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January 1992
360 pages  

6 x 9
9780822985334
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Arms for the Horn
U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953–1991
Lefebvre, Jeffrey
Through massive documentation and extensive interviewing, Jeffrey A. Lefebvre explains what price the United States has paid for its relations with two weak and vulnerable arms recipients in the Horn of Africa.

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Jeffrey A. Lefebvre is associate professor of political science at the University of Connecticut, Stamford.
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Political Science/US
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Using a great power-small power theoretical approach and advancing a supplier-recipient barganing model, Jeffery Lefebvre attempts to explain what the United States has paid for its relations with two weak and vulnerable arms recipients in the Horn of Africa. Through massive documentation and extensive interviewing, Lefebvre sorts through the confusions and shifts of the United States’ post-World War II relations with Ethiopia and Somalia, two primary antagonists in the Horn of Africa. He consulted State Department, Pentagon, and AID officials, congressional staffers, current and former ambassadors, and Ethiopian and Somali government advisers. The story of U.S. arms transfers to northeast Africa is tangled and complex. In 1953, 1960, and 1964-66, the United States entered into various arms provision deals with Ethiopia, spurred by the Soviet-sponsored buildup in the region. Policy changed in the 1970s: Nixon refused a large aid request in 1973, and in 1977 Carter ended Ethiopia’s military aid on human rights grounds and denied aid to Somalia during the 1977-78 Ogaden War. Reversing this policy, the Reagan administration extended military aid to Somalia despite its aggressive moves against Ethiopia. Changes in U.S. relations and the revolution in Somalia have altered the picture once more. Jeffery Lefebvre concludes that U.S. diplomacy in northeast Africa has been overly influenced by a cold war mentality. In their obsession with countering Soviet pressure in the Third World, Washington decision makers exposed U.S. interests to unnecessary risks and given far too much for value received during four decades of vacillating and misguided foreign policy. Arms for the Horn should interest all concerned with arms transfer issues and security studies, as well as specialist in Africa and the Middle East.
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“Jeffrey Lefebvre's book is an impressive piece of scholarship that offers the best analysis to date of US foreign policy toward the Horn of Africa. . . . A wide-ranging analysis of policy debates at three separate levels of the policymaking establishment-the White House, the bureaucracies of the executive branch, and Congress-makes this book unique within the general literature. . . . Definitely a must for scholars and policymakers alike.”—Middle East Journal

“This is a meticulously researched and exhaustively annotated case-study of US security policy in a key region of the Third World.”—International Affairs

“An impressive piece of theoretically informed scholarship. . . . The primary purpose of the book is to clarify the ways influence is wielded in 'great power supplier-small power recipient' relationships. . . . Especially intriguing for Horn of Africa specialists is Lefebvre's careful attention to describing US policies within the context of Middle Eastern politics, particularly the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.”—Third World Quarterly


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