composition is doing well, as Winterowd indicates at the end of his book (English Department 203–4). Consequently, rhetoric and composition scholars do not necessarily need to talk in terms of disciplinarity anymore. The historical distance now exists for an examination and reconsideration of this rhetorical approach. And this reconsideration needs to begin with Coleridge, who is situated at the center of these mappings of the field. In Young’s desire to categorize rhetorics, two terms get caught up in the battle and coded in specific ways. Art comes to stand for natural genius at the expense of technē, and method comes to stand for rigid formalism at the expense of heuristics. Both of these terms, obviously connected with romanticism and current-traditionalism, get connected to Coleridge’s placement in rhetoric’s narrative of retreat and return. Coleridge is seen as promoting the idea that artistic geniuses naturally employ proper formal method. However, Coleridge’s sense of art cannot be reduced to natural genius, and his sense of method cannot be reduced to scientific for-
malism. Separating Coleridge from these assumptions opens the way for re-evaluating his relationship to rhetoric.

Rather than leave genius up to natural ability or a mystical spontaneity, Coleridge seeks to ground it in an education based on method and situatedness. In “Essays on the Principles of Method,” Coleridge notes that one of the distinguishing characteristics of educated people is their speech, which is “grounded on the habit of foreseeing in each integral part, or (more plainly) in every sentence, the whole that he intends to communicate” (449). This dialectical “habit” does not just exist in a person as a gift but is the result of the study of method, which he argues is “a manifestation of intellect, and not a spontaneous and uncertain production of circumstances” (“Treatise on Method” 630). As Coleridge sees it,

The habit of Method, should always be present and effective; but in order to render it so, a certain training, or education of the mind, is indispensably necessary. Events and images, the lively and spirit-stirring machinery of the external world, are like light, and air, and moisture, to the seed of the mind, which would else rot and perish. In all processes of mental evolution the objects of the senses must stimulate the mind; and the mind must in turn assimilate and digest the food which it thus receives from without. Method, therefore, must result from the due mean, or balance, between our passive impressions and the mind’s re-action on them. (634)

The mind is not passive, merely accepting the chaos of images inductively without placing an ordering principle on them. But neither should an ordering principle be placed randomly or deductively on the world. To employ method, one has to examine the material context closely and tailor the arrangements of it to the conditions of possibility it offers. Consequently, genius is largely the result of a proper education in the dialectical relationship between part and whole, mind and world. Coleridge states explicitly that “we may define the excellence of [a text’s] method as consisting in that just proportion, that union and interpretation of the universal and the particular, which must ever pervade all works of decided genius and true science” (“Essays” 457).

The term genius here should not be misconstrued, however. In a short essay entitled “Genius, Talent, Sense, and Cleverness,” from The Friend, Coleridge sets out to define precisely what he means when he employs these terms. He
notes that they are often used synonymously, which leads to misunderstandings of his usages. For him, genius is “the faculty which adds to the existing stock of power, and knowledge by new views, new combinations. . . . [It is] originality in intellectual construction: the moral accompaniment, and actuating principle of which consists, perhaps, in the carrying on of the freshness and feelings of childhood into the powers of manhood” (419). Rather than something left up to chance, genius is a studied critical faculty that allows one to see outside of commonplace forms of thought and bring fresh perspectives and connections to a topic. It is, in short, a capacity for critical thinking and invention. Talent is “the comparative facility of acquiring, arranging, and applying the stock furnished by others and already existing in books or other conservatories of intellect” (419). This is a skill of arrangement and style: being able to see the relationships between existing knowledges and to link and order them in insightful ways. Coleridge sees sense as a skill for balance and judgment: it is “to the judgment what health is to the body” (419). The relationship between the mind and the body is important: “The mind seems to act en masse, by a synthetic rather than analytic process: even as the outward senses, from which the metaphor is taken, perceive immediately, each as it were by a peculiar tact or intuition, without any consciousness of mechanism by which the perception is realized” (419). Intuition, sense, is something learned, absorbed from one’s environment. It is knowledge at the level of the body. In addition to knowledge from the material environment, sense is in accord with the cultural environment, or cultural memory, and leans toward balance and compromise. Coleridge notes, “If Genius be the initiative, and Talent the administrative, Sense is the conservative, branch, in the intellectual republic” (420). Lastly, cleverness is “a comparative readiness in the invention and use of means, for the realizing of objects and ideas” (420). Cleverness can take the ideas developed by the other skills and make them happen, put them into action. “In short,” for Coleridge, “Cleverness is a sort of genius for instrumentality” (420). In terms of the rhetorical canons, cleverness would amount to delivery, or the ability to deliver.

All of these aspects can have elements of innate ability, and they can all be enhanced and developed through the study and practice of method. Young recognizes that the conflict between art as gift and art as technê goes back to
Greece, the eighteenth century, and “romantics like Coleridge”: “It reemerges every time men think seriously about the discipline” (“Arts” 59). But it is precisely this emphasis on disciplinarity that Coleridge does not share. In order to support composition as a research discipline, Young has to emphasize the fact that writing can be objectified. In order to support composition as an institutional course, Young has to emphasize the fact that writing can be taught. Gift and knack have to be devalued in favor of arts as explicitly identifiable and teachable. Coleridge has no such rhetorical or institutional exigence. Though Coleridge does value a particular conception of genius, he does not devalue talent, sense, or cleverness. All of these rhetorical capacities are important to education. As Coleridge notes, all ideas are based in experience and instincts: “the boy knows that his hoop is round, and this, in years after, helps to teach him, that in the circle, all the lines drawn from the centre to the circumference, are equal” (“Treatise” 633). Inborn capacities, bodily habits acquired through experience, and explicit instruction in methods through language are all important aspects of educational development. If the goal is rhetorical pedagogy and invention rather than disciplinary research and justification, all of these elements should be valued and utilized.

The Methodical Middle Way

This misreading of Coleridge’s concept of genius as purely natural extends to his concept of method as purely formal. Sharon Crowley recognizes the pliability of the term in *The Methodical Memory*: “The term method has been used since classical times to designate any orderly or systematic procedure, and it continues to be used in this loose sense. However, an important technical use of the term method began to emerge among the generations of scholars who immediately preceded Descartes. Walter Ong defines this historical use of method to mean ‘a series of ordered steps gone through to produce with a certain efficacy a desired effect—a routine of efficiency’” (33). It is the difference between this informal rhetorical sense of method and the formal scientific sense of method that produces different readings and valuations of Coleridge and causes confusion among terms and categories. In “On the Origin and Progress
of the Sect of Sophists in Greece,” Coleridge explicitly juxtaposes his method with the reductive formalism of the sophists, who use overly simple forms to pretend to teach truth and wisdom. For Coleridge, the term sophist originally signified “one who professes the power of making others wise, a wholesale and retail dealer in wisdom,” and it is for this, “not their abuse of the arts of reasoning,” that sophism should be dismissed (436). The issue for Coleridge is that they instructed the young in simplistic, acontextual forms rather than in moral and philosophical inquiry (a position not dissimilar to Fogarty’s call for the development of a contemporary philosophical basis for rhetoric and composition rather than current-traditional formalism). Rather than conceptualize method in the strict scientific sense of his day, Coleridge looks back to the Greek sense of method to pose an alternative to sophistic formalism.

In “Treatise on Method” Coleridge traces the term method back to its Greek origins. In the Greek, method “literally means a way, or path, of transit” (630). This implies that method is concerned with a transition from one point in a process to another. For Coleridge, this movement is not a random or passive acceptance of circumstances but the ability of the mind to see the steps in a process as connected to a whole or larger goal. The initiative of the process, then, comes from a goal or purpose that is then set in relation to circumstances. The object of methodical thinking is not things or ideas, but relations—relations of things with each other, relations of ideas with each other, and the relations of things and ideas with each other. The ability to see these complex interactions is what enables a thinker to move toward the goal or purpose. Such a way or path is not a strict, formalist sense of method that when employed will always lead to the same end. It is both designated by the intentions of the educated mind and the conditions of possibility that the material situation sets up. Consequently, the force of genius or the limits of empiricism cannot determine the path. This middle way can unfold only through dialectical interaction. The key to method, then, is following all of an initial goal’s ramifications so that sometimes the mind will wander to divergent paths that are then retraced in order to set out on “a new departure” (633). This recursive process is essentially an artistic practice that Coleridge places at the intersections of philosophy and science, between the dialectical method of Plato and the empirical method of Bacon. Art as a middle-ground method draws on these other meth-
ods but places them within a communicative situation. As he notes, “Method . . . demands a knowledge of the relations which things bear to each other, or to the observer, or to the state and apprehension of the hearers” (650).

In addition to being a product of a full education rather than reductive forms, this sense of method is also a rhetorical art. Coleridge uses the archetypal example of Shakespeare to show that genius is not purely natural or formal but founded on method. There are those who have been taught that Shakespeare is “immethodical”—a natural genius who works at random. In Coleridge’s mind, “Shakespeare was not only endowed with great native genius (which he is commonly allowed to have been), but what is less frequently conceded, he has much acquired knowledge” (649). Through his education, Shakespeare learned a great deal of information—facts, law, and culture—all of which appears in the detail of his characters and plots. The archbishop of Canterbury’s speech in Henry V, for example, required a man of knowledge to produce. Most importantly for Coleridge, all of Shakespeare’s reading, information, and knowledge were not a rough, unordered mass of things. Shakespeare’s use of this knowledge demanded an understanding of the relation among all of that information, the observer, and the hearers. Coleridge cites two examples: a passage by Mrs. Quickley in Henry IV and one by Hamlet. Coleridge notes that if we examine only the form, both would be “immethodical.” Mrs. Quickley merely restates from her memory the random chain of events, no matter how disconnected. Hamlet, however, organizes, reconfigures, and recontextualizes the information in light of the whole, and with regard to material circumstances and the friend to whom it is communicated. In each case, the relationship to method in these characters is deliberate on Shakespeare’s part. The relationships are aspects of the characters’ minds, their experience of the world, and their levels of methodical education and show Shakespeare’s methodical understanding of the characters’ places within a rhetorical situation.

Coleridge argues that most critics of his day completely missed this aspect of Shakespeare: Shakespeare did not apply simple formalisms to his works any more than he operated randomly with no method but contemplated ideas and their relationship to the world. Coleridge quotes A. W. Schlegel’s note that Shakespeare “lays open to us, in a single word, a whole series of preceding conditions” (quoted in “Treatise” 654; emphasis by Coleridge). Coleridge sees in
Shakespeare a methodical mind that contemplated ideas in their full complexity, “in which alone are involved conditions of consequences ad infinitum” (654). The problem, as Coleridge sees it, is that most critics focus on finding some formal disproportion or discontinuity in Shakespeare, rather than the methodical examination of situatedness. Coleridge posits two possible responses to these critics: either Shakespeare understood the workings of language and passion better than his critics, or he “was pursuing two methods at once: one poetical, the other psychological” (655). But even this dual approach does not grasp all of what is going on in Shakespeare’s works. Coleridge goes on to remark, “We said that Shakespeare pursued two methods. Oh! He pursued many, many more” (655). Method is multiple and situational. To write about ships requires knowledge of the oar, the sail, the helm, the stars, the artillery. Writing is not the application of simple formalisms to all occasions. It requires a broad-based education and being open to the multiple paths that can emerge out of any given rhetorical situation. For Coleridge, this is something a critic, with his “scalping knife and tomahawk,” would never recognize (656).

Far from espousing a reliance on art as natural genius, method as pure formalism, and poetry as superior to rhetoric, Coleridge is arguing against those who, in his time, held such positions. All of this comes down to the nature of art. All works of philosophy, science, and art become “poetry” as long as they display method. In the “meditative observation” of scientists such as Humphry Davy, William Wollaston, Charles Hatchet, and John Murray, Coleridge finds poetry. For him, “[t]his consideration leads us from the paths of physical science into a region apparently very different. Those who tread the enchanted ground of Poetry, often times do not even suspect that there is such a thing as Method to guide their steps. Yet even here we undertake to show that [poetry] not only has a necessary existence, but the strictest philosophical application; and that it is founded on the very philosophy which has furnished us with the principles already laid down” (649). Far from reducing poetry to natural genius or the adherence to linguistic form, poetry is grounded in philosophy and method. Coleridge states explicitly that “Plato was a poetic philosopher, as Shakespeare a philosophic poet. In the poetry, as well as in the philosophy, of both, there was a necessary predominance of ideas; but this did not make them regardless of the actual existences around them. They were not visionaries or
mystics; but dwelt in ‘the sober certainty’ of waking knowledge” (660). From this perspective, poetry becomes “all works of the higher imagination” that display method, regardless of medium, including all of what we typically consider the fine arts and humanities (658). When Weidner, Young, and others claim that for Coleridge poetry devalues rhetoric, they are not looking at this expanded definition, which can include works of rhetoric, and which can no longer be said to be immethodical or only left up to chance or natural genius. The only way Coleridge can be seen as devaluing rhetoric is if his notion of rhetoric is reduced to sophism. But the reduction to formalism he is against can be seen in all of these disciplines just as method can. It is not restricted to the discipline of rhetoric.

Young looks to place rhetoric as the mediating principle between subjective and objective principles. But this is precisely where Coleridge places art and method—potentially all forms of the arts and sciences, including rhetoric. Rather than seeing Coleridge as the enemy of rhetoric, as Weidner, Winterowd, and others do, I would argue that it becomes more profitable to place him in the context of an approach to rhetoric that values dialectic and situatedness. If rhetoric is defined by the social-scientific production of heuristics, Coleridge may have little value. But if rhetoric is defined as seeing the available means of persuasion and action in a given situation, then Coleridge should be seen as a precursor to contemporary rhetorics who had a method for theorizing situatedness. This move would make Coleridge part of rhetoric’s return rather than retreat or would at least question the notion of a complete retreat. And it is just such a perspective that James Berlin and Kameen explore. Berlin reads Coleridge’s method in terms of dialectics, and Kameen reads it in terms of phenomenological engagement with situations. These readings ultimately problematize the generalizing categorical move that links current-traditional rhetoric, romanticism, and vitalism. I extend Berlin’s and Kameen’s work by taking Coleridge out of the narrative of retreat and return and placing him into a vitalist history. Coleridge’s vitalism emerges out of his study of scientific theories rather than an adherence to “romantic” individualism, which takes him away from vitalism as natural genius or mystical spontaneity. Instead, a more in-depth understanding of life becomes a key aspect of a methodical practice within complex contexts.