Germany, Europe’s indispensable country, has occupied a central position in struggles over both social policy and immigrant-origin populations. Since World War II, the German social market economy and, by extension, German prosperity have rested heavily on both. Coming under increasing pressure, the country’s welfare state has appeared to confound calls for thorough reorganization by adjusting only incrementally (Cox 2001). When it comes to immigration-related issues, Germany has been seen as closed and irredeemably fixated on blood and “the people” (das Volk). It has been criticized for refusing to accept itself as an immigration country and for making “no attempt to integrate the immigrants or their families into the new environment” (Cesari 2000, 93).

The reality has proved more complicated and, in key respects, has run contrary to those verdicts. Germany’s welfare state has been changing in very real ways, with critical implications for ethnic identities and conflicts. And far from failing to devise integration policies, German policymakers’ social policy responses have shaped collective ethnic-based identities and kindled intermittent surges in ethnic hostility.

Germany’s extended, excruciating struggle to match nation with state, combined with its history of massive emigration, bequeathed an obsession with bloodlines. At the same time, German social democracy has rested on constitutional guarantees of individual human rights, class compromise and bargaining, and the resolution of religious conflict. The combined effect has been a host society finding it easier to extend formal protections to immi-
grants than to embrace them as members in full. When immigrants entered into German society, they were expected to do so as (temporary) members of the working class and as individuals possessed of a set of fundamental social rights.

Social policies and social work practices endeavored to integrate immigrants only structurally, cast them as passive clients, and encouraged ethnic consciousness. Ethnicity was used to solve problems and then took on a life of its own. The German welfare state relied on a tight network of subsidized non-profit associations, which had long adhered to an ethnic operating principle. The same was true of most efforts to give immigrants a consultative voice in political decision making. Federal officials also permitted foreign associations to organize immigrants along cleavages found in the homeland. Responsible for modulating the immigrant workers’ relationship with the labor movement, the German trade unions were key players in the neocorporatist policymaking system. They were more inclined to contain ethnic energies than to channel them into broader working-class battles.

The German welfare state began to undergo significant decentralization and delegation to self-help associations by the 1980s, belying depictions of being only a pruned entity. Those developments fueled a trend toward political-cultural disconnection along ethnic lines—not a natural outgrowth of immigration, but rather an institutional by-product. When authorities lightened the weight of the welfare state’s social control function and simultaneously invoked notions of self-help and empowerment, ethnic mobilization was given freer reign. It escaped its institutional corsets, aided and abetted by public policies. Anti-immigrant sentiment and activity, especially virulent in the wake of unification, profited from and aggravated the situation. Officials have since sought substitutes for their diminished social control and ways to facilitate immigrant integration without heightening ethnic tensions.

**Immigrants in a “Nonimmigration Country”**

It took longer for Germany to get into the labor-importing game than its European neighbors. After the Second World War, between eleven and twelve million refugees from what had once been part of the Reich met most of the labor demands in a rebuilding Germany. In the Federal Republic (FRG), demand soon outpaced even that supply. German officials entered into bilateral labor accords with Italy in 1955 and with Spain and Greece in 1960. Under them, “guest workers,” the famous Gastarbeiter, came up from Southern Europe on a contractual basis. They tended to concentrate in southern federal-states like Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, the closest and most advanced German regions.

In August 1961, the East German government closed the last hole in the Iron Curtain and with it the FRG’s easy access to eastern labor. Germany’s rather marginal colonial experience—considering the modest size of its em-
pire and its short duration—hindered the FRG from relying on that source of workers (Lüsebrink 2002). Instead, officials in Bonn signed a labor recruitment agreement that October with their counterparts in Turkey. The two countries had a relationship dating back at least to the construction by Germans of Middle Eastern railroads and Berlin’s alliance with the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. Late in 1969, the one-millionth Turkish guest worker arrived in the Munich train station, where he was warmly greeted by the president of the Federal Labor Office, who presented him with a German television set.1 Northern Germany had become the region in direst need of workers. By the 1990s, consequently, Turks constituted a far higher percentage of the immigrant population in (city-)states like Bremen, Berlin, and North Rhine–Westphalia than in the south.

By the end of the decade, the Turkish-origin population in Germany comprised just under one-third of the immigrant-origin total and was by far the largest national group. Around 1.4 million (out of 2.5 million in all) had been in the country longer than eight years; almost half were women, and more than half were of the second and third immigrant generations (Sommer 1999). The number of Turks in Germany had grown since the immigration stoppage of the mid-1970s, first due to family reunification and later to the immigration of marriage partners from the homeland, between 30,000 and 40,000 annually (Sen 1999).

Germany had also signed labor agreements with Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968). The treaties with the two North African countries lay largely inactive until the 1980s. Immigration from the Maghreb into Germany has been more recent than immigration into France and the Low Countries. In January 1990, just under 100,000 Moroccans, Tunisians, and Algerians lived in Germany. The vast majority came to work, although the number of asylum seekers was climbing rapidly. Those contingents, albeit modest in absolute terms, constituted a significant share of the fast-growing Arabic-speaking population in Germany. They pointed to the ethnic diversification of Germany’s immigrants, a major demographic trend of the past decade. Another trend has been toward the socioeconomic differentiation of immigrant-origin populations, even if in Germany most of them have yet to shed their blue collar. Manufacturing, especially the metals industry, and construction have been the major employers of immigrant-origin workers. Everywhere, they have occupied the least-qualified positions (Krummbacher 1998).

**German Policy Evolution**

Once German integration policies moved beyond an initial reactive stage, they limited themselves largely to the structural dimension: education and job training, housing, and social welfare. Immigrants could be treated like individual workers in those sectors, and Germany registered true successes in
them. Ethnicity entered through the back door, however, as policies in the areas of political participation and social work were stimulating the development of ethnic identities.

Guest workers were by definition supposed to be temporary. The “rotation” principle dictated that they were to leave the FRG within a set period of time (normally two years) after their arrival and be replaced with new contract workers. This impracticable system did not last. Under pressure from employers, who bore the training costs, public officials suspended rotation in the early 1960s. Even then, the general assumption was that most of the foreigners would eventually return home. Any who did not would blend without a trace into German society, just as the “Ruhr Poles” and Italians of an earlier era had done (Murphy 1982). To ensure that nontaxing outcome, officials put in force a dispersal policy: when the percentage of foreigners in a given district grew too high—12 percent officially made for “overburdening”—no more could settle there (Cohn-Bendit and Schmid 1993, 111).

**Structural Integration**

By 1974, deteriorating economic conditions compelled German authorities to halt new immigration. Economic forces had converted the guest workers into residents, and their demands on the host society had changed drastically. Settling and integrating them became the expressed goal in Bonn. Restrictions against family reunification fell. As of 1978, immigrants could apply for an unlimited residency permit *(unbefristete Aufenthaltserlaubnis)* after five years in possession of a limited one, and a permanent residency permit *(Aufenthaltsberechtigung)* eight years after that, provided they met three conditions: adequate housing, according to local standards; mandatory school attendance for their children; and “sufficient” knowledge of the German language. Those engaged in gainful employment also needed an appropriate work permit. Exceedingly complex and changeable, the system has always included numerous exceptions and provisions for immigrants from different countries.

The federal government began appointing a commissioner for foreigners in 1978 to make the general guidelines of “aliens” policy more consistent across the country and to enhance the federal government’s role. The commissioners (who have all been women to date) eventually became the immigrants’ lobbyists within the government. Six of the eleven West German federal-states, together with a number of large cities, had introduced a commissioner before German unification. Then, in September 1979, the federal government’s adviser Heinz Kühn issued a memorandum that put the spotlight squarely on the immigrant-origin population’s integration into German society. Of particular concern was that of the “first and a half” (those who arrived as youngsters with their parents) and second immigrant generations, characterized ominously by the German Ministry of Labor as “social dynamite on a time fuse” (Radtke 1990, 29).
The question of who was to do the defusing turned into a source of fierce haggling between the different levels of government and political parties. Federal officials control the entry of immigrant workers, refugees, and asylum seekers into Germany. The federal-states (Länder) have responsibility for primary and secondary education, police, internal security, the administration of justice, and mass communication. In other areas, too, the federal-states have the last word, including issues relating to family unification and the deportation of rejected asylum seekers. The two levels of government jointly handle housing, higher education, and regional economic development, with the federal-states primarily responsible for implementation. Authorities at the federal-state level have had a margin of maneuver at their disposal that should not be overlooked. For instance, German nationality law, based since 1913 on blood ties (jus sanguinis), has set the bar high for immigrants intent on adopting German nationality. Beyond basic requirements on lengths of residency and fees, though, it has been up to the states to determine candidates’ worthiness.

The Kühn report ushered in a period when officials launched rearguard actions to boost structural indicators of immigrant integration. Thus a two-pronged strategy toward the education of guest workers’ children emerged: integration into the German system (meaning German-language instruction), and, given the inevitability of their departure, preparation for reintegration into homeland schools (and thus supplementary instruction in the mother tongue). Generally, policies in states run by the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands—SPD) shifted earlier and more insistently toward teaching German and targeting groups in order to address educational deficiencies.

Interpreted in terms of success within the German educational system, integration stayed out of reach nationwide. Students of immigrant stock (11.3 percent of all students in 1990) were overrepresented in those institutions that had gained the stigma as havens for the weaker pupils: the main schools (Hauptschule, 18.5 percent immigrant) and comprehensive schools (Gesamtschulen, 14.1 percent). The higher up one climbed on the educational ladder in Germany—the intermediate schools (Realschulen, 8 percent) and the college preparatory schools (Gymnasien, 5 percent)—the fewer immigrant-origin students one encountered. The same was true in the vocational branch (8.2 percent), as well as in Germany’s otherwise top-notch apprenticeship system. More youths of immigrant backgrounds failed to complete their formal studies and receive their diplomas. Their linguistic difficulties served as an excuse to shunt a large portion of them (almost 18 percent) into “special” schools for the learning disabled (Schmalz-Jacobsen 1992, 7–10).

As the numbers of immigrant-origin pupils increased, educational officials worried about their concentration in inner-city schools. A number of states introduced segregated classes, and several imposed formal quotas for
nonnational pupils. Even so, certain classrooms regularly wound up with concentrations of over 80 percent. Other states, meanwhile, introduced more positive programs, both targeted at immigrant-origin groups and general in scope, in the elementary, secondary, and vocational schools. Some of them worked better than others. Globally in Germany, however, there was steady improvement in most indicators of academic success in the 1980s and 1990s.

Education and training policies in Germany produced outcomes that were uneven yet far from catastrophic, and housing policies advanced the trend. Guest workers first lived in housing provided by employers before they and their families entered the broader market. With an enduring shortage of affordable units, that market revolved far more around apartment rentals than home ownership, and government intervention was less extensive than in countries like France and the Netherlands. Germany’s social housing regime entailed government intervention in the private market. Housing allowances, subsidizing renters as well as homeowners, long suffered from serious underutilization. Of equal or greater import in the 1970s and 1980s was public financial assistance for building construction, the provision of which turned the units concerned into social housing. Federal and federal-state governments shared funding responsibility, with the latter overseeing implementation. Local governments could add to the social housing stock as they saw fit and as their budgets permitted. A needs assessment at the time of occupancy determined eligibility, and a tenant whose income rose did not have to move out. In a tight market, such laxity misallocated units, even as it kept native-stock tenants from leaving. In addition, German authorities never encouraged the construction of large housing projects like those surrounding Belgian, Dutch, and French cities. Only a few complexes appeared in industrial cities like Hamburg, Bremen, and Cologne (Osenberg 1987).

The share of immigrant minorities in the population of particular cities and neighborhoods depended on the structure and quality of their housing stock. Immigrants were left with the most dilapidated units at the lowest reaches of the private and social-housing markets, scattered across neighborhoods next to Germans with similar socioeconomic characteristics (Blanc 1991). There were few neighborhoods and individual housing blocks where the native German population completely withdrew, and the spatial dimensions of poor neighborhoods were relatively modest. Segregation levels were thus lower in Germany than in its Belgian and Dutch neighbors (Neef 1992).

Undergirding the structural position of nonnationals was the support of German trade unions. As misgivings about the influx of cheap laborers gave way to acceptance, the German Trade Union Confederation (Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund—DGB) and in particular its largest member union, IG-Metall, displayed more dependable solidarity than most of their counterparts elsewhere in Europe (Schmitter Heisler 1983). Their loyalty sprang in no small measure from concern about undercutting their own position. Missing the
opportunity to organize immigrants under its aegis could weaken the DGB’s hand in neocorporatist bargaining with employers, which has stood at the heart of German social democracy. Immigrant participation in worker movements swelled as economic restructuring began to bite in the early and mid-1970s. The joint struggles cemented an alliance between immigrant-origin workers and the DGB and reduced anti-immigrant sentiment within that organization’s hierarchy—if not always among the rank and file. The practical advantages of union membership were undeniable to immigrants, whose membership rates climbed to the point where they exceeded those among native-stock workers. Immigrant-origin members of workers’ councils grew in number and visibility in factories across the country (Uchatius 1999).

With the trade unions leading the charge on behalf of immigrants, arguments over their presence shifted to “wars by proxy” in the social policy realm (Boos-Nünning and Schwarz 1991). In Germany, the land of jus sanguinis, the persistent legacy of ethnic nationhood made accession to formal citizenship difficult. Germany’s constitutional, administrative, and judicial systems offered protection to foreigners, devising a “compensatory” strategy to make up for the difficulties of attaining full membership. The trade unions insisted that nonnational laborers receive the same social rights and benefits as “native” workers. Germany’s social market economy, albeit always messier and more differentiated in practice than in many social science renderings, was firmly rooted in the inclusion of individuals through social and economic rights (Baldas, Deufel, and Schwalb 1988). Certain national groups enjoyed protections owing to bilateral treaties that the European Community (EC) signed with labor-exporting countries. Immigrants from Iberia and Greece picked up rights when their homelands joined the EC in the 1980s, and since then, European Union nationals resident in another member state have steadily approached the legal status of nationals. As for non-EU immigrant workers, the 1963 association agreement with Turkey and the 1978 cooperation agreements with the Maghreb countries of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco guaranteed them equal economic and social rights and equal treatment in the labor market. These arrangements helped prevent the development of “foreigner colonies” or ghettos and encouraged structural congruence.

Social Work and Political Integration

Alongside their actions aimed at immigrants’ structural integration as individuals and workers, however, German officials had accepted differentiation according to ethnic criteria. Despite widespread qualms about multiculturalism, the policy repertoire in social work and measures to effect political and cultural integration all involved ethnic categorization. This structuring contributed to the formulation and articulation of ethnic-based interests.

Germans have engaged in heated debates over multiculturalism, both at the abstract level and in their assessment of policies to contend with ethnic
diversity. Activists in church circles (Gaf 1990; Geissler 1991) and on the new political Left (Gaitanides 1992; Leggewie 1991) have compiled a disjointed laundry list of multicultural demands, including voting rights for resident nonnationals, affirmative action programs, workplace recognition of religious holidays, bilingual education, and so on. Reluctantly in the beginning, the bulk of the SPD eventually adopted a more or less liberal multicultural vision in principle, accepting of ethnicity on a temporary basis. The Greens, for their part, rallied to the cultural pluralist camp, adamant in their demands for ethnic groups' cultural autonomy.

German republicans lionized French nationality codes and their blending of the laws of blood and soil (Oberndörfer 1992), and the traditional left persisted in decrying as misplaced the notion that modern societies divide in the first instance according to the criterion of ethnic membership (Radtke 1990). Both factions rejected policies that endorsed ethnic identities. On that point, if no other, they were in agreement with the far right, which painted a dire picture of a multiethnic Germany, and even some politicians closer to the mainstream right.

While such disputes raged, ethnic-based strategies were developing into accepted practice by public and quasi-public institutions and actors. Liberal multicultural thinking was having an impact on concrete policies in the areas of education, social policy, and social work. In the education field, for example, some local school systems tried to create order out of daily chaos by making use of ethnic differences in preparatory and remedial classes. The same held true when they pegged students' family background and ethnocultural traits as the reason for their lack of scholastic achievement. The role of the German language turned into a major bone of contention (Bommes 1993).

German policymakers, meanwhile, oversaw a system of social welfare that actively constructed ethnic identities. Dominating social policy in Germany have been actors belonging neither to the state, narrowly defined, nor to the private sector. The state co-opted autonomous public-law associations, nonprofits that were awarded a legal preference in the fulfillment of social welfare objectives. These “free carriers” (freien Träger) took on the contours of a cartel at the federal level and exercised a monopoly at the local level.

Their roots lay in the confessional traditions of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, the Catholic solidarity principle, and the struggle against Marxism during the Wilhelminian Empire. After World War I, the Evangelical Lutheran Diakonisches Werk and the Roman Catholic Caritas were joined by the SPD-created Workers Welfare (Arbeiterwohlfahrt—AWO), the independent German Paritäre Welfare Confederation (Deutsche Paritätische Wohlfahrtsverband—DPWV), the Central Jewish Welfare Agency in Germany (Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland—ZWSJD), and the German Red Cross. After World War II, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, amenable to Christian churches’ influence on German politics, tipped the balance to-
ward “association welfare.” In 1961, just before his conservatives lost their absolute majority, they passed legislation that enabled the social welfare nonprofits to regain their keystone role, especially the three biggest peak associations, Caritas, Diakonisches Werk, and AWO. They, the German Red Cross, and the ZWSJD joined together in the Federal Working Committee of the Free Welfare Agencies. Germany’s Federal Administrative Court in Karlsruhe declared the subsidiarity principle to be constitutionally grounded in 1967 (Thränhardt 1983).

This “organized love of one’s neighbor” suited a country characterized by a decentralized state and a state-oriented civic society, with political parties a major force in each (Bauer and Diessenbacher 1984). Germany rebuilt, prosperity widened, and society underwent atomization. These processes created a sharpened demand for social services, and the nonprofit sector expanded concomitantly with the welfare state. Its reliance on the nonprofits was heavy, as, in turn, was those organizations’ dependence on the public purse. By the 1980s, Caritas alone had more employees than Siemens, Germany’s largest private industrial employer (Groth and Müller-Gazurek 1983). The complex, multidimensional nature of social policies defied attempts to describe them in terms of a simplistic state-society opposition. Even specialists found it difficult to navigate the system (Kowalski and Reiermann 1994).

The cozy world of social welfare provision came to cover immigrant-origin populations. Customized public services for them had neither the personnel nor the funding to fill all of the lacunae in general social agency offerings. The advantages of delegating work with immigrants to the large nonprofits were plain to federal officialdom. They performed a buffer and control function. They welcomed immigrants as a justification for further growth of the social services sector and, in the beginning, took on their new tasks in an unbureaucratic and voluntary manner.

When the arrangement became more formalized, it became necessary to divvy up the immigrants. Brushing aside other possible classifications—such as by alphabetical order, which is often the practice in German administrative offices, or by year of immigration, socioprofessional status, gender, generation, or policy area—federal and nonprofit officials decided to apportion immigrants according to predominant religious affiliation and, within that category, by national background. The ethnoreligious division resembled the “Big Three” nonprofits: Catholic, non-Catholic, non-Christian. Such a division of labor among the largest social welfare associations was implemented without any public discussion or legal codification. It was an outgrowth of the tradition of Catholic spiritual and social services for Italian and Polish foreign workers that arose in the nineteenth century. The Roman Catholic Caritas took over social work with Italians (1960), Spaniards (1961), Portuguese (1962), and Catholic Yugoslavs (1962). In 1960, when Greek workers began to be recruited, the welfare association of the Evangelical Lutheran Church,
Diakonisches Werk, volunteered to care for their welfare, as well as that of other Orthodox Christians (such as Serbs) and any Protestant immigrants. The secular, union-linked AWO agreed to work with immigrant workers from Turkey (1962), Tunisia (1965), and Morocco (1965). By express wish of the former Yugoslav government, AWO became “officially” responsible for its nationals’ social welfare needs in Germany in 1969, although Caritas continued to handle Catholic Croats and Slovenes in practice. In fact, it set up institutions for Greeks and other immigrants that “belonged” to its colleagues. There were few links between the multiple structures that developed (Puskeppeleit 1989).

Despite official refusal to view guest workers as ethnic minorities, social welfare work nonetheless included strategies explicitly targeted toward them as such. The strong connection between ethnicity, culture, and confession reinforced a distinction that was in the process of losing much of its import in a secularizing Germany and that was not an organizing principle in the immigrants’ homelands. Nor was it obvious at the time that Turks would come to represent the largest single national group in Germany. As a consequence, the financially weakest nonprofit, AWO, eventually became responsible for around half of the foreign workers from recruitment countries. The German Paritative Welfare Confederation—which in other policy areas grouped together alternative, unconventional organizations—was excluded from the arrangement (Stratman 1984).

In the 1960s, the demand was for technical counseling and job training for immigrant workers. Over time, “foreigners’ work” expanded to form a complex component of family and youth policies. The Big Three nonprofits set up social counseling offices, and they linked together pastoral and syndicalist work with social work. They came to see themselves as lobbyists for immigrants and other poor people, petitioning federal-states and federal officials within the corporatist system. From the start there were discussions among the nonprofits, state agencies, trade unions, employers’ organizations, churches, and local government associations. Funding came from the general federal budget, supplemented from the budgets for child and youth policies and by the states.

As pillars of the German establishment, Caritas, Diakonisches Werk, and AWO were party to the “instrumentalization of foreigners in the direction of the specific interests of the German organizational system” (Puskeppeleit and Thränhardt 1990, 168). The nonprofits established no participatory institutions for their immigrant charges and repeatedly refused to collaborate with immigrant associations. Given the large number of “customers,” social work was of necessity reactive. It created a cliental relationship, a bond of dependency on social workers that was promoted by their political contacts and access to expert information. Individual casework reigned supreme. Immigrant-origin social workers lacked influence and respect. They could not apply for professional certification and thus remained completely reliant on their inse-
cure positions with the social welfare nonprofits. As paterfamilias, each of them protected and spoke on behalf “its” deprived. Diakonisches Werk described itself explicitly as the “mouth of the dumb.” The face on the other side of the coin was that of a stern, moralistic master trainer: as “helpless beings,” immigrants required guidance (Puskeppeleit and Fränhardt 1990, 126).

This creation of client status gave rise to ethnic segmentation. Nationality-specific social work assumed a cultural homogeneity that ran up against very real cleavages within each national group. Watched over by German institutional gatekeepers, immigrants had little choice concerning which association they could turn to. Even a conservative Turk or Moroccan had no option but to be attended to by AWO, for example, just as agnostic or atheistic Italians, Portuguese, and Spaniards came under Caritas’ wing. Immigrants represented a resource in the competition for political entrée and funding. Nonprofits won prestige and resources, yet in the process they grew dependent on the public trough and sacrificed their own autonomy. With no wish to challenge the system or underwrite broader social conflicts, they constituted a “cartel of silence” (Filsinger, Hamburger, and Neubert 1983).

German nonprofits, therefore, acted as controlling mechanisms and political breakwaters. They occupied virtually the entirety of the associational space, discouraging autonomous mobilization among immigrant-origin populations. To the Big Three the granting of autonomy to the immigrants’ own associations meant endangering their own service monopoly. They habitually viewed such organizations as a barrier to successful social integration and as politically extreme—that is, Communist (see BDAG 1972). Regardless, immigrant associations increased in number and diversity as their communities became more deeply rooted in Germany. Left-wing labor movements, students, and trade unions opposed to homeland regimes were prominent in the beginning, followed by religious organizations. Much of this associational activity depended financially on homeland entities. Only in a handful of places did it receive official German support, and its legal status was unclear. Under the weight of the German institutional yoke, immigrants were being trained to structure themselves along ethnonational lines.

The same was true of policies to realize immigrants’ political integration. Inured to corporatist decision making, German officials recognized the risk run by ignoring minority points of view. The Basic Law does not exclude nonnaturalized immigrants from political rights. Rather, theirs have been limited to those considered human rights—free association, expression, and petition—except when they include threats or a menace to public order or national security. German supreme court justices in Karlsruhe stood in the way of several federal-state governments’ desire to extend local voting rights to resident non-EU foreigners. Hence, from the early 1970s consultative foreigners’ auxiliary councils (Ausländerbeiräte) turned up in many cities and several states to facilitate immigrants’ integration. Given the country’s federal system,
there has been variation in how these bodies have been organized, how their members have been selected, and how much latitude they have enjoyed. In the main, the mandates of these ersatz participatory structures evolved from furnishing officials with useful information about immigrants to speaking for them. A relic of earlier phases, representatives of trade unions, employers, social service agencies, the social welfare nonprofits, and other local institutions have sat on many of them—increasingly, in a nonvoting, consultative capacity. The advent of direct elections has lent more councils a broader and more immigrant makeup, but they have been no guarantee of a connection with the masses. In most places the absence of political party lists has restricted opportunities for meaningful influence. Without durable organizations standing behind council members, elected with an eye toward the policies and programs that they intend to advance, interest articulation and aggregation have rarely occurred (Hoffmann 1986).

Where they have been elected, immigrant-origin candidates have sometimes run as individuals. Far more often, the foreigners’ councils have been organized along ethnonational lines in an implicit presumption of immigrants as homogeneous groups. Accordingly, the councils have created tensions between and within national groups and have impeded solidarity among them. Close German ties with official Turkish organizations and recognition of their associational emanations have stoked Turkish-Kurdish conflict (Uebel 1999). The diversification of immigrant-origin populations has made ensuring representation for smaller national groups a thornier challenge.

Since immigrants have realized they have no chance of protecting their well-being by voting in elections to fill the foreigners’ councils, their participation rates, not surprisingly, have been low. They have been higher only where ethnic-based mobilization has gained salience and where ethnicity has become a resource. Frequently, in fact, council members have had to “self-ethnicize” in order to perform the functions they have been assigned. Such pigeonholing has resonated with host-society administrations, which, surprisingly, have chosen ethnicity as the way to organize the groups in question and confront the problems they are accused of posing. German officials have reacted with genuine surprise whenever council members have not divided along ethnonational lines (Puskeppeleit and Thränhardt 1990, 169). Like the schools, youth services, labor market, and legal system, the foreigners’ auxiliary councils have done more to sustain than to reduce ethnic identities.

Welfare State Restructuring

Taken together, Germany’s integration policies managed to produce a trend toward structural congruence, even as they lent meaning to ethnic divisions. As long as the German institutional system kept the lid on them, they were not visible. Economic crisis was threatening the status quo by the 1980s, however. Poverty was spreading and becoming linked with the presence of non-Euro-
pean immigrants. Cracks were showing in the system, and pent-up ethnic energies were able to assert themselves. Welfare state restructuring soon furthered those trends. Taking in decentralization, privatization, and delegation, and accompanied by notions of self-help and empowerment, the process released ethnicity from some of its institutional confines before the painful German unification brought matters to a head at the end of the 1980s.

The New Poverty

When that decade had dawned, foreign workers and their children still suffered from serious educational and training deficiencies, and they still lived in shoddier housing than their German coworkers. But all things considered, Germans patted themselves on the back for having avoided the immigration-related disconnection and conflict harrying their French and Belgian neighbors. Relatively speaking, structural indicators were inching toward congruency for the country’s millions of immigrant residents.

However, the oil shocks of the mid and late 1970s had heralded an economic sea change that was throwing the postwar system into turmoil. Unemployment levels rose precipitously. The quasi-public Federal Labor Office (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit—BfA) in Nuremberg oversees German unemployment benefits. Its regional offices manage a variety of programs relating to education, training, and rehabilitation. The unemployed must register there in order to receive both types of benefits for those out of work: unemployment insurance (providing a set percentage of income, linked to previous employment and drawable for up to a year, and funded by employer and employee contributions) and unemployment assistance (providing less generous support, means-tested, and funded out of general federal tax revenues). Unlike the insurance, unemployment assistance is not limited in time, although the modest amount of support it affords frequently leaves recipients below the income poverty line (Schmitter Heisler 1992).

Nationals and some resident immigrants in that situation are eligible for social assistance. Although federal laws and policies have governed this safety net of last resort in Germany, local governments must finance and administer it. There are two types of assistance: help in special life situations (cash and in-kind aid to overcome particularly difficult situations, including illness and mental and physical disability) and help for life subsistence (cash to guarantee a minimum material existence). Subsistence is defined in connection with a basket of goods, part of the prerequisites for the life “worthy of a human being” that German social assistance law sets as the minimal social standard (Deutscher Caritasverband 1992).

By the mid-1980s, the growth in joblessness, together with cutbacks in unemployment benefits and the tightening of eligibility rules, was turning Germany into a “two-thirds” society. That share was comfortable—two-tenths floated just above the poverty line and one-tenth fell below it. The country
appeared to be splitting into a prospering, high-tech South and a decaying, industrial North (Friedrichs, Häussermann, and Siebel 1986). Debates over the “new poverty” phenomenon echoed those over the urban underclass across the Atlantic (see Leibfried and Voges 1992).

Intense pressures were brought to bear on the social assistance system. Between 1973 and 1990, the number of people receiving help for life subsistence would more than triple to 2.3 million. Those receiving help in special life situations would grow by half to 1.5 million. The new poverty affected immigrant-origin populations disproportionately. Their lower incomes and shorter employment histories meant that they were less likely to receive unemployment insurance benefits, making them more dependent on social assistance. Secondary analyses of data drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel suggested that non-German nationality increased the likelihood of going on the dole. In 1973 the share of the resident foreign population on help for life subsistence was 0.4 percent, far below that of German natives at 1.5 percent. Between then and 1990, the immigrant share rose to 12.7 percent, compared to 4.3 percent among those of German stock. A new population of the poor had materialized: families with many children and an unemployed family head, the long-term unemployed, single-person households, and those of non-German origin (Deutscher Caritasverband 1992).

Erstwhile guest workers, their families, and their dependents had access to the full array of social citizenship rights, including unemployment benefits, housing support, and social assistance. German law stipulated that foreigners reliant on the latter could be deported, except those with a permanent residence permit. In practice, if non-EU immigrants drew social assistance for too long, authorities could invoke it as a reason not to renew their residency permit and thus lead eventually to their expulsion. Turks and North Africans were protected by the bilateral agreements that their homelands had signed with the EC.

Decentralization, Privatization, and Delegation

The 1980s proved wrenching for the poor, especially for immigrants, and for the German welfare state. Federal officials moved to overhaul it. Even though spending cuts drew the most attention, the impact on the organization and delivery of social services was more profound. Social-policy restructuring further weakened their social-control function, without reducing the role of ethnicity. The result was higher levels of political-cultural disconnection along ethnic lines.

In a slow struggle against entrenched interests, German governments had been chipping away at social spending for years. Rather than structural reform, the fight against unemployment in Germany proceeded first and foremost with piecemeal alterations in policies that had developed over the years by dint of a long, conflicted process of horse trading. The express aim of the reforms
was not to strip welfare provisions to the bone but to scale back government social spending to a “reasonable” level. Unhappily, reductions in unemployment compensation and assistance only fueled demands for social assistance. By closing down a number of local social assistance offices, authorities generated higher demand for more costly home visits (see Olk and Otto 1989).

If such cutting could cause upset, the other side of welfare state restructuring—decentralization, privatization, and delegation—garnered widespread applause. Groups from the left to the right celebrated the transfer of new responsibilities to the local level and to the private and nonprofit sectors. In those moves supporters saw a means of allowing progressive cities to function as “counter-powers” to the central state (Social Democrats) or laboratories of grassroots democracy (the Greens), of implementing the subsidiarity principle (Christian Democrats), or of reducing federal spending (budget-conscious politicians of all stripes).

At one level the rearranging involved the introduction of market forces, pure and simple. Federal funds for socially supported housing decreased from the 1980s on, for example, while those allocated for rental allowances increased along with unemployment rates. A minor yet perceptible trend toward home ownership manifested itself. Left to the forces of the market, though, a significant segment of the immigrant-origin population was living more marginalized lives in Germany’s big cities. Concentrations of poverty developed, characterized by old, substandard housing and an accumulation of social disadvantages. Coordinated social work and urban redevelopment had limited success in modulating such trends (see Cooke 1989).

Moves that lightened the load on federal coffers more often than not transferred it onto the backs of officials at other levels. Most seriously, the consequences of benefit cuts tended to fall to municipal governments in the form of heightened demand for social assistance. Because they did not have discretion over the amount of statutory entitlements, which were guaranteed by the federal-states, each German mark spent for social assistance was one not available for maintaining the streets or other local services. Municipal officials did exercise some leeway when it came to distributing one-off assistance (as with help in special life situations) and assuming rent payments, but those were far from their main expenditures.

Adding to the fragmentation aggravated by the decentralization of policy and the injection of market forces was the delegation of social policy formulation and implementation to the nonprofit sector. Given the traditional centrality of nonprofit associations in the German welfare state, what did delegation mean there? As far back as the late 1960s, people on the “new” left and the right, in the nonprofits and the budget offices, enthused over a vision of social policy that gave people more freedom of choice and a greater personal stake in their own well-being. With the big nonprofits’ standard operating procedures
coming under fire, the idea of substituting them with self-help organizations became a live option (von Kardoff 1989). Self-help became the stuff of dreams of grassroots democracy and responded to the allegedly demobilizing effects of the welfare state. Depending heavily on volunteer labor and monies deriving from lotteries and charitable giving, self-help also promised to deliver services more cheaply in a time of public belt-tightening (Kulbach and Wohlfahrt 1994).

The upshot was a full-blown crisis in social work circles by the early 1980s that upset the collaboration between German officialdom and the social welfare nonprofits in the area of immigrant integration. Traditionally heavy-handed methods were proving inadequate. Fewer and fewer immigrants were turning to the social welfare nonprofits for assistance, a conclusion borne out by opinion-polling data (see Ögelman 1999). Such estrangement forced the large associations to react. As early as 1980, Diakonisches Werk, its Greek client base dwindling, had preached that immigrants should be assigned to all available German social services. Quickly, the Big Three produced an array of conceptional proposals on how to modernize their social work and enhance their outreach to, among others, those of immigrant origin. They all came to the same basic conclusion: it was time to expend more energy actively defending marginalized people, which perforce would involve them in labor market, housing, and immigrant integration policies. When all was said and done, nationality-specific social services for foreigners had encouraged disconnection. Social work needed to be community action, encompassing the entire “life field” of immigrants and Germans alike. 

The new attitude had concrete policy implications. Immigrants would eventually gain the freedom to choose which welfare associations they could contact for assistance. Under the revamped approach the neighborhood became the spatial location where the development of new strategies and the preparation of immigrant-origin professionals took place. Pressures for problem-oriented work pushed out that organized along national-ethnic lines. Municipal and regional officials dispersed responsibility for immigrants to specific policy areas, with immigrant self-help organizations and initiative groups as frequent intermediaries. Holistic, community-based social work was seen as an “orchid” to nurture as long as there was money in the till (ISSAB 1989, 24). The old system had loosened its institutional grip, even if the nonprofits retained a position of honor within the German social welfare system.

There was in the end widespread verbal and material backing for a variety of self-help projects. These initiatives sometimes remained trapped on the edges of the system, but with all-around agreement on their value, they made inroads. Gradually, self-help developed into a sturdier pillar of German social policy. Dependence on public funding, however, did not diminish. Subsidies were available out of municipal budgets and the social security system. In ad-
dition to financial support, governments helped self-help through infrastructural support, in the guise of informational and contact centers. The relationship between self-help groups and political and administrative institutions depended on a number of contingent factors, such as the quality of communication, bureaucratic openness, strategic capacity, and the tightness of networks. To work productively with authorities, many self-help movements aped the social welfare nonprofits in forming local “umbrella” associations. In the process of joining policymaking, they thus risked becoming marked by the same top-heavy structuring. Strong associational life in Germany has always been close to the state and distinctly neocorporatist (Anheier et al. 1998). Often, when self-help made an appearance in municipal planning, it amounted to little more than a handy, self-serving label applied to a range of activities that had developed of their own accord.

When it did manage to have the emancipatory quality it was intended to, on the other hand, self-help had unintended outcomes. Authorities bestowing public subsidies had to decide which groups to assist or to stimulate, and their choices could produce competition, antagonisms, and open conflict between established social service providers and self-help groups. Immigrants’ own associations came to look like the key to empowerment, important arenas within which to build social and political participation and the skills and self-confidence to fit into German society. These self-help groups were in the position to care for “their” national group. The cultural and recreational services they offered were the first to win official recognition and acceptance. Eventually, these associations started to substitute for more traditional forms of social assistance, absent a corresponding share in decision-making power. The outcome was an ungainly conglomeration of programs and projects, marked by aggravated ethnic fragmentation.

The Turkish associational spectrum, for example, ran the gamut from left-wing organizations of workers, to intellectuals, to nationalists and other right-wingers. Ideological, ethnic, and religious identities originated in the fatherland—home to some forty-seven distinct ethnic groups—and were then channeled through the German institutional matrix, which tried to “package” them into a smaller number of more manageable ethnic categories (compare Özcan 1989). The Turkish government moved to counter Kurdish separatism and, fiercely secular since the days of Atatürk, the spread of radical Islam. Anyone even calling for a dialogue between Kurds and Turkish authorities found him- or herself quickly pilloried by conservative Turkish media in Germany. The Turkish government’s religious office, the Diyanet, joined consular officials in facilitating the formation of “acceptable” religious organizations across Germany. In the early 1980s, a new wave of political refugees and asylum seekers found their way from Turkey to Europe, among them party and trade union leaders of all political persuasions. German officialdom’s de facto adoption of official Turkish policies toward minorities and opposition groups
polarized their members and encouraged more extreme elements in them to come to the fore.

Homeland influence varied—and was allowed to vary, in line with German foreign policy commitments—across the national groups and fed organizational differences. Generally, it was difficult for immigrants to forget their status as nonnationals or their own ethnonational identity. For many, their homeland’s membership in (or special relationship with) the EU put a spotlight on those divisions. Regional, religious, and ideological homeland institutions predominated within the Italian-origin community. Spaniards, for their part, rallied to defend their interests vis-à-vis the Spanish and German governments. Organizing around cleavages brought from Spain, they constructed dense networks of local associations that concentrated on cultural maintenance and mother tongue instruction. The same was true of Greeks, among whom even left-wing activists championed the so-called national schools, a position shared with conservative German officials. Smaller, newer non-European groups like the Moroccans and Tunisians rapidly forged associational networks that were tightly connected to consulates and homeland-based workers’ and conservative nationalist movements.

Although those national groups mobilized most frequently at the local level, they experienced pressure to come together in broader organizations. As early as the 1970s and throughout the 1980s, German-style immigrant associative federations were forming. It was the only way to win legitimacy in the eyes of German officialdom and have a hope of exercising pressure on the German policymaking system. Less than successful attempts were made at multietnic collaboration at the federal and federal-state levels.

In a range of policy areas linked to immigrant integration, officials latched onto ethnic-based tactics when trying to solve problems. In enforcing immigrants’ social rights, the policymaking system employed ethnic markers to define who did and did not benefit from preferential treatment. The system thereby provided political entrepreneurs the perfect ethnic rallying points to fight on behalf of potential beneficiaries or losers. Also given a new war cry were far-right, nationalist political parties. For the first time since the days of the Grand Coalition between the Social and Christian Democrats twenty years before, right-wing extremists were showing up on the country’s political radar screens. In the latter half of the 1980s, the Republicans and the German People’s Union were making a breakthrough. In Bremen in 1987 and then in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Hamburg, Hesse, and Schleswig-Holstein, small, extreme-right parties flirted with and occasionally exceeded the 5 percent threshold necessary to win representation.

Unification

Then the arduous process of unification fanned the flames and forced alterations in social policymaking that, in turn, kindled more ethnic strife. Poverty
had already taken on an ethnic cast, and the welfare states’ control function had already started to slip when the two Germanys came together after forty years apart in 1989–1990. Ethnic conflict quickly grew into a major challenge. The years following the fall of the wall saw an upsurge in anti-immigrant violence and legislation that tightened up asylum laws and made it easier to deport unwanted foreigners. Policy decisions during the rush to unite Germany conspired to bring ethnicity even more to the fore and lent it decidedly negative connotations.

The federal government sought to limit immigration after unification. It pushed through a new law on aliens in 1990, which both stressed the principle of equal rights for immigrants and their free access to the welfare state and refined rules governing family reunification and settlement. Subsequent legal modifications in the early 1990s also facilitated naturalization, especially for immigrant-origin youths. Dual nationality was impossible in most instances, however, and adults not born in the country still had to wait fifteen years before applying for formal citizenship.

With its extremely liberal asylum law, an atonement for Nazi crimes, the “old” FRG was Europe’s top recipient of would-be political refugees by a wide margin, processing more than three-quarters of the continental total. Anti-refugee sentiment escalated to dangerous levels with the new, postunification influx from the east. To lower tensions and to connect Germany’s two parts, the federal government required all of the states old and new, to welcome a share of asylum seekers corresponding to the relative population of each. Thus roughly 20 percent of applicants were allotted to eastern Germany.

The policy was disastrous. Socially and institutionally, eastern Germany was unprepared for the tidal wave of problems that crashed down on it. The new federal-states had never had to deal with such a population. Municipal governments faced the sudden and difficult challenge of developing social offices of a hitherto unknown type, finding and training appropriate personnel to staff them, administering policies completely new to them, and explaining the new benefits to dazed citizens. In addition to the asylum seekers, eastern Germany received one-fifth of the hundreds of thousands of “ethnic” Germans from what was once the Soviet bloc (Aussiedler and Spätaussiedler) who flowed into the country in the early 1990s. Thanks to the Basic Law (Article 116) and a 1953 law on refugees and expellees, those of German ancestry and those having lived in German territory within its 1937 borders could lay claim to the status of “statutory Germans.” They were thus entitled to immigrate to the FRG, automatically receiving German nationality (while maintaining their former nationality) and significant cash and in-kind assistance. Jewish migrants from the former Soviet Union, moreover, usually entered Germany along its eastern frontier, further stretching the limits of local institutions (Bade 1994).

Immediately upon their arrival, asylum seekers in the east headed to five
regionalized Central Processing Areas (Zentrale Anlaufstellen—ZAST), where they underwent initial processing before being sent out to communities. The fallout from such policies became glaringly apparent in the Lichtenhagen neighborhood on the outskirts of Rostock. Over a six-night period in August 1992, right-wing extremist youths clashed with riot police and attacked the overcrowded ZAST for the new federal-state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.

Key aspects of East German institutional life had evaporated virtually overnight. Unemployment, of course, was the most conspicuous sign of the former German Democratic Republic’s problematical merger with the FRG. Police forces also fell to a tenth of their previous strength in many places and crime rose. Just as seriously, the social infrastructure, especially that for young people, crumbled when generous East German state subsidies disappeared. Security was gone. The strain on the western German institutions charged with absorbing the east became visible as well.

Hate crimes spread, targeting immigrants, homosexuals, Jews, and the disabled. The majority of these attacks, which had been occurring regularly since the early 1980s, took place in what had been West Germany. Assaults by skinheads on an Italian in Saarlouis and on two sub-Saharan Africans in Saarbrücken in autumn 1991 were just the most publicized of the many incidents there. A firebomb killed three Turkish workers in the western city of Mölln, near Hamburg, in November 1992. The next year, there was an even more murderous attack in Solingen. Clashes between Turks and Kurds gained in frequency and intensity in many western cities. In the former German Democratic Republic, where the increase in violence was more spectacular, the most unloved foreigners were the Turks, hardly any of whom lived there (Ireland 1997). Ethnic profiling was proving context dependent.

Germany’s response was to tighten its asylum law in July 1993. After months of heated discussions, the major political parties reached an agreement to drop the guarantee of an individual vetting of asylum requests. Group identities won further value from the new focus on national origin. Applications from people arriving in Germany from other EU member states or “safe third countries” could be rejected without a court hearing. A simplified procedure was to deal with asylum requests from countries deemed “free of persecution.” The federal government stripped the access to special status from central European ethnic Germans, since it determined that they came from countries where persecution could not exist. That same law set an annual ethnic German quota of 220,000, which in any case was never met after 1995. After they peaked at nearly 400,000 in 1990, the yearly numbers declined steadily to just more than 100,000. Benefits had gradually shrunk (Zuwanderungskommission 2001).

The ethnic tensions of the unification period, therefore, strengthened the forces unleashed by earlier changes in the prevailing institutional setup. Under attack, literally in some cases, immigrants fell back on—and were being as-
signed to—the ethnic identities that social policies and social work had cultivated. Their structural position situation was affected, negatively for the most part, by policy decisions in the years following. A minority of immigrant-origin residents managed to attain socioeconomic mobility and fit themselves into German social and political institutions. The bulk of them nursed their ethnic identities as political-cultural disconnection grew.

**Immigrant Structural Integration**

Immigrants’ position in the labor and housing markets and the educational and vocational systems made few gains in the wake of unification. Almost 22 percent of immigrants in the old federal-states were unemployed in the mid-1990s, three times the native German rate (Norman 1998). From 1988 to 1993, the rate of immigrants drawing social assistance mushroomed to 184 out of every 1,000 immigrants, compared to only 62 out of every 1,000 Germans (Kanther 1996). Squeezed by ballooning deficits, federal officials continued to put the brakes on social spending.

A key factor in avoiding residential segregation, social housing was another victim of the times. Once the typical thirty-five-year mortgage was paid off on units that had received construction assistance, they were free to go onto the private market. As so much of socially supported housing was built between the late 1950s and early 1960s, a huge reduction in the supply of such units began to hit in the early 1990s. The postunification housing shortage and the government’s withdrawal from the housing market had the potential of reversing the integrative accomplishments of past policies.

The rise and decline of the so-called secondary labor market also illustrated the wrenching effects of the public sector’s retreat. Federal labor legislation provided local authorities with the funds to place the unemployed in temporary positions through Work Creation Mechanisms (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmassnahmen—ABM) designed for those who risked long-term unemployment. Under the make-work scheme, the local government would locate work, and the BfA would pay the wages. The majority of the jobs created were with municipal or other public or quasi-public organizations like social welfare agencies, foundations, and neighborhood associations. Organizations across the country became dangerously dependent on those positions. Their high price tag became a major sticking point in negotiations over the Solidarity Pact—the federal aid package for the east—in 1993. Financially strapped, the Bonn government decided to downsize the program. Mass demonstrations in spring 1993 did not force a reintroduction of the heavy subsidies, although a truncated version endured.

German unification created a trial and distraction for the social welfare nonprofits, too. Rebuilding the east siphoned off many of their resources and much of their attention. Caritas, Diakonisches Werk, AWO, the DPWV, and the Red Cross rushed in to replace the shattered East German welfare structure.
The unification treaty extended the subsidiarity principle to the new federal-states. After five years, the nonprofits had put some ten thousand institutions in place. The newfound responsibilities safeguarded the associations’ position as the hub of the German welfare state, even as they stretched their resources and diverted them from immigrant-related concerns. Chafing against the paternalism of the two confessional nonprofits, several immigrant associations took advantage of the diversion and “defected” from them to align with the DPWV, which had emerged as a prime institutional buttress for immigrant self-help groups. Meanwhile, charges built that AWO had come under the domination of elements close to the Ankara government to such a degree that Kurdish, Islamist, pan-Turkish, and other “minority” activists could not profitably utilize it (Ögelman 1999).

**Immigrant Political-Cultural Integration**

These developments paralleled a drift away from congruence in the political and cultural realms. Thanks to the structuring of the German political and legal systems, autonomous immigrant interest articulation had become most likely in associations bringing together people of the same ethnonational background. Although modulated and filtered by the German institutional setup, policies and institutions in the immigrants’ homelands also mattered and similarly fortified ethnic identities. The Turkish government’s relaxation of bans on non-Turkish languages and minority associations, echoed by greater liberalism from its counterparts in North Africa, spurred identity politics among ethnic and religious subcultures (Faist 1998).

That said, entrenched German policymaking circles did not usually incorporate newer, less organized interests like those of immigrant-origin groups. Interactions between the social welfare nonprofits and local immigrant leaders in many places did not go beyond irregular, noninstitutionalized contacts. The BfA for a while even excluded immigrant associations from those eligible for ABM positions in the field of social work. Immigrants responded by retreating into ethnic shells, pulling back from the German institutional system. They directed themselves more to their own support systems and less to the services offered by Caritas, Diakonisches Werk, and AWO. In 1985 more than a quarter of Turks and a fifth of Italians had turned to them when they had personal problems. Ten years later, the shares had plummeted to 4.5 percent and 2.6 percent (Ögelman 1999). Also commonly taken as an indicator of disengagement was the sharp increase in homeland newspaper, radio, and television consumption among all immigrant-origin populations, even European ones. Since their use of German media was not declining inversely, the implications of that development were open to interpretation (Uebel 1999).

Less debatable was that the popularity of self-help and empowerment fueled pressures to differentiate. In the cities and neighborhoods where Germany’s newly decentralized, privatized, and delegated social policies were
deployed, their dissipating impact was evident. Internecine rivalry and tussles between immigrant associations and traditional welfare providers erupted as services were progressively converted to short-term project funding. The competition pitted ethnically and nonethnically organized projects against each other.

There were few indications of a connection between immigrant associational activity and a “ghettoized” existence. In fact, such involvement often correlated with stronger social networks and more effective problem-solving skills (Santel 2002). Immigrant associations, however, did follow a decidedly ethnic logic that ran counter to most German hopes: for example, only 11 percent of immigrant associations in North Rhine–Westphalia crossed national lines in 1999 (MASSKS 1999). By the 1990s, many of the immigrant associational federations were still operational, but they were weak and unstable. Largely the preserve of first-generation elites, formal organizations attracted the active participation of a small and declining minority of immigrants.

Such associations were failing to reach immigrant workers’ children. They turned toward groups of similar ages and ethnic backgrounds as the forces of structural integration in Germany’s urban centers languished. Disillusioned immigrant-origin youths shunned organizations and institutions that used to link their communities to German society and turned inward for protection. “When people realize that their efforts on behalf of this society no longer count,” the federal commissioner for foreigners remarked, “then they quite naturally retreat back into their cocoons” (Schmalz-Jacobsen 1995, 28). Immigrant associations, dominated by the immigrant-worker generation, were failing to incorporate succeeding ones.

This phenomenon affected Turks and North Africans above all. Analysis of Marplan Institute surveys measuring immigrants’ concerns and fears confirmed young non-Europeans’ growing isolation. Among Turks this “self-ghettoization” generated support for the far-left Dev Sol movement, the nationalist Gray Wolves, and the Islamist Milli Görüs organization, among others outside the mainstream. Nationalism among groups that were minorities in Turkey, in particular the Alevites and Kurds, led to attacks against Turkish institutions on German soil. 10 Ethnic-based political parties sprang up, such as the Democratic Party of Germany, founded in 1995 by young Germans of Turkish extraction with ties to the government in Ankara. In cities across the country, other immigrant-origin young people were singing in rock bands of their predicament, caught between Germany and their parents’ homeland. These “Kanak-Kids” contributed to a cultural flowering reminiscent of the Beur movement in France. Their unofficial spokesman, Feridun Zaimoglu, became known as the “Malcolm X of Germany’s Turks” (see Zaimoglu 1995). Thomas Schwarz has drawn on a range of scholarly studies in laying out the potential for conflict among such immigrant-origin youths (Schwarz 1992).
The German institutional setup retained enough structuring power to hinder a true social movement or widespread rioting, but German authorities did not have the tools to fashion the sort of peak associations among Turkish, North African, and other minority populations with which they were used to dealing. They were stymied above all by Muslims’ refusal to coalesce and adhere to an “appropriate” organizational configuration. The German system’s back-door strengthening of ethnic and national identities fed rivalries with their roots in the Islamic world. Combined with the sheer diversity of thought among Muslims, they prevented the emergence of any organization capable of representing the entire faith.

German officials wanted just such an organization. The church-state relationship in the country is a matter for both the federal and federal-state governments. They must be neutral and equal in their treatment of all faiths, but the federal government pays officials of recognized faiths, subsidizes the upkeep and restoration of church buildings, and collects taxes in the name of each religious community that it then channels back to it. The system necessitates a representative council for each religion affected. Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Orthodoxy, and Judaism have all won recognition as corporate bodies. Partly due to their own actions, German officials were less able to find or create an equivalent for Islam, compared to their Dutch and Belgian neighbors.

Muslims were simply too fragmented for concerted sociopolitical action. National communities reflected German labor recruitment agreements and refugee and asylum policies. Of the 2.7 million Muslims in Germany in 1995, three-quarters were Turks. But there were also almost 82,000 Moroccans, more than 26,000 Tunisians, and sizable numbers of Muslims from Afghanistan, Algeria, Bosnia Herzegovina, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Turkistan, not to mention the various minorities within Turkey. There were likewise some 100,000 German converts to Islam (Sen 1998).

Compounding national divisions was a secular-religious cleavage. Many Islamists opposed to the secular system in Turkey came to Germany in the 1970s and became influential. Their groups established Islamic cultural centers in Münster and Cologne in the early 1970s. An estimated 100,000 Turkish children had attended the Quranic courses offered by various religious groups by decade’s end. Another religious group, represented by the (eventually banned) Islamist Welfare Party in Turkey, founded a national organization in Cologne in 1977 by pulling together some 250 local organizations with more than 25,000 members. The Turkish state’s Diyanet responded in the early 1980s by establishing a union of religious establishments that followed Ankara’s official secularist line. Although a latecomer, it quickly attracted over 60 percent of the mosque associations in Germany. Other such umbrella associations formed as well for radical and moderate Islamists, nationalists, Alevites, Muslim Kurds, students, and mystical sects. Multinational federations
existed, but they were weak. Mosques serving the population of North African origin fell almost entirely under control of homeland governments, who watched anxiously as Algeria slid into civil war.

Radical Islam eventually replaced Kurdish terrorism as immigration’s biggest perceived danger to Germany. Fears of Islamic parallel societies appeared misplaced (compare Heitmeyer, Schröder, and Müller 1997). The networks of Islamist cells that developed across the country never involved more than a miniscule minority of Germany’s Muslims. The German center-right nevertheless evinced a visceral rejection of radical Islam, and on the left, concern about human and especially women’s rights under Islam was voiced. Authorities in Baden-Württemberg required an Afghan-origin teacher to remove her hijab—a headscarf worn by some Muslim women—in the classroom, deeming it both a “political symbol” and a “symbol of cultural isolation” (Sommer 1998). (The Federal Administrative Court would reverse the federal-state’s decision late in 2003.) Many women from Turkey and North Africa had never worn a hijab in the homeland and were taken aback when Germans took their lack of one as evidence of the “progress” that resulted from living in a “modern” society (Kirbach 1999).

In the absence of a clear federal policy on mosques, the extent to which the religious practices of Muslims figured in urban planning depended on federal-state and city officials. Muslims maintained complicated, context-specific links with ethnic-specific and German associational networks. This was true even of associations linked to mosques, which found it impossible to offer educational and social welfare services to the Muslim population in isolation from other institutions. In the neighborhoods it was prosaic issues like the call to prayer, gender relations, and the ritual slaughtering of animals that caused the most conflict between Muslims and their fellow residents. Surveys suggested that religiosity was higher among older Muslims. Fewer younger people described themselves as religious, but among those who did, connections were stronger with more extreme forms of Islam (Sen 2002).

Muslim parents requested Islamic religious instruction for their children from the beginning of their settlement in Germany. North Rhine–Westphalia was the first to introduce such programs. They took place in the context of mother tongue instruction under the auspices of German school officials, who had responsibility for the curriculum. Bavaria, Hesse, Lower Saxony, and Rhineland-Palatinate adopted similar models. Teaching materials came straight from Turkey and were adapted by school authorities and Islamic associations. Hopes of introducing instruction in Arabic ran aground on Turkish complaints. In the late 1990s, officials in North Rhine–Westphalia determined that the diversification of that state’s Muslim population dictated that such Islamic classes take place in German. Unresolved was the issue of where to find sufficient numbers of qualified, German-speaking teachers (Bukta 2000). A second model had teachers selected, paid, and sent for five-year tours
by the Turkish Ministry of Education and Diyanet. This approach was followed in Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein, and Baden-Württemberg. Participation, again, was voluntary and the instruction in Turkish (Sen 1998). Everywhere, the training was not to indoctrinate but to transmit knowledge about religious traditions, and it drew its legal basis from an explicit provision in the Basic Law.

The effects of ethnic structuring, visible in the integration of the second and subsequent immigrant generations and Muslims, continued to affect the relationship between the German political system and immigrant-origin populations overall. It was never clear which representatives, if any, could truly speak on their behalf. The preeminent analyst of the foreigners’ auxiliary councils, Lutz Hoffmann, has argued that some of them became “little more than a venue through which established homeland-oriented organizations” could pursue their own “particularized goals” (Hoffmann 1997, 11). In a number of cities by the 1990s, Turks were occupying a disproportionate number of seats on foreigners’ auxiliary councils, increasingly dismissed as “Turkish councils.” Islamic lists soon came to outpoll the traditionally dominant left-leaning ones among Turks and North Africans across Germany. At the same time, turnout in elections to the councils was anemic. Opinion polls conducted among immigrant-origin populations suggested that few respondents, regardless of national origin, were positively predisposed toward the bodies. Only just over a third of Turks and just under a third of Italians in Germany were even aware of their existence (Ögelman 1999).

The immigrant-origin population was also pulling back from other forms of sociopolitical participation in Germany. Most notably, the share of union members fell between 1980 and 1995 among Turkish men (from 58 percent to 31 percent) and Italian men (from 44 percent to 25 percent). Meanwhile, 26 percent of Turks were members of a homeland association or club, compared to 14 percent who had joined a German one. For Italians, the national group that should have been the best integrated, the corresponding figures were 22.2 percent in a German organization and 21.5 percent in an Italian one (Ögelman 1999).

As for expressed sympathy for German political parties, support among residents of immigrant origin was strongest for the SPD and, to a lesser degree, the Greens; many conservative Turks backed the Christian Democratic Party (Christdemokratische Union—CDU). Only the CDU’s Bavarian partner, the Christian Social Union (Christlich Soziale Union—CSU), has snubbed nonnational members, and all of the other major German parties set up caucuslike organizations to link those of immigrant origin with native-stock German members (ZfT 1994). Regardless, only 5.8 percent of Turks and 2.6 percent of Italians belonged to a political party of any kind in 1995; and for 82.6 percent of the former and 41.1 percent of the latter, that party was a
homeland movement. A Marplan Institute survey in 1999 indicated that only a barely measurable 0.4 percent of Turks, Spaniards, Italians, former Yugoslavs, and Greeks resident in western Germany belonged to a German political party (Santel 2002).

While the SPD and the CDU have each received support within immigrant-origin populations, neither has made more than timid moves to integrate those of non-European origin into their structures. They have made it easy for the Greens to don the mantle of inclusion in this respect. Already in 1987, a woman of Turkish extraction from Kreuzberg became the first such minority to enter a federal-state parliament—on the Alternative List. A decade later, immigrant-origin Green deputies were sitting in the parliaments of Berlin, Hamburg, North Rhine–Westphalia, and Hesse. The Greens’ freestanding caucus for young people of immigrant origin, Immigrün, accounted for 10 percent of the party’s federal parliamentary representation by 1999 (Seidel-Pielen 1999). All told, however, the ranks of elected immigrant-origin officials were thin, even for those with roots in Southern Europe. German institutions exercised a powerful social control function that shaped collective identities among those with or without a German passport and kept the latter contingent in a subordinate position within the German system. The relaxing of some of that control encouraged ethnic-based participation, of a type not always welcomed by host-society policymakers.

With its social insurance and assistance system Germany had crafted a security net for all, including nonnationals, which had contributed in an important way to social harmony. Hand in hand with other policies, the social welfare state suppressed conflicts and provided ballast for German society. Cutting it back and orienting it toward a more market-oriented strategy may well have saved employers money and heartened budgeteers. But those gains were purchased at the cost of weakening its social and political stabilizing functions. Social policy became fragmented and dispersed over a wide variety of public, semipublic, and private providers, and there was even less transparency than before. The policy shake-up impaired governments’ ability to steer developments. The encouragement of self-help, aimed at unlocking groups’ independent organizational potential, loosened the ties that bound them to the public sector and its management.

In a postunification context of rising crime rates, that weakened capacity came to epitomize a more serious loss of social control. Media reports and right-wing politicians associated “immigrant” with “delinquency.” A blizzard of studies purported either to prove or to disprove that equation. The data were contradictory in many respects; yet while the number of Germans accused of crimes seemed to be holding steady, that of nonnationals rose dramatically. With controls in place on socioeconomic background, demographic structure, and types of crime, the figures narrowed dramatically. Traditional
guest worker groups,” said Ernst-Heinrich Ahlf, acting head of the Federal
Crime Office, “are often even less prone to commit crimes than Germans”
(quoted in Klonovsky 1994, 73).

Two groups were responsible for a majority of crimes committed by
nonnationals: organized bands of foreign criminals operating in the FRG and
immigrant youths whose integration into the host society had failed. Concern-
ing the latter, immigrant-dominated youth gangs had sprung up in Germany
in the first half of the 1980s. By the time unification occurred, they had mul-
tiplied and diversified. Roaming the streets of downtrodden urban neighbor-
hoods, their members took part in robberies, murders, shakedowns, and an-
gry confrontations with Aussiedler gangs, anti-immigrant skinheads, and the
police. It was not just the tabloid press that began to speak ominously of the
“Los Angeles syndrome” (Leggewie and Senocak 1993).

The vicious attacks against immigrants and refugees that rocked Germany
in the years following unification galvanized youths of non-European origin.
Within Germany’s Turkish-origin community, the fight against racism lent
unity, and talk of a “Turkish minority” was heard for the first time (Kastoryano
1996). The growing immigrant assertiveness could occasionally turn violent,
as after the 1993 firebombing in Solingen. Groups of young people of Turkish
background, joined by German supporters, rampaged through the streets for
several nights, breaking shop windows and smashing parked cars.

Because it had taken a relatively long time for ethnic conflict to manifest
itself in Germany, due to the effectiveness of structural integration policies and
social control, policymakers were caught flat-footed. Some of them echoed
former New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani in proclaiming “zero toler-
ance” for crime. Others campaigned for community policing and educational
and recreational projects. Missing from most talk about security were the fears
of the immigrant-origin population itself in the face of violence and crime.

The FRG anchored a general ban against racial discrimination in its legal
system but not, as in many other countries, as a right, plain and simple. Fol-
lowing the same logic that prompted help for self-help, officials attributed
anti-immigrant sentiment in part to the weak response of civil society. Popu-
lar outrage at acts of hatred built, and after every high-profile incident, hun-
dreds of thousands of Germans took to the streets carrying anti-hate banners
and candles. Broader, steady involvement was slower in coming. Public rela-
tions campaigns to raise popular awareness and to encourage bystanders to
intervene became a cornerstone of the policy response in many federal-states
and cities.

The Policy Response
Socioeconomic changes were producing a marginalized population, a segment
of whose members grew more heavily dependent on the publicly maintained
social infrastructure. The incomplete integration of immigrants, their ethnic
and class diversification, the housing shortage, and the proliferation of the unemployed and those on social assistance were overwhelming the problem-solving capacity of the public and nonprofit sectors. Rising ethnic tensions, along with indications that immigrant-origin residents might be retreating into their ethnic shells, provoked a shift away from ethnic-specific tactics and toward problem-specific ones. The latter were organized by sector or administrative department, which worked against a unified battle against poverty more typical of France and Belgian Wallonia.

Social policy restructuring had meant different ways of conceptualizing service delivery. The demand for finely tuned, contextually appropriate social work escalated. The new goal was to diversify services and agents within the social welfare system, so as to match better the needs of a diverse population. In an era of tight funding, the only way to reassert social control was to marshal forces through network building at the street level. These measures encompassed formal and informal service providers and built bridges to self-help movements. Existing networks among friends and neighbors, voluntary associations, churches, schools and parents’ committees, businesses, and meeting places created by the immigrants themselves afforded essential support and stability. At other times, though, networks could prevent mobility. Immigrant-origin youths, for example, could find themselves in counterproductive company, reacting in rebellion and crime. Ethnic identity could ossify into ethnic isolation if connections to the rest of society were absent.

The role of so-called ethnic businesses was uncertain. There were already 150,000 “foreign entrepreneurs” in Germany by the mid-1990s. They generated more than 200,000 jobs, almost a third filled by German nationals, and 41 billion marks in revenue in 1997. To cite just one noteworthy example, some 720 million Döner pita sandwiches were being consumed annually in Germany at immigrant-run restaurants, representing more spending than the McDonald’s, Burger King, and Wienerwald chains combined (Özoguz 1999). For some commentators this entrepreneurial boom represented a sign of immigrants’ advancing integration. The Center for Turkish Studies polled 1,600 Turkish enterprises and found that fully 81 percent of them met the formal requirements to train apprentices, although only 10 percent were doing so (Sen 1999). Pessimists, on the contrary, pointed to the limited opportunities and discrimination in the German labor market that compelled those of immigrant origin to strike out on their own.

Policies and institutions mold networks, meaning that the decentralization and delegation of the welfare state had an impact on immigrant communities’ resources in this regard—on their “ethnic capital,” in other words (see Borjas 1999). The official objective in Germany was to accentuate the steadying aspects of immigrant networks, fitting them into local and national German ones. Inclusiveness, it was hoped, could prevent the substitution of particularistic (that is, ethnic) resources for universal ones. Whether network building
actually managed to compensate for lost social control depended on the success of the intercultural opening in social services. German policymakers borrowed the principle from the Netherlands, along with their techniques (regularly, in turn, borrowed from the United States and the United Kingdom) in the areas of education, professional training, and conflict resolution (see Schröter 1997).

One way to harness the energies inherent in ethnic identities was by adding to the ranks of immigrant-origin personnel in public services. Those tailored for immigrants were too often second class in terms of staff qualifications and skills. Much was made of their separate but unequal status, with some critics even speaking of “social work apartheid” (Gaitanides 1998, 59). More minorities had to be hired, German officials broadly concluded, and German-stock workers had to undergo specialized training. That task fell largely under the purview of subnational policymakers. In some federal-states and cities, there was an uptick in the number of immigrant-origin social workers, educators, and legal and nurses’ aides. Yet in others, as well as overall in Germany, the results disappointed.

Open to nonnationals were the minority of public-sector positions that did not come under the civil servants’ statute. Given their pivotal function in assuring social control, police forces were of central concern. Only German nationals can perform high-level administrative functions, make arrests, and search cars and houses, even if federal-states can make exceptions if they identify an urgent administrative necessity. In the mid-1990s, only 100 out of 230,000 people employed by police departments in Germany were foreigners (Stein 1998). Hoping to remedy that situation and anticipating participants’ eventual naturalization, Baden-Württemberg, Bremen, Schleswig-Holstein, and Bavaria decided to admit immigrant-origin youths into midlevel civil service training programs in the mid-1990s.

By the end of the decade, Germany presented a very mixed picture. The creativity, goodwill, and determination to build a multiethnic society that characterized some localities were absent in others. Policy variation across Germany had only widened under welfare state restructuring.

Nor did far-right parties present a unified picture of strength. They did not pose a significant political threat to their mainstream counterparts nationally, but they did gain between 8 and 10 percent of the vote in elections in Baden-Württemberg as the 1990s drew to a close. From the mid-1980s on, their average vote shares in Bavaria, Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, and Schleswig-Holstein had surpassed the national average of around 3 percent and occasionally came close to clearing the 5 percent hurdle to win representation. Elsewhere, they fared miserably, as in North Rhine–Westphalia, where they failed to win even 1 percent of the vote in 1998. That same year, the German People’s Union garnered nearly 13 percent in state elections in Saxony-Anhalt (Karapin 1998).
While indicators of structural integration displayed equally significant regional and local divergences, the overall trend line did not always encourage optimism. Dr. Faruk Sen, director of Essen’s Center for Turkish Studies, pointed out that 14 percent of Germany’s Turks had purchased their home by the late 1990s, evidence of their intention to stay in Germany. Housing segregation remained less intense than elsewhere in continental Europe, where levels were highest in Belgium, followed by the Netherlands (see Musterd and Ostendorf 1998). Over the decade in Germany, however, levels of residential concentration and segregation of immigrant-origin populations had grown, markedly for Turks and North Africans. According to the EU, the unemployment gap between immigrants and Germans had widened from 0.7 percent in 1979 to 8.5 percent in 1998. General knowledge of the German language had not improved. Immigrant-origin students continued to be severely underrepresented at the higher levels of the educational system. They even received part of the blame for the country’s poor ranking in 2001 by the Program for International Student Assessment. The newest immigrants suffered from higher rates of poverty than native-stock populations, and longer-term immigrants exhibited rates that were not much better (Hanesch 2001).

That said, Germany was undergoing potentially substantial positive changes. Naturalization had become easier for the children of guest workers in 1990, 1993, and 1994. After passionate political wrangling, the new SPD-led federal governing coalition managed to update German nationality laws. Latching onto a longstanding proposal from the liberal Free Democrats, the SPD cut a compromise that allowed the children of immigrants to hold both German and their parents’ nationality at age sixteen, when one parent had lived in the country for at least eight years and had obtained a “stable” residency permit (unlimited or permanent). They had to decide on one nationality by age twenty-three. Eligible young people had to have lived for at least eight years in the country and to have attended German schools for at least six years. Dual status would be tolerated only when it was impossible to renounce the nationality of the homeland. Residency requirements were shortened, and the entire procedure was streamlined. Although the associated fees actually went up, the acquisition of German nationality was no longer blocked to an applicant who had received unemployment or social assistance (Münz and Ulrich 1999). While such reforms may seem paltry compared to developments in the Netherlands and Belgium, access to nationality in Germany was now flowing from a territorial principle and not simply from the veins.

Formal citizenship laws have been only part of the story. At least as important has been their implementation. A number of decisions regarding immigration and naturalization were up to local and state officials, which explained why naturalization rates fluctuated according to federal-state, city, and national background (normally being higher for Europeans). Nonnationals con-
victed of a crime were prevented from entertaining any possibility of obtaining a German passport. The new legislation yielded higher naturalization rates, but they ran behind governmental expectations.

By 1999, more than two-thirds of Germany’s immigrants had lived in the country for more than ten years and 15 percent for more than twenty years. Many former guest workers were becoming grandparents. Every ninth baby born in Germany was Afro-German, Turko-German, or Polish-German, although use of those hyphenated labels could provoke angst. “Just as in America, it is identity that will be fought over, no longer a second or third passport,” one journalist warned (A. Böhm 1999, 13). His prediction was born out in spring 2002. After a prolonged period of political bickering and controversy, a new immigration law passed whose express intention was to authorize firms in the information technologies, construction, and health care industries to call on skilled immigrant labor when desired. It also marked the first time that German legislation recognized that the country had become a land of immigration. The 2002 law was thrown out by the supreme court in Karlsruhe that December on procedural grounds.

German policymakers’ growing acceptance of a permanent immigrant-origin presence still contrasted with their discomfort with the ethnic identities that their policies had helped to create, however unintentionally. By the turn of the century, some public figures were openly fretting over “ongoing ghettoization, rising criminality, and burgeoning fundamentalism” (Margo- lina 1998). Concerns were raised over gender and class relations within immigrant-origin communities, the anti-Semitic rantings found in many Turkish- and Arabic-language publications, and the sometimes violent internecine divisions that rent immigrant-origin populations. Sporadic eruptions of anti-immigrant activity marred Germany’s all-important international image and hurt business interests.

There was general agreement that there had not been enough emphasis on the duties that accompanied the rights accruing to permanent residents in Germany. Cultural identity, even in a multicultural society, had its limits: everyone had to respect universal human rights as developed by and within European civilization. If ethnic identities could promote integration over the long haul, as some scholars contended, they could only do so if a clear transition to the labor market and eventual political incorporation were possible and if guarantees of equal treatment were in place. It followed, then, that instead of a separate system to intervene on immigrants’ behalf, the need was for concepts that took them into consideration, dealing with them separately at first, perhaps, but then integrating them into a more global social planning vision. It was less a matter of opposing targeted and general measures than of ensuring that the former permitted efficient access to the latter. Rather than true liberal neutrality, the vision was thus closer to a liberal multicultural one. People from other countries and cultures could retain their cultural identity if
they wished. They had to respect fundamental principles like the equality of men and women and the freedom of expression, though, as well as master the German language.

Popular arguments have stressed the mobilizing effects that racism, welfare chauvinism, and in-born ethnic proclivities had on immigrant-origin populations. Changes in the organization and implementation of social policies would seem to have had a stronger impact in Germany. This finding jibes with interpretations that have attributed renewed minority political action in the United States to attacks against social programs in the 1980s and 1990s and in Australia to moves away from ethnic-based welfare delivery, both of which allegedly provoked a reversal of earlier co-optation (Erie 1987; Jupp and Kabala 1993). Similarly, the German welfare state’s restructuring had major consequences for Germany’s minority populations. Their self-appointed leaders obtained logistical, financial, and moral support from officials to take charge of “their” communities.

Self-help contributed to political-cultural disconnection and to conflict. What emerged were groups and movements that reflected the opportunities and confines of the political and institutional context. Nationality-based restrictions and a stringent naturalization regime conspired to keep those of immigrant origin out of public-sector employment. Such exclusion curbed their political incorporation and prevented the erection of an American-style ethnoracial management “regime” (compare Reed 1995). Changes in that direction, coming after decades of demobilizing nonprofit tutelage, generated friction and intergroup and interethnic discord. Immigrant influence and political incorporation remained limited. Subsequently, officials strove to bring about congruence with policies that blended self-help with social control. They aimed to encourage and harness the energies of immigrant-origin groups and other elements in civil society while preserving social harmony—and, critics charged, the primacy of German culture.

To verify the causal impact of policies and welfare state restructuring, it is imperative to move to local analysis. With social policy shifting down to that level, already significant subnational variation in Germany grew more pronounced. Cities offer opportunities to appraise the relative force of institutional, ethnic, and other factors. Beyond such theoretical concerns, immigration scholarship should not neglect to consider just how diverse working-class families have interacted in the neighborhoods in which they live and struggle side by side. It is to those issues that the following chapter turns.